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Las preguntas que no podemos contestar son las que
ma´s nos ensen˜an. Nos ensen˜an a pensar. Si le das a
alguien una respuesta, lo u´nico que obtiene es cierta
informacio´n. Pero si le das una pregunta, e´l buscara´
sus propias respuestas.
El Temor de un Hombre Sabio
Patrick Rothfuss
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Resumen
La teor´ıa de juegos y otros paradigmas de toma de decisiones en grupo, ve´ase Gib-
bons [1992], se han considerado durante mucho tiempo inadecuados en la mayor´ıa
de aplicaciones al ana´lisis de riesgos. Sin embargo, gracias al apremio por tener en
cuenta las estrategias de los adversarios en contextos como la pol´ıtica antiterrorista,
la competencia econo´mica o la ciberseguridad, ha surgido un creciente intere´s en
estas metodolog´ıas otrora descartadas.
El Ana´lisis de Riesgos Adversarios (ARA) [R´ıos Insua et al., 2009] es un marco
emergente para el apoyo a un decisor que se enfrenta a oponentes en situaciones
de conflicto cuyas consecuencias son aleatorias y determinadas por las acciones de
todos los agentes involucrados. El ARA brinda ayuda prescriptiva y unilateral al
decisor, maximizando su utilidad esperada mientras las decisiones de sus adversar-
ios se tratan como variables aleatorias. Para encontrar su mejor plan de accio´n,
el ARA modeliza y resuelve los problemas de toma de decisiones de los oponentes,
bajo suposiciones sobre su racionalidad, introduciendo distribuciones de probabili-
dad subjetivas en todas las cantidades inciertas y, de esta forma, encontrando una
prediccio´n sobre cada una de sus elecciones. A veces, la estimacio´n de dichas dis-
tribuciones de probabilidad puede conducir a una jerarqu´ıa de problemas de toma
de decisiones anidados, como se describe en R´ıos y R´ıos Insua [2012], de forma
vinculada al concepto de razonamiento de nivel k [Stahl y Wilson, 1995].
En contraste con los enfoques de teor´ıa de juegos habituales, el ARA no asume
las esta´ndar, pero poco realistas al menos en aplicaciones de seguridad, hipo´tesis
de conocimiento comu´n, criticadas por ejemplo en Hargreaves-Heap y Varoufakis
[1995] o Raiffa et al. [2002], segu´n las cuales los agentes comparten informacio´n
sobre sus creencias sobre las utilidades y probabilidades de cada uno. As´ı mismo,
ampl´ıa el espectro limitado de los conceptos de solucio´n y racionalidades ligados
a los equilibrios de Nash y nociones derivadas comprendidas dentro del paradigma
actual de la teor´ıa de juegos (no-cooperativos).
El objeto de esta tesis doctoral, titulada Contribuciones al Ana´lisis de Riesgos Ad-
versarios, es proporcionar nuevos modelos en el contexto del ARA. A fin de lograr
esto, se cubren tres objetivos principales: (O1) el desarrollo de me´todos de repre-
sentacio´n en ARA; (O2) la mejora de la modelizacio´n del razonamiento estrate´gico;
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y (O3) la implementacio´n de modelos ARA.
Los resultados comprenden un enfoque algor´ıtmico ARA para evaluar diagramas
de influencia bi-agente propios (Objetivo O1), en el cual se apoya al decisor em-
pleando una estrategia de razonamiento de nivel 2 y se consideran interacciones
secuenciales y simulta´neas generales; una perspectiva ARA sobre co´mo gestionar
la incertidumbre de concepto (Objetivo O2), incluyendo los fundamentos de una
teor´ıa de decisio´n estad´ıstica adversaria que engloba un amplio conjunto de proble-
mas estad´ısticos relevantes; y una solucio´n ARA para el problema de contraste de
hipo´tesis con adversarios (Objetivo O3), extendido a un modelo de aceptacio´n de
lotes con observaciones parciales en oposicio´n a la premisa de informacio´n completa
en la estructura ba´sica.
A partir de los contenidos de esta tesis doctoral se han elaborado los siguientes
cuatro art´ıculos en diversos estados de publicacio´n:
Gonza´lez-Ortega, J.; R´ıos Insua, D. & Cano, J. (2018). Adversarial risk
analysis for bi-agent influence diagrams: An algorithmic approach. European
Journal of Operational Research, en prensa, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.
2018.09.015.
Gonza´lez-Ortega, J.; R´ıos Insua, D.; Ruggeri, F. & Soyer, R. (esp. 2019).
Hypothesis testing in presence of adversaries. Enviado a The American Statisti-
cian.
R´ıos Insua, D.; Banks, D.L.; R´ıos, J. & Gonza´lez-Ortega, J. (2017). Ad-
versarial risk analysis. En Wiley StatsRef: Statistics Reference Online, https:
//doi.org/10.1002/9781118445112.stat07972.
R´ıos Insua, D.; Gonza´lez-Ortega, J.; Banks, D.L. & R´ıos, J. (2018). Con-
cept uncertainty in adversarial statistical decision theory. En The Mathematics of
the Uncertain: A Tribute to Pedro Gil, 2018 ed., Springer, Cham, Suiza, 527–542.
Abstract
Game theory and other group decision-making paradigms, see Gibbons [1992], have
been regarded for a long time inadequate in most risk analysis applications. How-
ever, thanks to the urge to take into account the strategies of adversaries in contexts
such as counterterrorism, economic competition or cybersecurity, a growing interest
on these once dismissed methodologies has arisen.
Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) [R´ıos Insua et al., 2009] is an emergent framework
for supporting a decision-maker (she) who faces opponents (he/they) in conflict sit-
uations for which the consequences are random and determined by all interacting
agents’ actions. ARA provides one-sided prescriptive help to the decision-maker,
maximising her expected utility while treating her adversaries’ decisions as random
variables. To find her best course of action, ARA models and solves the opponents’
own decision-making problems, under assumptions about their rationality, introduc-
ing subjective probability distributions on all uncertain quantities and, thus, finding
a forecast over each of their choices. Sometimes the assessment of such probabil-
ity distributions may lead to a hierarchy of nested decision-making problems, as
described in R´ıos and R´ıos Insua [2012], which is related to the concept of level-k
thinking [Stahl and Wilson, 1995].
In contrast to usual game-theoretic approaches, ARA does not assume the standard,
but unrealistic at least in security applications, common knowledge assumptions,
criticised in e.g. Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis [1995] or Raiffa et al. [2002], ac-
cording to which the agents share information about their beliefs of each other’s
utilities and probabilities. Besides, it broadens the limited scope of solution con-
cepts and rationalities associated with Nash equilibria and derived notions within
the current paradigm of (non-cooperative) game theory.
The aim of this PhD thesis, titled Contributions to Adversarial Risk Analysis, is
to provide new models in the context of ARA. In order to achieve this, three main
objectives are covered: (O1) the development of representation methods in ARA;
(O2) the enhancement of the modelling of strategic reasoning; and (O3) the imple-
mentation of ARA models.
The results comprise an ARA algorithmic approach to evaluate proper bi-agent influ-
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ence diagrams (Objective O1), in which the decision-maker is supported employing
a level-2 thinking strategy and general sequential and simultaneous interactions are
considered; an ARA perspective on how to handle concept uncertainty (Objective
O2), including the foundations of an adversarial statistical decision theory that en-
compasses an extensive set of relevant statistical problems; and an ARA solution to
the adversarial hypothesis testing problem (Objective O3), extended to a batch ac-
ceptance model with partial observations as opposed to the assumption of complete
information in the basic structure.
From the contents of this PhD thesis the following four papers have been elaborated
under diverse publishing states:
Gonza´lez-Ortega, J.; R´ıos Insua, D. & Cano, J. (2018). Adversarial risk
analysis for bi-agent influence diagrams: An algorithmic approach. European
Journal of Operational Research, in press, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.
2018.09.015.
Gonza´lez-Ortega, J.; R´ıos Insua, D.; Ruggeri, F. & Soyer, R. (exp. 2019).
Hypothesis testing in presence of adversaries. Submitted to The American Statis-
tician.
R´ıos Insua, D.; Banks, D.L.; R´ıos, J. & Gonza´lez-Ortega, J. (2017). Ad-
versarial risk analysis. In Wiley StatsRef: Statistics Reference Online, https:
//doi.org/10.1002/9781118445112.stat07972.
R´ıos Insua, D.; Gonza´lez-Ortega, J.; Banks, D.L. & R´ıos, J. (2018). Con-
cept uncertainty in adversarial statistical decision theory. In The Mathematics
of the Uncertain: A Tribute to Pedro Gil, 2018 ed., Springer, Cham, Switzerland,
527–542.
Chapter 1
Introduction
We live in a competitive world. Moreover, in a competitive positioning world where
everything is relative and our success entails someone’s defeat. From a young age
we are taught that there are winners and there are losers; we are taught there are
1st, 2nd and 3rd places in competitions. We are encouraged to compete with others
and outscore everyone else.
Yet, this is not just a contemporary attitude. Chapter 4 of On the Origin of Species
[Darwin, 1859] already mentions “natural selection, or the survival of the fittest”.
That is, the better adapted for the immediate, local environment individuals are,
the more likely they are to survive against the competitive nature of the world.
Accordingly, our day to day life provides many competitive situations we have to
constantly deal with: our professional career choices; a wide variety of retailers
offering all sorts of products, qualities and prices; different social media struggling
to draw our attention... Furthermore, security, politics, environmental regulation
and disease control are all examples of areas in which multiple agents with distinct
goals collide while pursuing their own interests.
These may lead to cooperative or non-cooperative circumstances. Within cooper-
ative conditions, groups of agents (“coalitions”) that compete between them are
formed due to the existence of external enforcement of cooperative behaviour. In
opposition, a non-cooperative context arises when there is either no possibility to
forge alliances or all agreements are self-enforcing, that is, they stand as long as the
counterparts believe the agreement is mutually beneficial and is not breached by
either party.
Recent events such as terrorist attacks or economic crises have stressed the need
for decision-makers to take into account the strategies of their opponents in conflict
situations. The classic approach in mathematics and economics to such problems
has been (non-cooperative) game theory [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944].
1
2 Introduction
1.1 Game theory
For decades, game theory and other group decision-making paradigms, see Gibbons
[1992], have been considered of little use in practical risk management problems.
However, this point of view has recently become less preponderating because there
has been: (i) a mathematical sophistication of key business sectors which is now
being used to define adversary-aware strategies for competitive decisions in market-
ing, auctions and other areas; (ii) an increase in regulatory legislation to balance,
in a transparent and credible way, competing interests such as safety, growth and
environmental impact; (iii) a substantial demand of public investment in protective
responses to high-profile terrorist attacks with a major concern on their effective-
ness; and (iv) an acquaintance of random and potentially large financial penalties
for myopic protection in cybersecurity.
Game theory is a rich discipline which has been, and still is, thoroughly studied,
but is not adequate for the complexity of many real-world applications. A main
drawback of this methodology is its underlying common knowledge assumptions,
criticised in e.g. Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis [1995] or Raiffa et al. [2002]. Most
versions of non-cooperative game theory assume that adversaries know not only
their own payoffs, preferences, beliefs and possible actions, but also those of their
opponents. When there is uncertainty in the game, it is typically assumed that
players have common probabilities or, at least, a joint probability distribution over
their types known to all of them, as in games of incomplete information (Bayesian
games) [Harsanyi, 1967]. These common knowledge assumptions allow for a sym-
metric joint normative analysis in which players maximise their expected utilities,
and expect other players to do the same. Their decisions can then be anticipated
and predicted through Bayes-Nash equilibria and related refinements. However, in
contexts such as counterterrorism or cybersecurity, players will not generally have
so much knowledge about their opponents.
The other main objection derives from the fact that classical game theory assumes
perfect rationality, so that players are regarded as remarkably intelligent and capable
of framing and solving extremely complicated rational arguments to come up with
the most adequate solution. On one hand, it is quite obvious that nobody would
play chess in the same way against a ten year old kid as against Magnus Carlsen,
but rather play with respect to the opponent’s skills and game style. The amount of
effort and acceptable risk depends upon how strong, competent and experienced the
adversary seems to be. On the other hand, human beings have only a limited amount
of time, knowledge, memory and resources available when making rational choices,
which calls for bounded rationality [Gigerenzer and Selten, 2000] instead. This has
mainly been incorporated to game theory, as reviewed in Conlisk [1996] for economic
theory, through satisficing an optimising procedures like suboptimization, heuristics,
evolutionary approaches or deliberation, and also by means of hierarchical thinking
theories such as level-k thinking [Stahl and Wilson, 1995] and cognitive hierarchy
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Camerer et al. [2004]. However, all these methods still rely to some extent on
common knowledge assumptions and relate to debatable equilibria solution concepts.
1.2 Decision analysis
An alternative to game theory for dealing with conflict situations may be found
in decision analysis. In the context of strategic opponents, it was simultaneously
proposed by Raiffa [1982] and Kadane and Larkey [1982]. Developed from Bayesian
statistics, it presumes that decision-makers seek to maximise their expected utility
or, equivalently, minimise their expected loss. This results in a fundamentally dif-
ferent solution concept to that of the Nash equilibrium prevalent in game theory,
which assumes that each player knows the equilibrium strategies of the other players
and no player has anything to gain by independently changing their own strategy.
Decision analysis is Bayesian in that it requires decision-makers to assess probability
distributions over their opponents’ actions. In most settings, the frequentist defi-
nition of probability is untenable, as there is no prospect of repeated independent
trials. Hence, decision-analysts typically use personal probabilities, in the Savage
[1954] sense, reflecting their subjective beliefs about the likely actions of the other
agents.
However, decision analysis in conflict situations is not exempt of controversy. It was
deemed contrary to the spirit of game theory by Harsanyi [1982], arguing that prob-
ability assessment of the adversaries’ actions ought to be based upon an analysis
of their rational behaviour, and not upon their actual behaviour in similar games
nor upon judgements about their knowledge, motives or strategic capacity. In addi-
tion, Myerson [1991] challenged the difficulty derived from trying to determine the
subjective probability distribution over the other players’ strategies devising how
they conceive our own strategy and adapt to it, which could be the preamble of a
potentially infinite recursive problem in which we think what they would think that
we think they think...
In decision analysis, the problem is considered from the standpoint of a single agent
(she), solely using her beliefs and knowledge, rather than trying to provide a solution
to all agents’ problems simultaneously. The supported decision-maker is assumed
to have: (i) subjective conditional probabilities over the outcome(s) for every set
of possible choices; (ii) perfect knowledge of her own utility function; and (iii) a
subjective probability over the actions of each opponent. These subjective beliefs
held by the agent regarding the moves of her adversaries (he/they) pose the major
difficulty in implementing a decision analysis. When credible intelligence about the
opponents is available, it becomes an extremely valuable input. However, this is
often either unavailable or insufficient, so some kind of game-theoretic reasoning
4 Introduction
might be convenient to model the decision-maker’s uncertainty about the other
agents’ actions.
Traditional decision analysis has not explicitly addressed how to use a strategic per-
spective to construct one’s personal probabilities. Though Kadane [2009] advises
Bayesians to express their uncertainty on other players’ choices through probabili-
ties, he gives no prescription for how to arise them from a combination of strategic
analysis of the game and whatever knowledge they may have of their opponents. To
fill that gap, adversarial risk analysis has been conceived.
1.3 Adversarial risk analysis
Among all methodologies for conflict situations comprehended under the scope of
the decision analysis field, this PhD thesis focuses on the so called Adversarial Risk
Analysis (ARA) approach [Rı´os Insua et al., 2009]. The ARA framework stems from
observations in Parnell et al. [2007] and is founded on the idea that the analyst should
build a model for her adversaries’ decision-making processes. Within those models,
she would solve the problem from the perspective of each opponent, introducing
subjective probability distributions on all unknown quantities, so as to obtain a
forecast over the actions of each of them. Those distributions would then enable the
analyst to maximise her expected utility.
There are many ways in which these models can be developed, depending on how
the adversaries’ thinking is devised. Again, in the counterterrorism context, the
decision-maker might study historical terrorist attempts and assume that the ter-
rorists’ probabilities and utilities are related to those of their predecessors. Alter-
natively, she may analyse the terrorists’ previous public statements to assess their
utility from successful attacks and infer their chances of success. If she believes
they are irrational, she might base the model on random behaviour treating them
much as natural hazards; whilst if she considers them rational, she could presume
they will maximise their expected utility or, in case of being extremely risk averse,
minimise their worst-case outcome. She may even consider that they resort to ARA
too, mirroring her analysis. In any case, the decision-maker could assign a subjective
probability to each option, expressing her uncertainty about the kind of terrorists
she faces, and use a mixture model to describe their reasoning.
ARA provides a way forward to game theory with respect to common knowledge
assumptions, as they are no longer required, with just one decision-maker being sup-
ported against all other agents employing her own perspective and subjective beliefs.
However, the distinguishing feature of ARA is that it emphasises the advantage of
building a model for the strategic reasoning of an opponent. Essentially, ARA is
an attempt to combine both strategic reasoning about adversaries and probabilistic
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treatment of aleatory outcomes. It is an emerging perspective that has attractive
features in counterterrorism issues, as described in R´ıos Insua et al. [2009] and Mer-
rick and Parnell [2011], though it has many more potential applications. Additional
insights on the combination of risk analysis and game theory can be found in e.g. Cox
Jr. [2009].
1.4 State of the art
Research in ARA has mainly focused on the resolution of specific problems through
which general models have been extrapolated. In this way, relatively simple ARA
models with basic sequences of defence and attack movements have been developed.
This PhD thesis covers two main lines of research. The first one is to continue with
the actual research strategy in ARA, contributing to the development of a com-
prehensive and generic ARA framework which may be applied to specific problems
in different areas such as counterterrorism, cybersecurity or adversarial classifica-
tion. The second one explores diverse rationality paradigms that may be used for
adversaries and how to model them.
In this section, preceding relevant results in both lines of research will be covered
to lay the foundation of the work in this PhD thesis. Specific open questions are
raised and the significance of the ARA framework is highlighted.
1.4.1 Representation methods
As mentioned in Section 1.3, the ARA approach towards non-cooperative games
is based on supporting a single agent in her decision-making problem by building
a model for each of her opponents’ strategies, incorporating uncertainty through
probability distributions. To do so, the game-theoretic structure of the problem
must be exploited and different representation methods are found in the literature.
Standard game representations, both the normal matrix form and the extensive
game tree form [Luce and Raiffa, 1957], are perhaps the most frequently used and
well-known methods. They succeed in dealing with simple problems, yet grow ex-
ponentially with the number of variables and cannot cope with complex models.
Furthermore, they conceal the underlying structure of chance and decision variables
which obscures both the decision-making process and communication. Therefore,
they are inadequate to an ARA approach.
Probabilistic graphical models [Pearl, 1988] solve this problem using a directed graph
structure, where the nodes represent variables and the edges the direct dependence of
one variable on another, making explicit the conditional independence properties of
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the variables. These graphs are called probabilistic or Bayesian networks and have
clear and formal semantics that define them as a representation of a probability
distribution over the state space specified by the variables.
A natural extension of Bayesian networks to the decision-theoretic framework are
Influence Diagrams (IDs) [Miller et al., 1976]. In addition to chance variables, IDs
include decision variables, whose value the decision-maker chooses as part of her
strategy, and utility variables, which evaluate the expected utility of the resulting
outcomes. In his landmark paper, Shachter [1986] developed an algorithm capa-
ble of evaluating any proper ID, determining the optimal policy for its decisions,
and proposed extending the computation of optimal decision policies in IDs to the
multi-agent case as a critically important problem. So far, this suggestion has been
confronted from a (non-cooperative) game-theoretic perspective through problem
decomposition strategies relying on decision independence concepts, e.g. employing
conditional independence [Smith, 1996] or strategic independence [La Mura, 2000],
but specially stemming from Koller and Milch [2003] who introduced Multi-Agent
Influence Diagrams (MAIDs) and provided algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in
problems modelled as such using the notions of strategic relevance and s-reachability.
The problem has not been fully assessed from the ARA viewpoint.
Specific cases dealing with protection from intelligent threats such as anti-IED de-
fence in routing problems [Wang and Banks, 2011] or preventing ships from piracy
risks [Sevillano et al., 2012] have been modelled and solved with an ARA approach.
Banks et al. [2015] provide a broad review of applications in a variety of contexts.
These and other applications have been dealt with relatively simple ARA models
with basic sequences of attack and defence movements. Indeed, a number of tem-
plates which may be viewed as basic building blocks for general security risk analysis
problems can be identified, as in Brown et al. [2006], Zhuang and Bier [2007], Brown
et al. [2008] or Hausken [2011]. They differ in the way and order in which attack and
defence actions take place within the global sequence of decisions and events, as well
as in the information revealed. Figure 1.1 presents five of these basic templates, with
self-explanatory names: (a) the Sequential Defend-Attack (Seq. D-A) model; (b) the
Sequential Attack-Defend (Seq. A-D) model; (c) the Simultaneous Defend-Attack
(Sim. D-A) model; (d) the Sequential Defend-Attack-Defend (Seq. D-A-D) model;
and, finally, (e) the Sequential Defend-Attack with Private Information (Seq. D-A
with PI) model. They are covered in full detail in R´ıos and R´ıos Insua [2012] and
R´ıos Insua et al. [2013].
Beyond these templates, general adversarial problems between two agents in which
complex interactions are allowed, typically consisting of intermingled sequential and
simultaneous movements spanning across the relevant planning period, need yet to
be considered. This PhD thesis provides an algorithmic approach to solve (evalu-
ate) general bi-agent adversarial problems from an ARA perspective using Bi-Agent
Influence Diagrams (BAIDs).
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(c) Sim. D-A
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(d) Seq. D-A-D
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uD uA
V
(e) Seq. D-A with PI
Figure 1.1: BAIDs for five template models
1.4.2 Rationality paradigms
The key aspect of ARA, in contrast to the standard game-theoretic approach, is its
usage of a model for the strategic reasoning of the opponents, that is, the adversarial
component. Understanding and judging the motives, skills and way of thinking of
the adversaries makes a difference in the assessment of risks related to the decision-
making process.
Frequently, in decision-making contexts, it is typical to address just two types of
uncertain phenomena, see e.g. Parry [1996], Walker et al. [2003] or Refsgaard et al.
[2007], which could be described as follows in adversarial problems:
• Aleatory uncertainty. It refers to the randomness of the outcomes that the
agents receive, thus conditional on their choices.
• Epistemic uncertainty. It involves the strategic choices of intelligent adver-
saries, as driven by unknown preferences, beliefs and capabilities.
However, as mentioned in Section 1.1, a renewed interest on non-cooperative group
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decision-making paradigms that effectively take into account the strategies of ad-
versaries has arisen of late. This has entailed the need to consider a third type of
uncertainty:
• Concept uncertainty. It addresses how opponents frame the problem in relation
to questions like what kind of strategic analysis do they use, whether they are
rational or how deeply do they think. Often, the solution used will determine
the epistemic uncertainties that are relevant and, consequently, the aleatory
uncertainties.
Most authors in this context would focus on game-theoretic methods based on vari-
ants of Nash equilibria, see e.g. Gibbons [1992]. However, the ARA framework allows
to weaken the Nash equilibria common knowledge assumptions and provide more
flexible models for opponent behaviour. In a comparison of methods for adversarial
risk management, Merrick and Parnell [2011] preferred ARA precisely because it
handles and apportions these separate uncertainties more explicitly. In this respect,
ARA may be viewed as a Fermitisation strategy, as defined by Tetlock and Gard-
ner [2015], since it simplifies the assessment of complex uncertainties by considering
decompositions of complex problems into simpler ones in which the assessment is
easier.
ARA solutions are usually developed in the context of four common rationality
paradigms: non-strategic thinking, Nash equilibrium, level-k thinking and mirroring
argument. A detailed description of each of them may be found in Banks et al.
[2015]. Research has been done to manage the uncertainty about the strategic rea-
soning used by the adversary (mixture models) and measure their validity (Bayesian
updating), e.g. R´ıos Insua, Banks and R´ıos [2016], yet further work remains to be
done as only simple two-agent situations have been considered. This PhD thesis
develops more complex models and test them to help gain a deeper insight into how
to conduct concept uncertainty.
1.4.3 Adversarial applications
A main motivation for ARA developments arises from security and counterterrorism
contexts, but potential applications abound in many other areas: from competitive
marketing to disease control going through auctions, cybersecurity, social robotics
or supply chain management. A relevant issue across many of them is that of
Adversarial Hypothesis Testing (AHT).
Hypothesis testing is one of the fundamental problems in statistical inference [French
and Rı´os Insua, 2000]. Though subject to debate, Berger and Sellke [1987], Berger
[2003], Johnson [2013] or Wasserstein and Lazar [2016], it has been thoroughly
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studied from a decision-theoretic perspective, both from the frequentist and Bayesian
points of view, following the seminal work of Wald [1950].
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in issues related with hy-
pothesis testing problems in which hostile adversaries perturb the data observed
by a decision-maker to confound her about the relevant hypothesis and gain some
benefit. Examples come from the fields of adversarial signal processing, see Barni
and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez [2013] for an introduction; adversarial classification, with the
pioneer work in Dalvi et al. [2004]; adversarial medical testing, as undertaken by
Singpurwalla et al. [2016]; and adversarial machine learning, see e.g. Tygar [2011].
These cover applications like online fraud detection, watermarking, survival analysis
or spam detection, among many others.
Most attempts in these areas have focused on game-theoretic approaches to hypoth-
esis testing, with the entailed common knowledge assumptions. For example, Barni
and Tondi [2014] provide a framework focusing on zero-sum game-theoretic mini-
max procedures to hypothesis testing. This is not realistic since losses for various
participants will be typically asymmetric, and, moreover, the beliefs and preferences
of the adversary will not be readily available. Thus, key conditions of the commonly
proposed techniques would not hold.
AHT shows the broad applicability of the ARA methodology. Bearing in mind that
ARA appeared as a way forward to implement game theory to adversarial real-
world cases, the resolution of new problems is vital for the development of ARA
models so that they are understandable to the decision-maker and not too complex
to be efficiently implemented. Thus, an ARA framework to AHT, along with some
problem-specific solutions, is devised in this PhD thesis.
1.5 Research objectives
The aim in this PhD thesis is to provide new models in the context of ARA to
solve certain problems identified in the current paradigm of (non-cooperative) game
theory. Specifically, problems related to the common knowledge assumptions and the
limited scope of solution concepts and rationalities associated with Nash equilibria
and derived concepts. As two main lines of research are covered, the main objectives
and secondary targets of interest will be indicated for both of them.
The first research line corresponds to the current research strategy in ARA, that
is the development of a general ARA scheme to provide solutions to specific con-
flict situations. With this purpose, Section 1.4.1 presented different representation
methods frequently used for non-cooperative games concluding that bi-agent influ-
ence diagrams result in useful structures for the ARA approach that need yet to be
operationalised, justifying Objective O1.
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O1. Develop representation methods in ARA. Representation methods used
for (non-cooperative) games have not yet been fully assessed from the ARA
perspective. Relatively simple ARA models have been developed, regarded as
templates, but comprehensive adversarial problems still need to be studied.
Thus, several subobjectives are:
(i) Provide computational schemes for general proper bi-agent influence di-
agrams from the ARA perspective.
(ii) Produce a computational environment to support the ARA methodology
for bi-agent influence diagrams.
(iii) Address the use of the above methods in security related problems.
The second research line intends to provide tools to model different thinking strate-
gies that may be associated with the adversaries. The discussion in Section 1.4.2,
which introduced concept uncertainty and prevailing rationality paradigms bestowed
on opponents, leads to Objective O2.
O2. Enhance the modelling of strategic reasoning. A distinctive element
of ARA is the strategic reasoning modelling. Different rationality paradigms
may be used for the adversaries and it is crucial to evaluate the soundness of
the chosen strategies. In this case, the subobjectives are:
(i) Contemplate different solution concepts and how to handle them from
the ARA perspective.
(ii) Procure methods to deal with concept uncertainty.
Finally, Section 1.4.3 reviewed earlier models that have been devised to deal with a
variety of conflict situations encompassed within the scope of adversarial hypothesis
testing, providing a set of specific applications of ARA and making for Objective
O3. This objective is transversal in relation to the rest.
O3. Implement ARA models. All developed ARA models should be applied
to real-world problems or numerical examples for testing purposes. Related
subobjectives are:
(i) Take the efficiency of models into consideration.
(ii) Develop models which are understandable to decision-makers.
The objectives’ development involves the use of a variety of mathematical tools
related to the ARA paradigm, MAIDs, Bayesian inference and expert elicitation,
among many others. In order to develop the different computational schemes, they
will be implemented in R [2008] and MATLAB [2017].
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1.6 Dissertation structure
An introduction and motivation of the proposed research has been provided in the
present chapter, while the actual research is detailed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. To wrap
up, some conclusions and further work are discussed in Chapter 5. Supplementary
materials consist of clarifying additional figures for Chapter 2 (Appendix A) and the
relevant original R and MATLAB codes used for the numerical examples’ resolution
(Appendix B).
Specifically, Chapter 2 deals with Objective O1 describing how to support a decision-
maker who faces an adversary with their joint problem modelled as a bi-agent in-
fluence diagram. Unlike previous solutions framed under a standard game-theoretic
perspective, a decision-analytic methodology based on an ARA approach is provided
using a schematic critical infrastructure protection problem for illustrative purposes.
With regard to Chapter 3, Objective O2 is undertaken. As such, concept uncertainty
is studied under an ARA perspective, adding a new layer to the traditional risk
analysis distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, when adversaries
are present. Adversarial statistical decision theory is introduced with a foundational
prospect and used to construct a leading example from the specific case of adversarial
point estimation.
Persisting on the adversarial statistical decision theory defined in the previous chap-
ter, the fundamental problem of AHT as representative of Objective O3 is considered
in Chapter 4. In particular, a hypothesis testing situation in which an adversary
aims at distorting the relevant data-process monitored by the decision-maker so
as to confound her and achieve a certain benefit. An ARA solution to this prob-
lem is developed and its use extended to a batch acceptance context with partial
observations of the data-process.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarises all conducted research and raises new questions de-
rived from the work in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In addition, (stochastic) differential
games are suggested as a whole new set of problems that could be faced within the
ARA paradigm.
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Chapter 2
Bi-agent influence diagrams
This chapter provides an ARA algorithmic approach to solve general bi-agent ad-
versarial problems using the BAIDs capacity to model complex interactions between
both agents, taking advantage of the strategic relevance and s-reachability concepts,
yet relaxing the common knowledge assumptions through the ARA methodology.
Though many different rationality paradigms may be considered in the ARA frame-
work [R´ıos Insua, Banks and R´ıos, 2016], the decision-maker is regarded as a level-2
thinker, in the Stahl and Wilson [1995] sense, so that she ponders how the adversary’s
strategy would adapt to her own one but presumes that he does not conduct like-
wise. The aim is to support her decision-making process, for which the opponent’s
intentions need to be forecast. For that, he is assumed to be an expected utility
maximiser. The adversary’s actions could be predicted by finding his maximum ex-
pected utility policy; however, the uncertainty in the decision-maker’s assessments
about the opponent’s utilities and probabilities propagates to his optimal decisions
providing instead probability distributions over the required forecasts.
In Section 2.1, IDs and BAIDs are defined and the problems that shall be dealt with
presented, with a driving example in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) being
provided. Section 2.2 illustrates the key computational features of the proposal
applied to that example. Section 2.3 first reviews ID reduction operations and
strategic relevance concepts to then develop the general methodology, while Section
2.4 procures a numerical example. Section 2.5 conducts a recapitulation.
2.1 Formal definition
An ID is a directed graph representing a decision-making problem [Miller et al.,
1976]. Nodes represent random variables (circles), decisions (squares) and utilities
(hexagons). Arrows into chance or value nodes specify conditional dependence,
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while dashed arrows into decision nodes indicate the available information when
making that decision. For example, Figure 2.1 depicts the ID for a simple decision-
making process in which a random event (S) occurs and an agent responds to it
(D) perceiving some utility (u). In the ID, the dashed arrow emerging from chance
node S to decision node D reflects that the agent makes her choice having observed
the outcome of the random event. Besides, arrows coming out from S and D to
value node u manifest that the decision-maker’s utility depends on both the random
outcome and her choice. The preceding terminology is based on Banks et al. [2015],
whereas the remaining features are shared with standard IDs as characterised by
Shachter [1986].
u
S D
Figure 2.1: ID example
In opposition to decision trees as tools to perform decision analysis, IDs are com-
pact, emphasising the relationships among variables, and yet represent complete
probabilistic descriptions of the entailed decision-making problems. This results in
substantial reductions in memory requirements. However, though being equivalent
representation methods, IDs correspond to symmetric decision trees, so they can-
not benefit from savings achieved through asymmetric processing. A comprehensive
introduction to IDs may be found in Howard and Matheson [2005].
A BAID essentially consists of coupled IDs, one for the decision-maker and one
for her adversary, possibly with shared chance nodes and some links between both
agents’ decision nodes. Figure 1.1 in Section 1.4.1 presented the BAIDs for five
template models. In these, one can observe several chance, decision and utility nodes,
corresponding to the decision-maker’s (green) and her adversary’s (red) problems,
respectively. Bi-colour nodes represent common chance nodes, in the sense that
such uncertainties are relevant in both agents’ decision-making. However, they may
entertain different probability models over such nodes which, as mentioned, will not
be common knowledge.
Schemes for implementing ARA within such templates may be seen in R´ıos and R´ıos
Insua [2012] and R´ıos Insua et al. [2013]. Still, such stylised settings may not be
sufficient to cope with the complexities of many real problems. As an illustration,
consider the BAID in Figure 2.2, which shall be used to outline and demonstrate
the methodology. It refers to a scenario related to CIP. In it, the incumbent au-
thorities (decision-maker, defender) have to decide whether or not to increase the
infrastructure’s protection against terrorist attacks. To this aim, they could de-
ploy additional measures (D1) by e.g. reinforcing security controls on people and
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items. Meanwhile, terrorists (opponent, attacker) might be pondering over infiltrat-
ing within the infrastructure (A1) to gain intelligence for future attacks. Decisions
D1 and A1 are simultaneous and unknown to the respective adversary while being
made. The attacker then observes D1 and springs to action, fearing that new coun-
termeasures might be added soon. He chooses his attack (A2) consisting of a direct
attempt to cause damage to the infrastructure. The interaction between decisions
D1, A1 and A2 would yield a random outcome (S1) describing the consequences
of the attack. Depending on such consequences and the attacker’s action A2, the
defender will implement recovery measures (D2). Finally, the combined effect of
decisions A2 and D2 along with outcome S1 would determine a random effect (S2),
which determines the impact of the recovery effort. For each agent, there is a value
node which assesses all their consequences, respectively represented by uD and uA.
In particular, the defender’s utility uD (respectively, the attacker’s utility uA) will
depend on her decisions D1 and D2 (respectively, his decisions A1 and A2) and the
results S1 and S2. This, or similar sequences of defence-attack movements, could be
repeated across time, spanning over several planning periods.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD uA
Figure 2.2: ARA modelling of the CIP bi-agent problem
Note that, within the general layout of the BAID in Figure 2.2, patterns of defence
and attack movements from those earlier described in Section 1.4.1 as basic templates
may be identified. In particular, nodes D1–A1 correspond to the Sim. D-A template,
in which both agents decide their move without knowing the action chosen by each
other. Similarly, nodes D1–A2 reproduce the backbone structure of a Seq. D-A
template, in which the defender first chooses her action and then, having observed
it, the attacker decides his own move. Finally, nodes D1–A2–D2 may be regarded
as drawn from a Seq. D-A-D template. Detecting such patterns within the global
layout of the BAID will be key in the proposed solution strategy.
Though general adversarial problems for two agents interacting with each other
over time are to be considered, not all BAIDs conceivable as the mere junction
of two IDs (one for the decision-maker, one for her adversary) with several shared
16 Bi-agent influence diagrams
chance nodes and arrows linking their decision nodes will be dealt with. To ensure
consistency between the informational structure and the ordering of the agents’
analysis, terminology from Shachter [1986] is drawn, extended to the bi-agent case.
IDs are said to be proper if they are an unambiguous representation of a single
player’s perspective of a decision-making problem. Within them, a relevant subset
is that of regular IDs which satisfy that: (i) the directed graph has no cycles; (ii) the
value node, if present, is unique and has no successors; and (iii) there is a directed
path that contains all of the decision nodes. In the ARA setting, a proper BAID will
be an acyclic directed graph over chance, decision and value nodes, where chance
nodes can be shared by both agents, such that, from each player’s perspective, it is a
regular ID. Essentially, if two decisions are simultaneous, there must be no directed
path between them.
To check whether a BAID satisfies this constraint, an ID is obtained for each agent
by deleting their opponent’s value node and converting his/her decision nodes into
chance ones. Chance nodes that relate only to the other player are also eliminated.
Decision nodes owned by the other agent may become barren ones (nodes with no
successors) and, thus, be removed. Each player’s ID, D for the decision-maker and
A for her adversary, must then define a total order of decisions and a corresponding
partial order of chance nodes. The total order for the decision-maker is associated
with the chronological order of her m decisions: D1 →D D2 →D · · · →D Dm. This
induces a partition of the set CD of chance nodes relevant for her: (i) CD0 , consists
of those random events that she is acquainted with when making her first decision
D1; (ii) C
D
i , contains those chance nodes whose values she observes between her
decisions Di and Di+1, for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1; and, finally, (iii) CDm, are those chance
nodes that she does not perceive before making all of her decisions. Some of these
CDi sets might be empty. This partition defines a partial order over decision and
chance nodes CD0 ≺D D1 ≺D · · · ≺D CDm−1 ≺D Dm ≺D CDm, inducing an information
structure within the temporal order of decisions that specifies the information known
by the decision-maker at the time she makes each decision. Similarly, a partial order
CA0 ≺A A1 ≺A · · · ≺A CAn−1 ≺A An ≺A CAn may be defined for the n decisions
A1 →A A2 →A · · · →A An to be made by her adversary and the incumbent set CA
of his chance nodes. DD (respectively, DA) shall designate the set of decision nodes
in D (respectively, A). Note that, except for barren nodes which are assumed to
have been eliminated, DD ⊂ CA and DA ⊂ CD, as adversarial actions are uncertain
to the opposing agent. It could be the case that CD ∩ CA 6= ∅ due to some chance
nodes being shared.
The two associated IDs represent, respectively, the decision-maker’s and her adver-
sary’s viewpoint of their problems. As an example, consider the CIP model in Figure
2.2. When the defender’s problem is addressed, the attacker’s decisions at nodes A1
and A2 are treated as uncertain from the defender’s perspective. By substituting
A with A this is reflected in the ID in Figure 2.3a, where the attacker’s decision
nodes have been converted into defender’s chance nodes. Note, however, that the
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defender will observe the outcome of (for her) chance node A2 prior to making her
own decision D2. When the defender tries to solve her problem, she will need to
analyse the problem from the attacker’s stance, Figure 2.3b. Revealed by replacing
D with D , decision nodes D1 and D2 are now chance nodes for the attacker, as
he is uncertain about the defender’s intentions. Similarly, the attacker will perceive
the result of (for him) chance node D1 prior to deciding upon A2.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
Figure 2.3: Both agents’ IDs in the CIP model
2.2 Algorithmic approach
A description on how to deal with the CIP example in Figure 2.2 is provided as a
motivation for the general computational strategy proposed in Section 2.3.1. First,
the defender’s problem D, depicted in Figure 2.3a, is solved. Her utility function
is denoted by uD(d1, d2, s1, s2); her beliefs over the attack S1 and recovery S2 out-
comes, respectively, by pD(s1 | d1, a1, a2) and pD(s2 | d2, a2, s1); and her probability
distributions over the attacker’s decisions A1 and A2, respectively, by pD(a1) and
pD(a2 | d1, a1). The ID is evaluated backwards following the approach in Shachter
[1986]:
D1. Remove chance node S2, computing the expected utilities
ψD(d1, d2, a2, s1) =
∫
uD(d1, d2, s1, s2) pD(s2 | d2, a2, s1) ds2.
D2. Eliminate decision node D2, determining and storing the optimal action, given
d1, a2 and s1,
d∗2(d1, a2, s1) = arg max
d2
ψD(d1, d2, a2, s1),
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and recording the optimal expected utility
ψD(d1, a2, s1) = max
d2
ψD(d1, d2, a2, s1).
D3. Take out chance node S1, calculating the expected utilities
ψD(d1, a1, a2) =
∫
ψD(d1, a2, s1) pD(s1 | d1, a1, a2) ds1.
D4. Withdraw chance (for the defender) node A2, estimating the expected utilities
ψD(d1, a1) =
∫
ψD(d1, a1, a2) pD(a2 | d1, a1) da2.
D5. Delete chance (for the defender) node A1, obtaining the expected utilities
ψD(d1) =
∫
ψD(d1, a1) pD(a1) da1.
D6. Finally, reduce node D1, finding the maximum expected utility decision
d∗1 = arg max
d1
ψD(d1).
The defender’s optimal strategy would be to choose d∗1 at node D1 and, later,
d∗2(d1, a2, s1) at node D2.
While the assessments of uD(d1, d2, s1, s2), pD(s1 | d1, a1, a2) and pD(s2 | d2, a2, s1)
are standard in the decision analysis practice [French and R´ıos Insua, 2000], those
of pD(a1) and pD(a2 | d1, a1) require strategic thinking. To anticipate her adver-
sary’s movements, the defender may analyse the attacker’s problem A, shown in
Figure 2.3b. As acknowledged, the defender is considered to be a level-2 thinker:
her uncertainty about the attacker’s decisions, which stems from her uncertainty
about the attacker’s utilities and probabilities, is modelled assuming he is an ex-
pected utility maximiser. Therefore, the defender needs to assess his utility func-
tion uA(a1, a2, s1, s2); his beliefs over the attack S1 and recovery S2 outcomes, re-
spectively, pA(s1 | d1, a1, a2) and pA(s2 | d2, a2, s1); as well as his distributions over
her own decisions D1 and D2, respectively, pA(d1) and pA(d2 | d1, a2, s1). However,
in general, she will not know the attacker’s utilities and probabilities since com-
mon knowledge is not available. Assume she may model such uncertainty about
them through random utilities and probabilities, which may be described as F ∼(
UA(a1, a2, s1, s2), PA(s1 | d1, a1, a2), PA(s2 | d2, a2, s1), PA(d1), PA(d2 | d1, a2, s1)
)
. To
obtain the (random) optimal alternatives for the attacker, the uncertainty in F
would then be propagated:
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A1. Remove chance node S2, computing the attacker’s (random) expected utilities
ΨA(d2, a1, a2, s1) =
∫
UA(a1, a2, s1, s2)PA(s2 | d2, a2, s1) ds2.
A2. Eliminate chance (for the attacker) node D2, estimating the attacker’s (ran-
dom) expected utilities
ΨA(d1, a1, a2, s1) =
∫
ΨA(d2, a1, a2, s1)PA(d2 | d1, a2, s1) dd2.
A3. Take out chance node S1, calculating the attacker’s (random) expected utilities
ΨA(d1, a1, a2) =
∫
ΨA(d1, a1, a2, s1)PA(s1 | d1, a1, a2) ds1.
A4. Withdraw decision node A2, determining the attacker’s (random) optimal de-
cisions, given d1 and a1,
A∗2(d1, a1) = arg max
a2
ΨA(d1, a1, a2),
and recording the (random) optimal expected utilities
ΨA(d1, a1) = max
a2
ΨA(d1, a1, a2).
A5. Delete chance (for the attacker) node D1, obtaining the attacker’s (random)
expected utilities
ΨA(a1) =
∫
ΨA(d1, a1)PA(d1) dd1.
A6. Reduce decision node A1, finding the attacker’s (random) optimal decision
A∗1 = arg max
a1
ΨA(a1).
The optimal (random) attacks would be A∗1 and A
∗
2(d1, a1).
Finally, the defender’s probability pD(a2 | d1, a1) over attack A2, conditional on her
first defence decision d1 and the attacker’s first move a1, which she needs in step
D4, would be given by∫ a2
−∞
pD(a2 = y | d1, a1) dy = Pr(A∗2(d1, a1) ≤ a2).
Similarly, her probability pD(a1) over attack A1, which she requires in step D5, is
given by ∫ a1
−∞
pD(a1 = x) dx = Pr(A
∗
1 ≤ a1).
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This information would be incorporated to the defender’s problem to obtain her
optimal defence. Both distributions can be approximated through Monte Carlo
simulation.
Given the sequentiality of the problem, with alternation of simultaneous and se-
quential decisions by both agents, it may be solved stepwise, scheduling optimisa-
tion stages from the defender and simulation stages from the attacker, to get the
requested distributions in the defender’s problem). One could think of tackling first
all the simulation stages and then the optimisation ones, but switching between both
problems allows to better apportion the uncertainty around the defender’s optimal
decisions, as suggested in Merrick and Parnell [2011]. In this manner, the defender’s
distributions over the attacker’s probabilities for her decisions can be better assessed,
in line with Fermitisation strategies in structured expert judgement methodologies
[Tetlock and Gardner, 2015]. Indeed, schemes D (D1–D6) and A (A1–A6) may be
combined in different ways into a single one which jumps from D to A steps and
backwards, e.g. as in the following scheme E :
E1. Perform D1. The ingredients uD(d1, d2, s1, s2) and pD(s2 | d2, a2, s1) are avail-
able from the defender. Then, compute the expected utilities in D1.
E2. Complete D2 to remove D2 and find optimal decision d∗2(d1, a2, s1), given d1,
a2 and s1.
E3. Implement D3, where pD(s1 | d1, a1, a2) is also provided by the defender. Thus,
calculate the expected utilities in D3.
E4. At step D4 pD(a2 | d1, a1) is needed. Since the defender lacks it, switch to prob-
lem A. Recurring to UA(a1, a2, s1, s2), PA(s1 | d1, a1, a2), PA(s2 | d2, a2, s1) and
PA(d2 | d1, a2, s1), execute steps A1 to A3 and then, A4, getting pD(a2 | d1, a1)
from Pr(A∗2(d1, a1) ≤ a2). Then finalise D4.
E5. Step D5 requires pD(a1). The defender does not have it, so turn again to
problem A. Using PA(d1), realise A5. Then, conduct A6, obtaining pD(a1)
from Pr(A∗1 ≤ a1), and conclude D5.
E6. Finally, carry out step D6 to eliminate D1 and find optimal decision d∗1.
Essentially, this scheme solves as many D steps (with standard ID reduction opera-
tions) as possible until some assessment from the attacker is needed to solve another
D step. Then, as few steps from problem A are solved, with ID reduction oper-
ations modified to take into account the uncertainty about the attacker’s utilities
and probabilities, until the required attacker’s assessment is obtained. At this point
one jumps back to the defender’s problem and proceeds as above until all defender’s
decision nodes have been reduced.
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Deciding when to jump from problem D to problem A, and backwards, is relatively
simple to perform by hand, but can be messy from an algorithmic point of view.
This may be achieved through the use of the relevance and component graphs of
the BAID, described in Koller and Milch [2003] and reviewed in Section 2.3.2. The
relevance graph for the CIP example is shown in Figure 2.4, together with the so-
called maximal Strongly Connected Components (SCCs, delimited by dashed lines)
{D1, A1}, {A2} and {D2} which define the component graph. This graph induces
a topological ordering among the defender’s and attacker’s decisions which, in our
example, is unique: {D2} → {A2} → {D1, A1}. Note that this encompasses the
identified simultaneous D1–A1 block, as well as the sequential D1–A2 and A2–D2
blocks, complemented with the decision sequences D1 →D D2 (for the defender) and
A1 →A A2 (for the attacker).
D1 A1
D2 A2
Figure 2.4: Relevance graph for the CIP example
As stated, scheme E is difficult to generalise from an algorithmic point of view.
However, using the topological ordering induced by the component graph, as well
as the decision sequences for each agent, a more general and systematic approach,
designated G, may be designed:
G1. Tackle the first SCC: {D2}. It consists only of one of the defender’s decision
nodes. Using her utility uD(d1, d2, s1, s2) and probability pD(s2 | d2, a2, s1),
complete steps D1 and D2 to eliminate decision D2.
G2. Deal with the second SCC: {A2}. It comprises an attacker’s decision node.
Through assessments UA(a1, a2, s1, s2), PA(s1 | d1, a1, a2), PA(s2 | d2, a2, s1) and
PA(d2 | d1, a2, s1), get pD(a2 | d1, a1) from Pr(A∗2(d1, a1) ≤ a2) by performing
steps A1 to A4.
G3. Take up the remaining SCC: {D1, A1}. This combines defender’s and at-
tacker’s decision nodes. Begin by solving the attacker’s decision node A1.
Applying PA(d1), carry out A5. Finally, achieve A6, obtaining pD(a1) from
Pr(A∗1 ≤ a1).
G4. Finish with last SCC: {D1, A1}. Only decision node D1 belonging to the
defender awaits to be reduced. Probability pD(s1 | d1, a1, a2) is available to the
defender, so conduct D3. At step D4 pD(a2 | d1, a1) is need, but it was already
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found at G2, so it may be accomplished. In the same way, step D5 requires
pD(a1) which was estimated at G3. To conclude, execute D6 to eliminate D1.
Appendix A graphically represents the implementation of solution scheme G, which
is now generalised.
2.3 General computational strategy
A general methodology for solving BAIDs through ARA is described in this section.
Two agents, the decision-maker and her adversary, are assumed to deal with a
problem which may be modelled with a proper BAID, as indicated in Section 2.1.
First, the basic BAID reduction operations are presented. Then, a brief review of
the necessary strategic relevance concepts is provided. Finally, an algorithm for
ARA support to an agent in a problem modelled as a BAID is introduced.
2.3.1 BAID reduction operations
As in Section 2.2, reduction operations referring to D steps and A steps are dis-
tinguished. Those in relation to problem D (D-reductions) correspond to standard
ID reduction operations, as in Shachter [1986], which shall be called D-barren node
removal, D-arc inversion, D-chance node removal and D-decision node removal. A
D-barren node is a chance or decision node without successors in problem D.
The operations in relation to problem A (A-reductions) must take into account the
uncertainty about the adversary’s utilities and probabilities. Therefore, they need
to be modified, except for the A-barren node removal, which coincides. With no
loss of generality, it may be presumed that all involved random utilities UA and
probabilities PA are defined over a common probability space (Ω,F ,P) [Chung,
1968], with atomic elements ω (single events in the sample space). Thus, when
invoking them in reference to ω, they shall be designated as UωA and P
ω
A , respectively.
The remaining notation is adapted from Shachter [1986] where: superscripts old and
new refer to an element, respectively, before or after the BAID transformation; and,
for any node i, C(i) designates its conditional predecessors (chance and value nodes),
I(i) its informational predecessors (decision nodes) and S(i) its direct successors.
Initially, ΨωA(xC(v)) = U
ω
A(xC(v)) where v refers to the value node.
• A-Arc inversion. An arc (i, j) between chance (for the attacker) nodes i and j,
such that there is no other directed path between i an j, may be replaced by the
arc (j, i). Node inheritance is as in conventional IDs. (Random) probability
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assessments are changed by applying Bayes’ formula parametrically so that
P ωA
new(xj|xC new(j)) =
∫
P ωA
old(xj|xC old(j))P ωA old(xi|xC old(i)) dxi,
P ωA
new(xi|xC new(i)) =
P ωA
old(xj|xC old(j))P ωA old(xi|xC old(i))
P ωA
new(xj|xC new(j)) .
• A-Chance node removal. A chance (for the attacker) node i whose only suc-
cessor is the value node v may be removed, with v inheriting the conditional
predecessors of i. Note, however, that expectations have to be taken paramet-
rically so as to obtain (random) expected utilities. Prior to node i reduction,
there is a (random) expected utility ΨωA
old(xC old(v)) related to each combination
xC old(v) of values for predecessors of v. After the reduction, a new (random)
expected utility is associated with v defined by
ΨωA
new(xC new(v)) =
∫
ΨωA
old(xC old(v))P
ω
A(xi|xC(i)) dxi.
• A-Decision node removal. Assuming no barren nodes, a decision (for the at-
tacker) node i which is a predecessor of the value node v and whose predeces-
sors include those of v may be reduced, by computing the expected utility of the
(random) optimal alternatives, conditional on the values of its predecessors.
Node inheritance is as in conventional IDs. (Random) optimal alternatives are
stored through
Aωi
∗(xC new(v)) = arg max
xi
ΨωA
old(xi, xC new(v)),
whereas their (random) expected utilities are
ΨωA
new(xC new(v)) = max
xi
ΨωA
old(xi, xC new(v)).
To check that the above A-reductions are correctly defined, one just needs to re-
alise that, when conditioning on the atomic element ω of the underlying σ-algebra,
problem A behaves as an ordinary ID parametrised by ω. Therefore, standard ID
reduction operations (as proved by Shachter [1986]) may be applied to each of the
parametrised IDs, conforming the characterised A-reductions.
The procedure that will be used to decide which reduction operation to apply at each
step, whether in problem D or A, is that provided by Shachter [1986], which runs in
quadratic time in the number of nodes in the BAID. For the sake of completeness,
it is next included.
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Algorithm 1 BAIDs: Shachter’s ID reduction procedure
Data: Proper ID I with C(v) 6= ∅.
1: If ∃i ∈ C ∩ C(v) such that S(i) = {v} then
2: Remove chance node i.
3: Else If ∃i ∈ D ∩ C(v) such that C(v) ⊂ I(i) ∪ {i} then
4: Remove decision node i and all resulting barren nodes.
5: Else
6: Find i ∈ C ∩ C(v) such that D ∩ S(i) = ∅.
7: While C ∩ S(i) 6= ∅ do
8: Find j ∈ C ∩ S(i) such that there is no other directed (i, j) path.
9: Reverse arc (i, j).
10: End While
11: Remove chance node i.
12: End If
2.3.2 Strategic relevance concepts
The concept of strategic relevance will help in identifying when to jump from problem
D to problem A, and backwards, as well as the structural blocks within the BAID.
The basic concepts are briefly recalled, with further details in Koller and Milch
[2003].
A decision node Nj is strategically relevant for decision node Ni if and only if the
decision made at node Nj is need to be known to make the decision at node Ni. It
is also said that Ni (strategically) relies on Nj. A graphical criterion for detecting
strategic relevance is provided by s-reachability : a decision node Nj is s-reachable
from a decision node Ni in a BAID if and only if the utility node u associated
with Ni verifies that if a new predecessor Np were added to Nj, there would be an
active path from Np to u given Ni ∪C(Ni)∪ I(Ni) viewing the BAID as a Bayesian
network. As proved by Koller and Milch [2003], Nj is s-reachable from Ni if Ni
relies on Nj, though Ni does not rely on Nj in every BAID if Nj is s-reachable from
Ni, as probabilities and utilities in the BAID may be chosen in such a way that
the influence of one decision rule on another does not manifest itself. However, the
latter is true for some BAID with the same graph structure, so it is safe to assume
that strategic relevance and s-reachability are equivalent in the general case.
Based on the s-reachability concept, the relevance graph for the BAID is built,
which is a directed graph whose nodes are the decision nodes (of both agents) in
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the BAID and contains an arc Nj → Ni if and only if Nj is s-reachable for Ni. Note
that, according to this definition, all strategic reliance relations between decision
nodes are being manifested in the relevance graph and that every arc provides a
potential strategic reliance relation in the BAID. If two decision variables Ni and
Nj within the relevance graph are s-reachable from each other, the graph is declared
cyclic. Otherwise, it is called acyclic. The sets N of nodes such that for every
pair of them Ni, Nj ∈ N there exists a directed path from Ni to Nj, are named
Strongly Connected Components (SCCs). SCCs which are not a strict subset of
another one are designated maximal. When the relevance graph is acyclic, the
SCCs are singletons. The component graph, which is acyclic, has the maximal SCCs
as nodes and includes an arc between two of them if and only if one of the nodes
in the predecessor component is s-reachable from one of the nodes in the successor
component.
For any BAID the relevance graph can be constructed, e.g. using an algorithm such
as Bayes-Ball [Shachter, 1998], which allows to determine the set of nodes which are
s-reachable for each decision node and was used to build Figure 2.4. This algorithm
runs in linear time in the number of nodes in the BAID. By applying it to each
decision node, the relevance graph is obtained in quadratic time in the number of
nodes in the BAID.
If all decisions made by the decision-maker and her adversary have to be performed
sequentially, the relevance graph is acyclic and a complete topological ordering of
the decision nodes may be found, N1 → N2 → · · · → Nm+n, although not necessarily
unique, such that if Nj is s-reachable from Ni, then Ni precedes Nj. This ordering
corresponds to the reverse sequence of decisions that both agents make during their
interaction, corresponding to sequential Defend-Attack and Attack-Defend blocks,
possibly interlinked by sequences of Attack or Defence decisions. As an example,
one could have a sequential Defend-Attack-Attack-Defend-Attack-Defend model.
However, it could happen that certain pairs of decisions are made simultaneously,
one by each agent, without prior knowledge of the other’s action, corresponding to
simultaneous Defend-Attack blocks. Such paired decisions are s-reachable from each
other, preventing a precedence ordering between them and, consequently, making
the relevance graph cyclic. Should that be the case, the component graph from the
SCCs would be built to provide the required reduction mechanism. This task may
be accomplished in linear time in the number of nodes in the BAID.
2.3.3 Computational strategy: The acyclic case
Algorithm 2 describes a general computational strategy to evaluate proper BAIDs,
assuming that the relevance graph is acyclic. In this case, any (if multiple) of the
topological orderings of all decision nodes in the BAID is found. Then, the decision
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nodes at each ID are eliminated, according to the sequence provided by it, using the
necessary D-reductions (for the defender’s ID, D) or A-reductions (for the attacker’s
ID, A).
As mentioned, the defender is assumed to be a level-2 thinker. The aim is to deter-
mine which the defender’s decisions should be. A more complete response, however,
would provide information about those of the attacker through their likelihood.
Thus, the algorithm will solve all decision nodes, regardless of them belonging to
the defender or the attacker.
Algorithm 2 BAIDs: General computational strategy – Acyclic case
Data: BAID B with acyclic relevance graph; a topological ordering N1, . . . , Nm+n
of the relevance graph for B; the associated IDs D for the defender and A
for the attacker.
1: For i = 1 to m+ n do
2: If Ni ∈ DD then
3: While Ni ∈ D do
4: Apply Algorithm 1 to D using D-reductions.
5: End While
6: Else
7: While Ni ∈ A do
8: Apply Algorithm 1 to A using A-reductions.
9: End While
10: End If
11: End For
Algorithm 2 removes the decision nodes one by one, following the topological or-
dering obtained from the relevance graph, until no node remains to be eliminated.
Shachter’s procedure (Algorithm 1) guarantees the application of successive reduc-
tions to the corresponding ID until a decision node is withdrawn and the next
decision node may be targeted. Due to the proposed ordering, while reducing any of
the problems D or A to remove the incumbent decision node, none of the remaining
decision nodes is taken out and, thus, Algorithm 2 is well defined. As Shachter’s
procedure runs in quadratic time in the number of nodes in the BAID, so does Al-
gorithm 2, which essentially performs such procedure twice, once for ID D and once
for ID A, though intertwined. This discussion may be formalised as follows:
Proposition 2.1. For a problem modelled as a proper BAID with acyclic relevance
graph, Algorithm 2 concludes in quadratic time in the number of nodes in the BAID
providing the defender’s optimal alternatives in her decision nodes based on the
forecasts of the attacker’s random optimal choices in his decision nodes.
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2.3.4 Computational strategy: The cyclic case
The above approach, however, will not always work. Problems will arise when some
SCCs are not singletons, as in Figure 2.4 with {D1, A1}. There is a need to generalise
the arguments in Section 2.2 for scheme G, as done in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 BAIDs: General computational strategy – Cyclic case
Data: BAID B; a topological ordering N1, . . . ,Nr of the component graph derived
from the relevance graph for B; the associated IDs D for the defender and A
for the attacker; the decision sequences D1, . . . , Dm and A1, . . . , An, relative
to D and A.
1: For i = 1 to r do
2: While Ni ∩DA 6= ∅ do
3: Find j = max {k |Ak ∈ Ni}.
4: While Aj ∈ A do
5: Apply Algorithm 1 to A using A-reductions.
6: End While
7: End While
8: While Ni 6= ∅ do
9: Find j = max {k |Dk ∈ Ni}.
10: While Dj ∈ D do
11: Apply Algorithm 1 to D using D-reductions.
12: End While
13: End While
14: End For
Algorithm 3 solves the SCCs one by one, following the topological ordering obtained
from the component graph, until none of them remains to be reduced. For each
SCC, the attacker’s decision nodes are tackled first in their reverse decision sequence
so that the defender can best assess her predictions over the attacker’s decisions.
Then, the remaining decisions in the SCC are removed, which will correspond to the
defender. As in Algorithm 2, ID reductions are performed until the targeted decision
node removal is achieved while no other decision node is withdrawn, ensuring that
the algorithm is well defined. As in Section 2.3.3, Algorithm 3 runs in quadratic
time in the number of nodes in the BAID. An equivalent result to Proposition 2.1
may be formulated:
Proposition 2.2. For a problem modelled as a proper BAID with cyclic relevance
graph, Algorithm 3 concludes in quadratic time in the number of nodes in the BAID
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providing the defender’s optimal alternatives in her decision nodes based on the
forecasts of the attacker’s random optimal choices in his decision nodes.
2.3.5 Computational strategy: The general approach
Both algorithms are now combined into a single one. The defender’s and attacker’s
IDs are first built. If both are proper, the relevance graph is obtained. If this is
acyclic, Algorithm 2 is followed. Otherwise, Algorithm 3 is adopted.
Algorithm 4 BAIDs: General computational strategy
Data: BAID B.
1: Build ID D associated with B for the defender.
2: If D is not a proper ID then
3: Break.
4: Else
5: Eliminate all barren nodes from D.
6: End If
7: Build ID A associated with B for the attacker.
8: If A is not a proper ID then
9: Break.
10: Else
11: Eliminate all barren nodes from A.
12: End If
13: Build R the relevance graph for B.
14: If R is acyclic then
15: Find a topological ordering N1, . . . , Nm+n of R.
16: Apply Algorithm 2.
17: Else
18: Find a topological ordering N1, . . . ,Nr of the component graph of R.
19: Find decision sequences D1, . . . , Dm and A1, . . . , An relative to D and A.
20: Apply Algorithm 3.
21: End If
The relevance graph may be built in quadratic time in the number of nodes in the
BAID, and so may be found a topological ordering of the related component graph,
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as claimed in Section 2.3.2. Therefore, Algorithm 4 runs in quadratic time in the
number of nodes in the BAID as all processes involved, including Algorithms 2 and
3, have such computational complexity.
2.4 CIP: A numerical example
The proposed methodology is illustrated with the CIP example from Section 2.1. To
support the defender, several assessments need to be obtained from her, regarding
both her decision-making problem and her perspective on how the attacker would
deal with his. Simplified assumptions shall be made to better depict the concepts.
Then, Algorithm 4 is used to attain the defender’s optimal decisions as well as the
distribution over the attacker’s random choices. In addition, a sensitivity analysis
and some computational performance results are procured.
2.4.1 Assessing the defender’s problem
To begin with, the defender’s decisions are considered. First, she has to decide (D1)
whether to deploy additional measures to protect the infrastructure against terrorist
attacks. Such choice is deemed to be binary: she reinforces the security (d1 = 1)
or she does not (d1 = 0). After observing the outcome of the possible attack (S1),
she must determine (D2) whether to implement recovery measures. Suppose that
she has a specific budget to invest on relief and two options: mitigate the attack’s
consequences (d2 = 1) or do nothing, saving the money (d2 = 0).
Secondly, what the defender regards as the attacker’s alternatives are dealt with.
Both attacker’s choices will be allowed to be binary. Thus, he must decide (A1)
about infiltrating one person within the infrastructure to gain intelligence for future
attacks (a1 = 1) or not (a1 = 0). Then (A2), he will determine whether to attack
(a2 = 1) or not (a2 = 0).
The interaction between both agents’ decisions results in two different random
events. The first one is the outcome of the attack (S1), dependent on D1, A1
and A2, which shall be characterised through the number of days of service short-
age (s1 ∈ {0, 12 , 1}). Table 2.1 reflects the marginal distributions associated by the
defender with each outcome s1 depending on the combinations of d1 and a1 when
there is an attack (a2 = 1). For example, when the defender does not reinforce
(d1 = 0) and the attacker infiltrates the infrastructure (a1 = 1), a half a day short-
age (s1 =
1
2
) has a probability 0.55 of occurrence. When there is no attack (a2 = 0),
all probability concentrates in no shortage days (s1 = 0).
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(Reinforce, Infiltrate) - (d1, a1)
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Shortage
-
s1
0 0.30 0.15 0.40 0.25
1
2
0.45 0.55 0.40 0.50
1 0.25 0.30 0.20 0.25
Table 2.1: Defender’s marginal distributions of S1 given that a2 = 1
The second random event (S2) refers to the recovery impact, given D2, A2 and S1. It
will determine the number of days of service shortage reduction (s2 ∈ {0, 14 , 12 , 34 , 1}),
constrained by s1. Table 2.2 presents the marginal distributions assessed by the
defender about S2 depending on s1 when there is an attack (a2 = 1) and the defender
takes some action (d2 = 1). For example, when facing a one day shortage (s1 = 1),
the probability of reducing it by one quarter (s2 =
1
4
) is 0.15. Otherwise, when the
attacker chooses not to attack (a2 = 0) or the defender does not take any action
(d2 = 0), there is no shortage reduction (s2 = 0).
Shortage - s1
0 1
2
1
Shortage
Reduction
-
s2
0 1.00 0.20 0.10
1
4
0.00 0.50 0.15
1
2
0.00 0.30 0.30
3
4
0.00 0.00 0.25
1 0.00 0.00 0.20
Table 2.2: Defender’s marginal distributions of S1 given that a2 = 1
Last, the defender’s utility uD(d1, d2, s1, s2) is assessed as suggested in Gonza´lez-
Ortega, Radovic and R´ıos Insua [2018]. A value function that effectively monetises
all impacts is first considered: (i) security reinforcement (d1 = 1) has a cost of
m1D = 5Me; (ii) the budget for relief (d2 = 1) is of m
2
D = 10Me; and (iii) each day
of service shortage (s1 − s2) is considered to produce losses of m3D = 40Me. The
resulting value function (Me) is
vD(d1, d2, s1, s2) = −m1D d1 −m2D d2 −m3D (s1 − s2).
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Then, reckoning the defender as constant risk averse [Dyer and Sarin, 1982], the
exponential utility function
uD(d1, d2, s1, s2) = 1− exp(−λD (vD(d1, d2, s1, s2) + cD))
is determined, where λD = 0.06 is the risk aversion coefficient and cD = 55 is an
adjusting constant so that 0 ≤ uD ≤ 1.
2.4.2 Assessing the attacker’s problem
The defender’s perspective on the attacker’s problem is now approached. Some
of the assessments in her decision problem may be reused, such as the problem’s
structure or both agents’ set of possible decisions. However, modelling the attacker’s
value and chance nodes is more involved as she is uncertain about his utility and
probabilities.
Concerning the attacker’s beliefs over the random events, the defender could base
them on her own discrete probability distributions with some uncertainty around
them by means of Dirichlet distributions as in Banks et al. [2015]. She would thus be
assuming that the attacker’s estimates are expected to agree with hers, but allowing
for some uncertainty around them. This is just an operational heuristic and the
attacker might have a completely different perception. If the situation were to be
repeated over time, she could update the parameters in the Dirichlet distribution
through Bayesian inference to obtain a posterior distribution that better reflects the
attacker’s estimates.
As an example, consider the marginal distribution of S1 when the defender does
not reinforce security (d1 = 0), the attacker does not infiltrate the infrastructure
(a1 = 0) and there is an attack (a2 = 1). The assessments for probabilities qi =
pD(s1 = i | d1 = 0, a1 = 0, a2 = 1) with i = 0, 12 , 1 in Table 2.1 are, respectively,
0.30, 0.45 and 0.25. However, the defender is uncertain about how the attacker
would assess them; she associates random variables Xi such that E [Xi] = qi with
i = 0, 1
2
, 1 and their joint distribution is Dirichlet, (X0, X1/2, X1) ∼ Dir(α), with
parameters α = (α0, α1/2, α1). If αˆ =
∑
i αi, then:
E [Xi] =
αi
αˆ
, V ar [Xi] =
αi(αˆ− αi)
αˆ2(αˆ + 1)
, i = 0, 1
2
, 1.
It suffices to fix a value for V ar [X0] to calculate the required αi parameters. If,
for example, it is assumed that V ar [X0] = (0.1 ∗ E [X0])2 = (0.1 ∗ 0.30)2, one gets
(X0, X1/2, X1) ∼ Dir(69.70, 104.55, 58.08). Applying the same procedure to the
other marginal distributions of the possible outcomes of S1 for each combination of
d1 and a1 when there is an attack (a2 = 1), the Dirichlet distributions specified by
their parameters in Table 2.3 are obtained. Again, when the attacker decides not to
attack (a2 = 0), there are no shortage days (s1 = 0).
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(Reinforce, Infiltrate) - (d1, a1)
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Shortage
-
s1
α0 69.70 84.85 59.60 74.75
α1/2 104.55 311.12 59.60 149.50
α1 58.08 169.70 29.80 74.75
Table 2.3: Dirichlet α for the attacker’s probabilities of S1 given that a2 = 1
For the second random event S2, following a similar argument, Table 2.4 displays
the parameters of the Dirichlet distributions when there is an attack (a2 = 1) and
the defender takes some action (d2 = 1). Alternatively, there is no shortage reduc-
tion (s2 = 0). Note that when the outcome S2 is certain, the resulting Dirichlet
distribution is degenerate; e.g. when there is no shortage (s1 = 0).
Shortage - s1
0 1
2
1
Shortage
Reduction
-
s2
α0 1.00 79.80 89.90
α1/4 0.00 199.50 134.85
α1/2 0.00 119.70 269.70
α3/4 0.00 0.00 224.75
α1 0.00 0.00 179.80
Table 2.4: Dirichlet α for the attacker’s probabilities of S2 given that d2, a2 = 1
PA(d1) and PA(d2 | d1, a2, s1) are now assessed. To avoid recursions while acting on
a level-2 thinking strategy, they are considered to be based on expert judgement
allowing for some uncertainty. First, the defender has to choose D1. Assume she
concludes that the attacker’s average probability for her to reinforce is 0.65. Then,
she decides to use a Beta distribution PA(d1 = 1) ∼ Be(13, 7) (and PA(d1 = 0) =
1 − PA(d1 = 1)). As with the Dirichlet distributions, Bayesian inference may be
used to update the Beta distribution to better reflect the attacker’s estimates.
Her second decision D2 is more complex: she has to decide upon investing on re-
covery depending on an eventual attack (A2), the outcome of that attack (S1) and
her reinforcing decision (D1). Suppose the defender estimates the attacker’s average
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probabilities for her random (for him) decision D2 as in Table 2.5. She may assume
that the attacker would consider her recovery effort just dependent on the attack’s
outcome s1, when there is an attack (a2 = 1). For example, when confronting a one
day shortage (s1 = 1), the attacker’s average probability for the defender to try to
mitigate it (d2 = 1) is 0.70. On the other hand, when the attacker decides not to
attack (a2 = 0), she may presume the attacker to expect her to do nothing (d2 = 0)
having no evidence upon which to act.
Shortage - s1
0 1
2
1
Recovery
-
d2
0 1.00 0.60 0.30
1 0.00 0.40 0.70
Table 2.5: Attacker’s average probabilities of D2 given that a2 = 1
As before, the defender may introduce uncertainty in her assessment by means of
Dirichlet distributions. Table 2.6 presents the matching parameters when there is
an attack (a2 = 1).
Shortage - s1
0 1
2
1
Recovery
-
d2
α0 1.00 39.40 69.70
α0 0.00 26.27 162.63
Table 2.6: Dirichlet α for the attacker’s probabilities of D2 given that a2 = 1
Finally, the attacker’s random utility UA(a1, a2, s1, s2) has to be determined. Fol-
lowing the guidelines in Gonza´lez-Ortega, Radovic and R´ıos Insua [2018], suppose
the defender has come up through expert judgement with an idea of the attacker’s
value function that relates all events in monetary terms: (i) infiltration (a1 = 1)
approximately costs him m1A = 1Me; (ii) the attack (a2 = 1) is expected to cost
him m2A = 5Me; and (iii) each day of service shortage (s1−s2) is considered to profit
him m3A = 35Me. However, the defender is not sure about the precise parameters,
so she could draw each of them uniformly over an interval of width 1Me centred on
the selected value; e.g. M1A ∼ U(0.5, 1.5) for the first parameter. Thus, the resulting
random value function (Me) is
VA(a1, a2, s1, s2) = −M1A ∗ a1 −M2A ∗ a2 +M3A ∗ (s1 − s2).
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Then, she may assume that the attacker is constant risk prone [Dyer and Sarin,
1982] and use expert judgement to establish the exponential utility function
UA(a1, a2, s1, s2) = exp(ΛA ∗ (VA(a1, a2, s1, s2) + CA)),
where ΛA ∼ U(0.05, 0.07) represents the uncertain risk proneness coefficient and
CA = - max VA is an adjusting constant so that 0 ≤ UA ≤ 1.
2.4.3 Supporting the defender
All the ingredients to support the defender are now available, while Algorithm 4
has been implemented in R (Appendix B.1). When using Monte Carlo simulation to
approximate the defender’s probabilities of the attacker’s actions, K = 105 iterations
have been used. The solution is presented in the manner of scheme G in Section 2.2:
G1. Begin by solving decision D2. Should there be no attack (a2 = 0), there would
be no consequences (s1 = 0) and the defender would not have to mitigate
them: d∗2(d1, 0, 0) = 0 with an expected utility of 0.963 (respectively, 0.950) if
she had (respectively, had not) previously reinforced the system. However, if
there is an attack (a2 = 1), there are different possible scenarios. Table 2.7
displays the corresponding defender’s optimal decisions and expected utilities:
the optimal recovery decision is not to invest on relief (d2 = 0) unless service
shortage is most severe (s1 = 1), when it is worth trying to mitigate it (d2 = 1).
(Reinforce, Shortage) - (d1, s1)
(0,0) (0, 1
2
) (0,1) (1,0) (1, 1
2
) (1,1)
Recovery - d∗2 0 0 1 0 0 1
Exp. Utility 0.963 0.878 0.754 0.950 0.835 0.668
Table 2.7: Defender’s optimal decision d∗2(d1, a2, s1) given that a2 = 1
G2. Next, deal with A2. The probabilities pD(a2 | d1, a1) in Table 2.8 have been
obtained using Monte Carlo simulation. For example, when the defender does
not reinforce security (d1 = 0) and the attacker infiltrates the infrastructure
(a1 = 1), the attacker’s probability of attack (A
∗
2(0, 1) = 1) is 0.776. Note
that it is always more likely that there is an attack (a2 = 1), except when
the defender reinforces security (d1 = 1) and the attacker has not infiltrated
anyone within the infrastructure (a1 = 0).
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(Reinforce, Infiltrate) - (d1, a1)
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Attack
-
A∗2
0 0.339 0.224 0.593 0.430
1 0.661 0.776 0.407 0.570
Table 2.8: Attacker’s simulated probabilities for his optimal decision A∗2(d1, a1)
G3. The attacker’s decision A1 has to be now considered. Through Monte Carlo
simulation one can determine that the probability of him infiltrating someone
within the infrastructure (A∗1 = 1) is 0.282 and, thus, that the probability of
him not doing so (A∗1 = 0) is 0.718.
G4. Finally, solve the defender’s decision D1. Making use of the previous probabil-
ities for A∗1 and A
∗
2(d1, a1), her optimal decision is to implement additional se-
curity measures (d∗1 = 1), expected utility 0.900; against not doing it (d
∗
1 = 0),
expected utility 0.896.
Then, the defender’s optimal strategy would be to reinforce the security (d∗1 = 1).
Later, implement the mitigation policy (d∗2 = 1) in case of an attack (a2 = 1) if the
service shortage is maximum (s1 = 1), and do nothing (d
∗
2 = 0) otherwise.
2.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
A solution to the CIP problem has been attained based on the proposed ARA
approach. However, a more complete response would also provide some information
about that solution’s robustness. For this, a sensitivity analysis may be performed
to check the impact of perturbations in the input. Robustness is specially important
given the intrinsic uncertainty in the defender’s assessment of the attacker’s utility
and probabilities.
To be concise, and as an example, just a brief sensitivity analysis about the param-
eters in the Beta distribution used to model PA(d1) shall be performed. In Section
2.4.2, PA(d1 = 1) ∼ Be(13, 7) (and PA(d1 = 0) = 1 − PA(d1 = 1)) was used. Table
2.9 displays the defender’s optimal reinforcement decision d∗1 and its expected utility
for slightly different choices of the parameters in the Beta distribution as well as, for
comparison purposes, the estimated attacker’s probability of infiltrating someone
within the infrastructure, pD(a1 = 1). Note that the defender’s second decision D2,
related to the mitigation policy, would be unaffected by these parameter changes as
D1 is not strategically relevant for D2.
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Beta Parameters (11, 9) (12, 8) (13, 7) (14, 6) (15, 5)
Avg. Pr. Reinforce 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
Reinforce - d∗1 1 1 1 1 1
Exp. Utility 0.899 0.899 0.900 0.900 0.900
Pr. Infiltrate 0.293 0.288 0.282 0.279 0.276
Table 2.9: Sensitivity analysis of PA(d1)
It may be concluded that the solution is robust with respect to the initial estimation
of PA(d1), as the prescribed solution remains the same while its expected utility
presents no significant variations. However, notice that the estimation of pD(a1 = 1)
does differ. When the attacker expects the defender to reinforce the infrastructure
with a higher probability, he is further deterred to attack.
2.4.5 Computational performance
To conclude this section, the computation times of the implemented R routine for
Algorithm 4 are provided considering different numbers of iterations for the Monte
Carlo simulation to approximate the defender’s probabilities of the attacker’s ac-
tions. Simulations were run on a PC with the following specifications: Operating
System - Windows 7 Professional 64 bits; Processor - Intel Core i5-6200 @ CPU 2.30
GHz (4 CPUs); RAM Amount - 8.00 GB; Graphics - Intel(R) HD Graphics 520. Ta-
ble 2.10 presents the computation time for each number of iterations as well as the
estimated attacker’s probability of infiltrating someone within the infrastructure,
pD(a1 = 1), as a means of comparison.
Iterations - K 1 10 102 103 104 105
Comp. Time 0.14 sec 0.63 sec 5.62 sec 55.56 sec 9.23 min 1.53 h
Pr. Infiltrate 0.000 0.500 0.330 0.303 0.275 0.282
Table 2.10: Computation times for Algorithm 4
It may be observed that Algorithm 4 runs in linear time in the number of iterations
used in the Monte Carlo simulation. This was to be expected, as the process of
simulating the attacker’s decisions is the most time consuming part of the algorithm.
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In addition, note that the estimation of pD(a1 = 1) becomes quite stable with a
number of iterations (K) greater than 104.
2.5 Recapitulation
An ARA algorithmic framework to deal with proper BAIDs has been provided, thus
avoiding strong common knowledge assumptions typical of earlier non-cooperative
game-theoretic approaches to the problem. Within it, one of the agents is supported
by essentially forecasting the actions of her adversary and then finding her opti-
mal alternatives, which is better performed sequentially based on the informational
needs of the sustained decision-maker exploiting the strategic relevance concept as
in Koller and Milch [2003]. This leads to a procedure that combines simulation and
optimisation stages switching between them according to the relevance and compo-
nent graphs while identifying sequential and simultaneous decision sequences. The
resulting algorithms employ a level-2 thinking strategy.
The methodology has been illustrated with a CIP example which could actually lead
to a real model with some refinement, e.g. based on Zhang and Ramirez-Marquez
[2013] or Bao et al. [2017]. However, the research has focused on the underlying
interaction structure for which the example has just been illustrative and, therefore,
on how to solve the model rather than to make it genuine and reliable.
As with standard IDs, the approach has quadratic complexity in the number of
nodes. Besides, it has linear complexity in the number of iterations used for the
Monte Carlo simulation adopted to estimate the distribution of the opponent’s ac-
tions. To provide a solution to the numerical example, and as a pilot attempt, all
algorithms have been implemented in R and are accessible in Appendix B.1.
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Chapter 3
Concept uncertainty
The focus in this chapter is on concept uncertainty and how to handle it with an
ARA approach. As explained in Section 1.4.2, concept uncertainty refers to the way
in which the decision-maker believes her opponents frame the problem and choose
their respective actions. To study it, the problem of Adversarial Statistical Decision
Theory (ASDT) is introduced, extending the standard Statistical Decision Theory
(SDT) formulation to consider an adversary who tries to modify the data-process
observed by the decision-maker to confuse her and, consequently, attain a profit.
Within the ASDT framework, the specific case of point estimation is used.
First, the idea of concept uncertainty is stressed with a qualitative security example
based on spy drone detection in Section 3.1. Then, ASDT is presented in Section 3.2,
while the methodology to cope with concept uncertainty through ARA is provided
through the particular ASDT case of adversarial point estimation in Section 3.3.
Finally, portraying the security example as an adversarial point estimation situation,
a numerical example illustrates the approach in Section 3.4. A recap is included in
Section 3.5.
3.1 Basic notions: A security example
The notion of concept uncertainty will be elaborated through a qualitative security
example in relation to the detection of spy drones. Consider a defender (decision-
maker) and an attacker (adversary) who make simultaneous decisions, with the
defender being supported.
Although several methods have been proposed to detect nearby drones, among which
Hearing and Franklin [2016], Shin et al. [2017] and Trundle and Slavin [2017] con-
stitute a small representative collection, they all suffer from the same shortcoming:
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they cannot determine what is being captured. Thus, they fail to discriminate be-
tween the legitimate use of a drone (e.g. for a home-made video) from an illegitimate
use (e.g. to invade someone’s privacy), as this distinction may rely on the video cam-
era’s orientation rather than on the drone’s location. Nassi et al. [2018] suggest an
external interception model using a radio frequency scanner to analyse the bit rate
(number of bits conveyed per unit of time) of the live video-stream sent from the
drone to the pilot (operator). In particular, they make use of the fact that changes
in the number of pixels from a frame to its consecutive frame requires data to encode
(intra-frame coding), therefore increasing the bit rate, and induce this to happen
with physical stimuli to detect whether a drone is filming a certain target.
For the purpose of this example, assume the defender just wants to detect whether
a drone is using its camera or not. Based on the method proposed by Nassi et al.
[2018], assume she pretends to estimate the average data-stream bit rate of a certain
drone model so as in the future be able to infer that she might be under surveillance
when noticing it to be substantially higher. Suppose the attacker discovers this and
may decide to perturb the process to try to be inconspicuous in case of spying the
defender with that same kind of drone.
Typically, after both agents choose their actions, the outcomes and payoffs for each
of them are random variables. In the example, regardless of the attacker’s decision,
there is a chance that the defender correctly evaluates the drone’s average data-
stream bit rate to detect its potential illicit use and a chance that she fails to
determine it, providing a random amount of beneficial information to the attacker by
snooping on the defender and causing a random amount of economic and/or personal
damage to her. This randomness is aleatory uncertainty and is conditional on the
choices of the opponents, yet it does not depend upon any strategic calculation on
their parts, referring to the non-strategic randomness of an outcome. The defender
should assess her beliefs about the outcome probabilities, conditional on the actions
chosen by both agents. This can be addressed through traditional probabilistic risk
analysis [Bedford and Cooke, 2001]. The defender’s beliefs should be informed by
expert judgement and previous history and extracted through appropriate elicitation
methods as described by Cooke [1991] and O’Hagan et al. [2006], taking into account
factors such as experts being over-confident and that previous history may be only
partially relevant.
Epistemic uncertainty describes the defender’s distributions over the choices the at-
tacker will make, which usually integrate his preferences, beliefs and capabilities.
For the spy drone detection example, the defender does not know how the attacker
will affect the estimation process or whether he will actually do it. His choice would
depend upon factors like which perturbation method is most valuable to him (a pref-
erence), the bit rate he thinks has the bigger chance of making him undetectable
(a belief) and whether or not he has a clear way of influencing the procedure (a
capability). The defender does not know these and, thus, has epistemic uncer-
tainty. She expresses it as a distribution over all possible targets. This uncertainty
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is handled differently for each solution concept that the defender thinks the attacker
might use. For example, with a Nash equilibrium concept, the defender believes
that the attacker thinks they both know the relevant utilities and beliefs; hence, the
relevant epistemic uncertainty refers to the defender’s distribution over the payoff
bi-matrices that the attacker may be using. In the case of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
concept, there is additional uncertainty related to games of incomplete information
[Harsanyi, 1967]. Besides the distribution over the entailed payoff bi-matrices, the
defender must also express her epistemic uncertainty about the common knowledge
distributions which the attacker is assuming that they share, their common distribu-
tions on types. In principle, full description of the epistemic uncertainties is complex,
even with simple solution concepts. Often, there are pragmatic approximations that
may be used.
Finally, as mentioned, concept uncertainty would arise from ignorance of how one’s
adversary will frame the analysis. In classical game theory terms, the defender does
not know which solution concept the attacker will use to make his decision. Concept
uncertainty embraces a wide range of strategies and is an essential component in the
ARA formulation: the defender must model how the attacker will make his decision,
but there are many possible solution concepts that he might use. Some of them are:
• Non-strategic play. The defender believes that the attacker will select an ac-
tion without consideration of her choice. This includes the case in which the
attacker selects actions with probabilities proportional to the perceived utility
of success, Pate´-Cornell and Guikema [2002]. It also allows for non-sentient
opponents, such as a hurricane.
• Nash or Bayes-Nash equilibrium methods. The defender concludes that the
attacker is assuming they both have a great deal of common knowledge and
pursues an equilibrium point in which each agent’s choice is the best response
to their counterpart’s action [Nash, 1951].
• Level-k thinking. The defender considers that the attacker thinks k steps deep
in an “I think that she thinks that I think...” kind of reasoning as in Stahl
and Wilson [1995]. Level-0 corresponds to non-strategic play.
• Mirroring equilibrium analysis. The defender supposes that the attacker is
modelling her decision-making in the same way that she is modelling his, and
both use subjective distributions on all unknown quantities [Banks et al., 2015].
As a Bayesian approach, ARA enables great flexibility in tailoring the analysis to
the context and in accounting for the different kinds of uncertainty that arise. Usu-
ally, the defender does not know which solution concept the attacker has chosen.
But based on previous experience with the attacker, and input from informants or
other sources, she can place a subjective probability distribution over his possible
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solution concepts. She could then make the decision that maximises her expected
utility against that weighted mixture of strategies. Realistically, a full Bayesian
analysis that puts positive probability on a large number of different solution con-
cepts becomes computationally burdensome. However, in principle, the approach
is simple. Each solution concept will lead (after handling the relevant epistemic
and aleatory uncertainties) to a distribution over the attacker’s actions. Then, the
defender weights each distribution with her personal probability that the attacker is
using such solution concept. This generates a weighted distribution on the attacker’s
action space which reflects all of the defender’s knowledge about the problem and
all of her uncertainty. The approach is related to Bayesian model averaging, in
which uncertainty about the model is expressed by a probability distribution over
the possible models and inference is based upon a weighted average of the posterior
distributions from each model, see Hoeting et al. [1999] and Clyde and George [2004]
for further details.
3.2 Adversarial statistical decision theory
As a motivation for the ASDT problem, a concise review of the standard Bayesian
SDT framework is first provided. As depicted in the ID in Figure 3.1, a decision-
maker needs to make a decision (D) based on an observation (X) depending on a
state (Θ). She attains a loss lD(d, θ) which is subject to her choice d and the state
θ actually occurring.
Θ
X
lDD
Figure 3.1: Sketch of the general SDT problem
To solve her decision-making problem, the decision-maker could describe her prior
beliefs over the state θ through a prior pD(θ) and the dependence of data x on
the state θ through a likelihood pD(x | θ). Given such elements, she would seek the
decision d∗(x) that minimises her posterior expected loss, given x, which is
d∗(x) = arg min
d
∫
lD(d, θ) pD(θ |x) dθ. (3.1)
Note that, for optimization purposes, the denominator pD(x) in Bayes’ formula may
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be ignored and problem
d∗(x) = arg min
d
∫
lD(d, θ) pD(x | θ) pD(θ) dθ (3.2)
be solved, which is equivalent to (3.1). This transformation allows to directly involve
the probabilities pD(θ) and pD(x | θ) and, in principle, avoid computing the more
complex posterior pD(θ |x). By appropriately crafting the decision space and the loss
function, this framework embraces most usual statistical problems including point
estimation, set estimation, hypothesis testing, forecasting and decision analysis, as
reviewed in detail in e.g. French and R´ıos Insua [2000].
There are many possible variants of the SDT framework that extend it to the ASDT
problem by considering a strategic adversary who makes decisions in the previous
context which affect the information and/or consequences that the decision-maker
obtains to acquire some advantage. Among all several adversarial scenarios that
may actually be considered, three of the simpler ones are described through their
BAIDs in Figure 3.2:
Θ
Λ
X
lD lAD A
(a) Structural adversary (S1)
Θ
X
Y
lD lAD A
(b) Data-fiddler adversary (S2)
Θ
X
lD lAD A
(c) Simultaneous adversary (S3)
Figure 3.2: BAIDs for three ASDT scenarios
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S1. The adversary somehow manages to transform state θ affecting the data-
process leading to a modified one a(θ) = λ. This may be called a structural
adversary, shown in Figure 3.2a.
S2. The adversary manages to modify the data x to be received by the decision-
maker, who actually observes a(x) = y. This may be designated a data-fiddler
adversary, depicted in Figure 3.2b, which reflects the typical case in adversarial
machine learning, see e.g. Dalvi et al. [2004] or Tygar [2011].
S3. The adversary makes decisions a so that the losses for each agent, which are
respectively denoted lD(d, θ, a) and lA(d, θ, a), depend upon both their choices
and the relevant state. Other than that, the opponent faces a problem struc-
turally similar to that of the decision-maker. This may be named a simulta-
neous adversary, represented in Figure 3.2c.
Note that the three formulations could appear combined in certain scenarios. For
example, in the spy drone detection problem, during the defender’s estimation of
the average data-stream bit rate the attacker might artificially decrease the bit rate
(θ); perturb the Wi-Fi signal that her radio frequency scanner captures (x); and,
in addition, undertake adaptive modifications on his own drone (a), contesting the
defender’s detection strategy.
3.3 Adversarial point estimation
The relevance of concept uncertainty is now studied showcasing it in the standard
problem of point estimation, described in Lehmann and Casella [1983]. The problem
is first understood as a specific case of SDT and later adapted to an adversarial situ-
ation by acknowledging the presence of an adversary willing to deceive the supported
decision-maker, in line with the ASDT framework. Lastly, concept uncertainty is
properly engaged.
3.3.1 Point estimation as a SDT problem
The SDT problem reviewed in the previous section may be used to reflect a point
estimation problem. Just as illustrated in Figure 3.1, a decision-maker is required
to determine a value d ∈ Θ after observing x which depends on a state θ taking
values in the same set Θ, obtaining a loss lD(d, θ). Her optimal decision would then
be found by minimising (3.1) or, more appropriately, by using its equivalent version
(3.2).
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As an example, under the quadratic loss function lD(d, θ) = (θ − d)2, it may be
easily obtained that d∗(x) = E [θ |x] from (3.1) [French and R´ıos Insua, 2000]. The
optimisation argument with the quadratic loss is next rehearsed in the simplified
form (3.2). The objective function to be minimised in this case is∫
θ2 pD(x | θ) pD(θ) dθ + d2
∫
pD(x | θ) pD(θ) dθ − 2d
∫
θ pD(x | θ) pD(θ) dθ,
which is equivalent to minimising in d
d2 pD(x)− 2d
∫
θ pD(x | θ) pD(θ) dθ,
whose minimum is, as announced,
d∗(x) =
1
pD(x)
∫
θ pD(x | θ) pD(θ) dθ =
∫
θ pD(θ |x) dθ = E [θ |x] . (3.3)
3.3.2 Adversarial point estimation as an ASDT problem
To streamline the discussion, only the ASDT Scenario S1 in which an structural
adversary is capable of perturbing θ (Figure 3.2a) will be considered. Specifically,
suppose that the opponent just uses deterministic transformations λ = θ+a, biasing
the underlying state, with a chosen by him. In addition, a quadratic loss function
for the decision-maker will be assumed. Note first that a decision-maker who is not
aware of the presence of the adversary would be proposing as optimal the decision
in (3.2), without noticing that pD(x | θ) should be updated to pD(x | θ + a) as the
data-process is being perturbed and, therefore, systematically erring her estimation
in general.
Consider now an adversary-aware point estimator. She faces a problem similar to
that in Figure 3.1, except for the additional uncertainty about a, as reflected in the
ID in Figure 3.3a, which modifies the state θ. Recall that as the decision-maker
does not know her adversary’s choice, his corresponding decision node (A) appears
as random to her. Once she makes a forecast pD(a) of the action a to be performed
by her opponent, the problem that she needs to solve is formulated (equivalently)
as
d∗(x) = arg min
d
∫∫∫
(θ − d)2 pD(x |λ) pD(λ | θ, a) pD(θ) pD(a) dλ dθ da. (3.4)
In the same manner as the non-adversarial version in Section 3.3.1, observe that this
leads to the equivalent problem of minimising in d
d2 pD(x)− 2d
∫∫∫
θ pD(x |λ) pD(λ | θ, a) pD(θ) pD(a) dλ dθ da,
46 Concept uncertainty
whose solution is
d∗(x) =
1
pD(x)
∫∫∫
θ pD(x |λ) pD(λ | θ, a) pD(θ) pD(a) dλ dθ da.
This expression may then be simplified to obtain
d∗(x) =
1
pD(x)
∫∫
θ pD(x |λ) pD(λ | θ) pD(θ) dλ dθ
=
1
pD(x)
∫
θ pD(x | θ) pD(θ) dθ =
∫
θ pD(θ |x) dθ = E [θ |x] .
Apparently, the same solution as in (3.3) is reached. However, these compressed
expressions do not explicitly show that the probability model pD(θ |x) is different in
both cases. Therefore, it is convenient to use decomposed expressions such as (3.4)
which involve probabilities that are easier to model and learn from, in line with the
Fermitisation point of view mentioned in Section 1.4.2. Due to the deterministic
transformation assumption, in this specific case pD(λ = θ + a | θ, a) = 1 (and 0
otherwise). Thus, (3.4) becomes
d∗(x) = arg min
d
∫∫
(θ − d)2 pD(x |λ = θ + a) pD(θ) pD(a) dθ da. (3.5)
It shall be remarked once again that a good assessment of pD(a) is therefore crucial,
although it is complex because of the strategic element involved. To better assess
it, the decision-maker may consider her adversary’s problem reflected in the ID in
Figure 3.3b, as conducted in Section 2.1, with her decision (D) being a chance node
to him. Concept uncertainty needs to be faced at this point.
Θ
Λ
X
lDD A
(a) Decision-maker’s problem
Θ
Λ
X
lAD A
(b) Adversary’s problem
Figure 3.3: Both agents’ IDs for a structural adversary in ASDT
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3.3.3 Addressing concept uncertainty
For the sake of simplicity, just two different solution concepts for the adversary
(Bayesian and minimax) will be proposed. A way to aggregate them in terms of the
defender’s uncertainty will be explained.
A Bayesian adversary
Suppose first that the adversary minimises expected loss. He would seek to find the
optimal value a to transform state θ such that, when the decision-maker observes x
and estimates d, his expected loss lA(d, θ, a) is minimum. To solve his problem, the
opponent would need to express his prior beliefs over the state θ through a prior
pA(θ) and the dependence of data x on the state θ and the defender’s choice d on
observation x, respectively, through likelihoods pA(x |λ = θ+a) and pA(d |x). Then,
his optimal decision would be computed as
a∗B = arg min
a
∫∫∫
lA(d, θ, a) pA(d |x) pA(x |λ = θ + a) pA(θ) dd dx dθ.
However, the decision-maker does not know her adversary’s loss function and proba-
bilities. If she acknowledges her uncertainty about them through random losses and
probabilities F ∼ (LA(d, θ, a), PA(d |x), PA(x |λ = θ + a), PA(θ)), she would solve
A∗B = arg min
a
∫∫∫
LA(d, θ, a)PA(d |x)PA(x |λ = θ + a)PA(θ) dd dx dθ
to find the optimal random decision A∗B, which is a random variable whose dis-
tribution is induced by the above random loss function and probabilities. Then,
as in Section 2.2, the decision-maker would have found the distribution that she
needs to calculate her best decision d∗(x). That distribution would incorporate all
of her uncertainty about her adversary’s decision-making context, assuming that he
is Bayesian, and may be defined through pBD(a) = Pr(A
∗
B = a) in the discrete case
and, similarly, in the continuous one.
To approximate pBD(a), one would typically use Monte Carlo simulation, drawing
K samples
(
LkA(d, θ, a), P
k
A(d |x), P kA(x |λ = θ + a), P kA(θ)
)
, k = 1, . . . , K from F ,
finding
A∗B,k = arg min
a
∫∫∫
LkA(d, θ, a)P
k
A(d |x)P kA(x |λ = θ + a)P kA(θ) dd dx dθ (3.6)
and approximating
pˆBD(a) ≈ #{A∗B,k = a}/K.
Within F , PA(d |x) is much harder to assess than the other three elements. It entails
strategic thinking, since the decision-maker needs to understand her adversary’s
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beliefs on what point estimates she will make given that she observes x. This
could be the prelude of a hierarchy of decision-making problems if the decision-
maker assumes that her opponent regards her as adversary-aware; see R´ıos and Rı´os
Insua [2012] for a description of the potentially infinite regress in a simpler class
of problems. For illustrative purposes, the immediate stage of the hierarchy in this
case is presented. Note that in the problem
d∗(x) = arg min
d
∫∫∫
lD(d, θ) pD(x |λ) pD(λ | θ, a) pD(θ) pD(a) dλ dθ da
to be solved by the decision-maker, her adversary lacks knowledge about the terms
in the integral. Assuming uncertainty about them through a random loss LAD(d, θ)
and random distributions PAD (x |λ), PAD (λ | θ, a), PAD (θ) and PAD (a), he would get
the corresponding random optimal decision by replacing the matching elements.
Again, this demands assessment of PAD (a) (what the decision-maker believes that
her adversary thinks about her beliefs concerning his action to be implemented) for
which there is a strategic component, leading to the next stage in the hierarchy.
In line with the already introduced level-k thinking strategies, one could stop at a
pertinent level in which no more information is reasonably available. At that point,
one could use a non-informative prior over the involved losses and probabilities.
A minimax adversary
Assume now that rather than minimising posterior expected loss, the decision-maker
feels that her adversary behaves in a minimax manner. This means that he would
try to minimise his possible maximum loss through
a∗M = arg min
a
max
d,θ
lA(d, θ, a).
However, as in Section 3.3.3, the decision-maker does not know her opponent’s
loss function. If she ascertains some uncertainty about it through a random loss
LA(d, θ, a), she would solve
A∗M = arg min
a
max
d,θ
LA(d, θ, a),
to find the optimal random decision A∗M . Again, the distribution of A
∗
M incorporates
all of her uncertainty about her adversary’s decision-making context, suspecting this
time that he is a minimax adversary. Thus, it may be defined as pMD (a) = Pr(A
∗
M =
a) in the discrete case and, similarly, in the continuous one.
Monte Carlo simulation would typically be used to estimate pMD (a), as in Section
3.3.3, drawing K samples from LkA(d, θ, a), k = 1, . . . , K, and computing
A∗M,k = arg min
a
max
d,θ
LkA(d, θ, a),
which would lead to
pˆMD (a) ≈ #{A∗M,k = a}/K.
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Aggregating solution concepts
The above adversary types could be extended with other solution concepts, but for
the purpose of this section two of them are enough. If the decision-maker believes
that her adversary is Bayesian with weight piB and minimax with weight piM , with
piB + piM = 1 and piB, piM ≥ 0, then the required forecast pD(a) would be based on
piB pˆ
B
D(a) +piM pˆ
M
D (a) which would be plugged in her decision-making problem (3.5),
leading to an optimal adversary-aware point estimation.
3.4 Spy drone detection: A numerical example
Coming back to the spy drone detection setting from Section 3.1, a numerical ex-
ample is included to make the ARA approach to concept uncertainty clear. Note
first that, essentially, the defender faces an adversarial point estimation process in
which she tries to assess a drone’s average data-stream bit rate while the attacker
might perturb the procedure. Assuming the attacker is an structural adversary and
may do this by artificially decreasing the bit rate, the same conditions as in Section
3.3.3 are met. Consider that the defender believes that:
• Drones’ average data-stream bit rates follow a normal prior θ ∼ N (µD, σD).
In particular, µD = 200 Kbps and σD = 25 Kbps shall be set.
• Observations x = (x1, . . . , xn) will be i.i.d. around bit rate θ as xi | θ ∼
N (θ, ρD) for i = 1, . . . , n. Specifically, ρD = 10 Kbps shall be stipulated.
When the defender is unaware of any artificial decrease of the data-stream bit rate
made by the attacker, her optimal estimation of the average bit rate may be com-
puted by means of (3.2), given observations (x1, . . . , xn), minimising in d∫
(θ − d)2 1
σD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(θ−µD)2
2σ2D
) n∏
i=1
1
ρD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(xi−θ)2
2ρ2D
)
dθ
∝
∫
(θ − d)2
√
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
ρD σD
√
2pi
exp

−
(
θ − µD ρ
2
D+σ
2
D
∑n
i=1 xi
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
)2
2
ρ2D σ
2
D
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
 dθ,
which is equivalent to minimising in d
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d2
∫ √
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
ρD σD
√
2pi
exp

−
(
θ − µD ρ
2
D+σ
2
D
∑n
i=1 xi
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
)2
2
ρ2D σ
2
D
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
 dθ
− 2d
∫
θ
√
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
ρD σD
√
2pi
exp

−
(
θ − µD ρ
2
D+σ
2
D
∑n
i=1 xi
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
)2
2
ρ2D σ
2
D
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
 dθ.
Both integrals include the density function of the normal distribution
Z ∼ N
(
µD ρ
2
D+σ
2
D
∑n
i=1 xi
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
,
ρD σD√
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
)
so the problem may be simplified to minimising in d
d2 − 2dE [Z] = d2 − 2d µD ρ
2
D+σ
2
D
∑n
i=1 xi
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
,
whose optimal value is the mean in the Bayesian posterior normal distribution with
known variance
d∗(x) =
µD ρ
2
D + σ
2
D
∑n
i=1 xi
ρ2D + nσ
2
D
=
1
1
σ2D
+ n
ρ2D
(
µD
σ2D
+
∑n
i=1 xi
ρ2D
)
. (3.7)
In particular, with the above specific parameters:
d∗(x) =
32 +
∑n
i=1 xi
0.16 + n
.
Suppose now that the defender is aware of the attacker’s presence. Then, she needs
to further model her perspective on the attacker’s losses and probabilities. Assume
that the defender thinks the attacker:
• Considers drones’ average data-stream bit rates follow a normal distribution
θ ∼ N (µA, σA). Moreover, µA ∼ U(175, 225) and σA ∼ U(20, 30), in Kbps,
reflect her uncertainty about the actual parameters he uses.
• Is restricted to just two actions, a ∈ {-25, 0}, related with decreasing the bit
rate in 25 units (a = -25 Kbps, with the bit rate becoming λ = θ − 25) or
doing nothing (a = 0 Kbps, with the bit rate unperturbed as λ = θ).
• Takes the observations (x1, . . . , xn) to be i.i.d. and normal around the trans-
formed bit rate λ as xi |λ ∼ N (λ, ρA) for i = 1, . . . , n where ρA ∼ U(5, 15), in
Kbps, models her uncertainty.
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• Is a Bayesian adversary with probability piB = 23 and a minimax adversary
with probability piM =
1
3
.
• Adopts a loss function that incorporates a penalty in relation with a and
a quadratic term regarding her estimation d, so that LA(d, θ, a) = α |a| −
β (θ − d)2. Note that the attacker wins, on one hand, when the defender’s
estimate is further distant from θ, and, on the other hand, as his perturbation
is smaller. We model the defender’s uncertainty about the loss parameters
with α ∼ U(3, 5) and β ∼ U(0.1, 0.3).
• Determines that she will make her decision (point estimate of θ) uniformly
around x¯ = 1
n
∑n
i=1 xi with d |x ∼ U(x¯− 10, x¯+ 10), in Kbps.
Note first that when the attacker is a minimax adversary as in Section 3.3.3, his
maximum loss always corresponds with the defender correctly guessing the aver-
age data-stream bit rate θ aggravated by his choice of a. Therefore, he would be
compelled to do nothing (a = 0 Kbps) and, thus:
pˆMD (-25) = 0, pˆ
M
D (0) = 1.
This leads to the same decision (3.7) as in the non-adversarial problem, as can be
verified by replacing pD(a) with pˆ
M
D (a) in (3.5).
On the contrary, when the attacker is Bayesian as in Section 3.3.3, simulation scheme
(3.6) may be applied. To keep computations simple, the attacker will be presumed
to consider that the defender will just make n = 1 observations, though uncertainty
around this fact could also be introduced. A computational environment implement-
ing (3.6) has been developed in MATLAB (Appendix B.2). Using K = 104 iterations,
the following probabilities are obtained:
pˆBD(-25) = 0.695, pˆ
B
D(0) = 0.305.
Thus, he is more likely to perform his attack than not. Then, making use of (3.5),
the defender may compute her optimal decision, given observations (x1, . . . , xn), by
minimising in d
pˆBD(-25)
∫
(θ − d)2 1
σD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(θ−µD)2
2σ2D
) n∏
i=1
1
ρD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(xi−θ+25)2
2ρ2D
)
dθ
+ pˆBD(0)
∫
(θ − d)2 1
σD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(θ−µD)2
2σ2D
) n∏
i=1
1
ρD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(xi−θ)2
2ρ2D
)
dθ.
This may be simplified in the same manner as the non-adversarial version to find
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the equivalent problem of minimising in d
pˆBD(-25) ξ(x, -25)
(
d2 − 2d µD ρ
2
D+σ
2
D
∑n
i=1 (xi+25)
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
)
+ pˆBD(0) ξ(x, 0)
(
d2 − 2d µD ρ
2
D+σ
2
D
∑n
i=1 xi
ρ2D+nσ
2
D
)
where
ξ(x, a) = exp
(
(µD ρ2D+σ2D
∑n
i=1 (xi−a))
2
2 ρ2D σ
2
D(ρ2D+nσ2D)
−
∑n
i=1 (xi−a)2
2 ρ2D
)
,
whose minimum is
d∗(x) =
µD ρ
2
D
ρ2D + nσ
2
D
+σ2D
pˆBD(-25) ξ(x, -25)
∑n
i=1 (xi + 25) + pˆ
B
D(0) ξ(x, 0)
∑n
i=1 xi
(ρ2D + nσ
2
D) (pˆ
B
D(-25) ξ(x, -25) + pˆ
B
D(0) ξ(x, 0))
.
Employing the explicit parameters:
d∗(x) =
32 +
0.695 ξ(x, -25)
∑n
i=1 (xi + 25) + 0.305 ξ(x, 0)
∑n
i=1 xi
0.695 ξ(x, -25) + 0.305 ξ(x, 0)
0.16 + n
with
ξ(x, a) = exp
(
(32 +
∑n
i=1 (xi − a))2
32 + 200n
−
∑n
i=1 (xi − a)2
200
)
.
Aggregating the different solution concepts (Bayesian and minimax) as in Sec-
tion 3.3.3, the defender’s optimal decision may be determined, given observations
(x1, . . . , xn), by minimising in d
piB pˆ
B
D(-25)
∫
(θ − d)2 1
σD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(θ−µD)2
2σ2D
) n∏
i=1
1
ρD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(xi−θ+25)2
2ρ2D
)
dθ
+
(
piM + piB pˆ
B
D(0)
) ∫
(θ − d)2 1
σD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(θ−µD)2
2σ2D
) n∏
i=1
1
ρD
√
2pi
exp
(
−(xi−θ)2
2ρ2D
)
dθ,
whose solution is
d∗(x) =
µD ρ
2
D
ρ2D + nσ
2
D
+σ2D
piB pˆ
B
D(-25) ξ(x, -25)
∑n
i=1 (xi + 25) +
(
piM + piB pˆ
B
D(0)
)
ξ(x, 0)
∑n
i=1 xi
(ρ2D + nσ
2
D) (piB pˆ
B
D(-25) ξ(x, -25) + (piM + piB pˆ
B
D(0)) ξ(x, 0))
.
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Then, using the specific parameters:
d∗(x) =
32 +
0.436 ξ(x, -25)
∑n
i=1 (xi + 25) + 0.537 ξ(x, 0)
∑n
i=1 xi
0.436 ξ(x, -25) + 0.537 ξ(x, 0)
0.16 + n
.
Table 3.1 summarises the different optimal estimations obtained with all the con-
sidered solution concepts. As stressed in Section 3.3.2, in an adversary-unaware sit-
uation (non-adversarial) the defender would systematically misestimate the drone’s
average data-stream bit rate in case that the attacker perturbs the process. With an
ARA approach, the defender would fully acknowledge his presence in the problem
and take into account all reasonable attack strategies through concept uncertainty,
adjusting her assessment accordingly.
Solution Concept Optimal Estimation
Non-Adversarial
32 +
∑n
i=1 xi
0.16 + n
Minimax Adv.
32 +
∑n
i=1 xi
0.16 + n
Bayesian Adv.
32 +
0.695 ξ(x, -25)
∑n
i=1 (xi + 25) + 0.305 ξ(x, 0)
∑n
i=1 xi
0.695 ξ(x, -25) + 0.305 ξ(x, 0)
0.16 + n
Uncertain Adv.
32 +
0.436 ξ(x, -25)
∑n
i=1 (xi + 25) + 0.537 ξ(x, 0)
∑n
i=1 xi
0.436 ξ(x, -25) + 0.537 ξ(x, 0)
0.16 + n
Table 3.1: Defender’s optimal estimations for each solution concept
3.5 Recapitulation
Concept uncertainty within the ARA framework has been exemplified in ASDT,
specified through point estimation. Only one out of the three outlined ASDT for-
mulations, that of structural adversaries, was dwelt with using concept uncertainty,
yet that of data-fiddler adversaries is deeply studied under an ARA perspective
portrayed as the AHT problem in next chapter. The approach has been general
extending beyond point estimation and may be applied to other standard statisti-
cal problems, including not only hypothesis testing but also interval estimation and
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forecasting. Two solution concepts have been used, namely Bayesian and minimax
adversaries, along with an aggregating procedure to deal with concept uncertainty.
A spy drone detection example based on Nassi et al. [2018] has illustrated an ad-
versarial point estimation situation. This could be further sophisticated by means
of considering the adversary to be not just structural but also data-fiddler and/or
simultaneous. The expressions providing the optimal estimations have been numer-
ically approximated in MATLAB, with code available in Appendix B.2.
Chapter 4
Adversarial hypothesis testing
In the present chapter, an alternative novel ARA approach to the AHT problem is
procured. This problem considers a decision-maker who needs to assess which of
several hypotheses holds, based on observations from a source that might have been
disturbed by an adversary. In line with Dalvi et al. [2004] and Barni and Tondi
[2014], the adopted basic AHT framework coincides with that of ASDT Scenario
S2 in Section 3.2 in which the opponent is regarded as a data-fiddler adversary.
However, a modification of the problem’s structure is also developed, exemplified in
a batch acceptance context, to reflect an alternative situation where the decision-
maker only has partial information on the observations.
To start with, Section 4.1 devises the ASDT problem under the case of a data-fiddler
adversary. In Section 4.2, the elementary AHT problem under an ARA perspective
is formalised and a conceptual solution focusing on binary point hypothesis testing
supplied, as well as an illustrative numerical example and a comparison with a
game-theoretic paradigm. Last, Section 4.3 describes in depth an extension of the
above AHT model to an application associated with batch acceptance. Section 4.4
provides a recapitulation.
4.1 Data-fiddler adversaries in ASDT
The problem of ASDT considering data-fiddler adversaries was illustrated in Figure
3.2b of the previous chapter through a BAID. Essentially, depending on an uncertain
state θ, a decision-maker ought to receive some original data x and then make a
decision d for which she perceives a loss lD(d, θ). However, x gets perturbed in
advance into y through her adversary’s action a who obtains a loss lA(d, θ, a). Thus,
the decision-maker actually observes y, while x and θ remain unknown to her.
55
56 Adversarial hypothesis testing
As an example, a security agent (decision-maker, defender) may be screening incom-
ing e-mails. She does not know θ, an indicator of potential security issues associated
with them. Her observations could be based on the length of the e-mails, the types
of attachments, the presence of certain words, the sending address, etc. A cyber-
criminal (data-fiddler adversary, attacker) might distort that information through
subterfuge, e.g. adding or deleting certain words, using an apparently legal source
address and so on, to make her believe that the e-mails are legit and, as a conse-
quence, obtain some benefit.
In this framework, the adversary decides upon his action first, then the decision-
maker chooses hers after observing the manipulated data and, finally, both agents
take in their losses. In general, the adversary is presumed to allow for some loss
related to the resources or effort spent in disturbing the information. This is reflected
by the dependence of his loss on his implemented action. In the e-mail screening
example, the attacker incurs in monetary costs to purchase an IP, spends some
time to appropriately craft the e-mail and commits a crime when forging it, all
constituting real or potential losses. Opportunity costs may all also be taken into
account through this dependence.
The problem that the decision-maker needs to solve is described in the ID in Figure
4.1a. Not knowing her adversary’s choice, as customary, decision node (A) turns
out as random to her. In a standard decision-theoretic approach, the decision-maker
would solve
d∗(y) = arg min
d
∫
lD(d, θ) pD(θ | y) dθ. (4.1)
Bayes’ formula may be used to obtain
pD(θ | y) = pD(θ, y)
pD(y)
=
1
pD(y)
∫∫
pD(y |x, a) pD(x | θ) pD(θ) pD(a) dx da, (4.2)
so her optimal decision is equivalent to
d∗(y) = arg min
d
∫∫∫
lD(d, θ) pD(y |x, a) pD(x | θ) pD(θ) pD(a) dx dθ da.
Of all the assessments required to evaluate the ID, lD(d, θ), pD(y |x, a), pD(x | θ)
and pD(θ) are standard in Bayesian SDT. The only distinctive one is pD(a) (the
decision-maker’s forecast over the action a) which entails strategic thinking. The
ARA approach to ASDT determines it by focusing on the problem that the adversary
solves, represented in the ID in Figure 4.1b. This analysis assumes that he wants to
minimise his expected loss. For his decision-theoretic solution, he solves
a∗ = arg min
a
∫∫∫∫
lA(d, θ, a) pA(d | y) pA(y |x, a) pA(x | θ) pA(θ) dd dy dx dθ. (4.3)
Note that, unlike the decision-maker’s, her adversary’s actions are taken before
making any observations.
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lDD A
(a) Decision-maker’s problem
Θ
X
Y
lAD A
(b) Adversary’s problem
Figure 4.1: Both agents’ IDs for a data-fiddler adversary in ASDT
As usual, the decision-maker lacks knowledge about the loss function and probabil-
ities used by her adversary. Modelling her uncertainty about them through random
losses and probabilities F ∼ (LA(d, θ, a), PA(d | y), PA(y |x, a), PA(x | θ), PA(θ)), she
would solve
A∗ = arg min
a
∫∫∫∫
LA(d, θ, a)PA(d | y)PA(y |x, a)PA(x | θ)PA(θ) dd dy dx dθ
to find the optimal random decision A∗. Thus, the decision-maker comes up with the
distribution pD(a) = Pr(A
∗ = a) in the discrete case and, similarly, in the continuous
one, that she needs to ascertain her best decision d∗(y). All of her uncertainty about
her adversary’s situation is properly embodied in it.
K samples
(
LkA(d, θ, a), P
k
A(d | y), P kA(y |x, a), P kA(x | θ), P kA(θ)
)
, k = 1, . . . , K, would
be drawn from F to approximate pD(a) through simulation, in line with Section
3.3.3, procuring
A∗k = arg min
a
∫∫∫∫
LkA(d, θ, a)P
k
A(d | y)P kA(y |x, a)P kA(x | θ)P kA(θ) dd dy dx dθ
and estimating
pˆD(a) ≈ #{A∗k = a}/K.
As in Chapters 2 and 3, four of the components of F are relatively easy to model,
see Banks et al. [2015]:
• PA(θ) could be based on pD(θ) incorporating some uncertainty about it. For
example, should pD(θ) be a discrete distribution, PA(θ) could be modelled as
a Dirichlet distribution with mean pD(θ), employing the same techniques pre-
sented in Section 2.4.2. Similarly, should pD(θ) be a continuous distribution,
PA(θ) could be modelled as a Dirichlet process with base measure pD(θ).
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• Analogously, PA(y |x, a) could be built from pD(y |x, a) with some uncertainty.
• This would also apply to PA(x | θ), which could be formed on pD(x | θ) with
additional uncertainty about it (although in many cases it will be reasonable
to accept that they genuinely coincide).
• For LA(d, θ, a), one could normally reflect upon the adversary’s interests, for-
mulate a parametric form for the loss function and appraise a subjective dis-
tribution over its parameters, as conducted in Section 2.4.2.
On the other hand, it is not easy to assess PA(d | y), since it demands strategic
thinking and the decision-maker is required to conceive her adversary’s convictions
on what decision she will support given that she observes y. This predicament was
discussed in Section 3.3.3.
4.2 The elementary AHT problem
The ASDT framework in the preceding section is now adapted to the hypothesis
testing context. Focus shall be on the problem of testing two simple hypotheses
described by Θ = {θ0, θ1}. Continuing with the e-mail screening example, suppose
the defender needs to decide whether a batch of e-mails includes spam or not. She
has beliefs about the standard stream of legit and spam messages, but an attacker
perturbs such stream by adding, deleting or modifying some of the messages, in an
attempt to confound her and obtain some benefit. Both agents get different rewards
depending on whether the batch is accepted by the defender and includes any spam.
The backbone structure of the AHT problem coincides with that of a data-fiddler
adversary scenario in the ASDT problem, covered in Section 4.1. Depending on the
uncertain hypothesis θ ∈ Θ, there will be an observation data-stream x which gets
perturbed to y by the adversary’s action a. The modified data-stream y is the one
perceived by the decision-maker, who needs to decide which is the relevant hypothe-
sis θ. She makes such decision d without observing neither x nor θ. Depending on d
and the actual hypothesis θ, both agents receive their corresponding losses. Besides,
the adversary is assumed to spend some effort in performing the attack, as reflected
by the dependence of his loss on the attack he implements. The aim is to support
the decision-maker in choosing the appropriate hypothesis.
4.2.1 Solving the decision-maker’s problem
The problem the decision-maker needs to solve was depicted in Figure 4.1a. Her
decision space is {d0, d1}, with dj denoting her support for θj, j = 0, 1. Following
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a standard Bayesian decision-theoretic approach, suppose that the decision-maker
may elicit the following judgements:
• At node Θ, pD(θ) models her beliefs about the various hypotheses, which are
designated
pD(θ = θj) = pi
j
D, j = 0, 1,
with pijD ≥ 0 and pi0D + pi1D = 1.
• At node X, pD(x | θ) expresses her opinion about how data x would depend
on each hypothesis θj, j = 0, 1.
• At node Y , pD(y |x, a) describes her understanding about how data will be
perturbed: it reflects her notion about what would the observed y be, if x is
the relevant data and a is her adversary’s selected action.
• At node A, pD(a) portrays her convictions about which attack a would be
undertaken by her adversary.
• At node lD, lD(d, θ) represents the decision-maker’s loss function. A standard
0-1-cD loss function as in Table 4.1 is used, where 0 is the best loss (associated
with a system functioning as expected) and 1 is the worst (related to a non-
functioning system). Thus, it is assumed that 0 ≤ cD ≤ 1.
Actual Hypothesis
θ0 θ1
D’s
Decision
d0 0 1
d1 cD 0
Table 4.1: Decision-maker’s loss function
The decision-maker would then solve (4.1) getting
arg min
d
1∑
j=0
lD(d, θj) pD(θj | y).
After simple computations, it follows that her optimal decision would be to support
θ0 if and only if
pD(θ1 | y) ≤ cD pD(θ0 | y).
Making use of (4.2) results in
pD(θj | y) = pi
j
D
pD(y)
∫∫
pD(y |x, a) pD(x | θj) pD(a) dx da, j = 0, 1.
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Therefore, the optimal decision for the decision-maker would be d0 if and only if
pi1D
∫∫
pD(y |x, a) pD(x | θ1) pD(a) dx da
≤
cD pi
0
D
∫∫
pD(y |x, a) pD(x | θ0) pD(a) dx da.
(4.4)
As in Section 4.1, among the required assessments, the one related to pD(a) is non-
standard and involves strategic thinking. Its estimation is facilitated by considering
the problem that her adversary should elucidate.
4.2.2 Modelling the adversary’s problem
Figure 4.1b provided the adversary’s decision-making problem, assuming that he
aims at minimising expected loss. For its decision-theoretic solution, the adversary
would need the subsequent appreciations:
• At node Θ, pA(θ) models his beliefs about the likelihood of the hypotheses,
which are designated
pA(θ = θj) = pi
j
A, j = 0, 1,
with pijA ≥ 0 and pi0A + pi1A = 1.
• At node X, pA(x | θ) expresses his opinion about the data-stream x, for each
hypothesis θj, j = 0, 1.
• At node Y , pA(y |x, a) describes his understanding about what would the effect
of his actions a be in transforming the data x to y.
• At node D, pA(d | y) portrays his convictions about the decision-maker’s deci-
sion d provided that she observes y.
• At node lA, lA(d, θ, a) represents the adversary’s loss function, structured as
in Table 4.2. Typically, l00(a) ≥ l01(a) and l10(a) ≤ l11(a), since it is better
for him when the defender makes mistakes.
Actual Hypothesis
θ0 θ1
D’s
Decision
d0 l00(a) l01(a)
d1 l10(a) l11(a)
Table 4.2: Adversary’s loss function, given attack a
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An important case is described in Table 4.3, where 0 ≤ c0A ≤ c1A ≤ 1 is
assumed. This reflects that 0 is the adversary’s best loss (attained when the
decision-maker supports θ0 and she should not), while 1 is his worst (obtained
when the decision-maker upholds θ0 and she should). The intermediate cases
manifest that it is worse for the adversary that the decision-maker favours θ1
when the actual hypothesis is θ1 (incurring in costs and motivating security
awareness) than when it is θ0 (avoiding costs and inducing disproportionate
security exigence).
Actual Hypothesis
θ0 θ1
D’s
Decision
d0 1 0
d1 c
0
A c
1
A
Table 4.3: Adversary’s loss function
Should the above assessments be available, plugging them in (4.3), the optimal
decision a∗ for the adversary would be
a∗ = arg min
a
1∑
i,j=0
pijA
∫∫
lA(di, θj, a) pA(di | y) pA(y |x, a) pA(x | θj) dy dx.
However, as common knowledge is not applicable, the decision-maker resorts to
random losses and probabilities as in Section 4.1 and solves instead
A∗ = arg min
a
1∑
i,j=0
ΠjA
∫∫
LA(di, θj, a)PA(di | y)PA(y |x, a)PA(x | θj) dy dx. (4.5)
4.2.3 AHT: A numerical example
The previous ideas for the AHT problem are illustrated with a numerical exam-
ple in which a defender (decision-maker) monitors continuous positive observations
perturbed by an attacker (adversary). The two entertained hypotheses are θ0 = 2
and θ1 = 1. Required elements are displayed as introduced in Section 4.2.1 for the
defender’s problem:
• As for the priors over the hypotheses, both are assumed to be equally likely a
priori, so that pi0D = pi
1
D =
1
2
.
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• With regard to pD(x | θ), the defender receives data x exponentially distributed
Exp(θj), with uncertainty about the parameter θj, j = 0, 1.
• The attacker may modify data x according to a strategy which allows for keep-
ing, doubling or halving its value. Such actions shall be respectively denoted
a0, a1 and a2: if x is the actual value, the defender will perceive y = x if
the attacker chooses a0, whereas y = 2x and y = x/2 will be the observed
values if the attacker chooses a1 and a2, respectively. Therefore, distributions
pD(y |x, a) are Dirac measures with support at y = x (a0), y = 2x (a1) and
y = x/2 (a2).
• As an illustration, start by contemplating the case in which the defender knows
the probabilities pD(a) with which the attacker chooses among his actions.
Suppose, for the moment, that pD(a0) =
1
2
, pD(a1) =
1
6
and pD(a2) =
1
3
.
• The loss function in Table 4.1 is considered for lD(d, θ), with cD = 34 .
Recall (4.4), leading the defender to adopt decision d0 (accept θ0). In this case,
using lD(d, θ), pD(x | θ) and pD(y |x, a), such condition becomes
pi1D
[
θ1 e
−θ1 y pD(a0) + θ1 e
−θ1 y2 pD(a1) + θ1 e−θ1 2y pD(a2)
]
≤
3
4
pi0D
[
θ0 e
−θ0 y pD(a0) + θ0 e
−θ0 y2 pD(a1) + θ0 e−θ0 2y pD(a2)
]
.
Substituting the specific values of θ0, θ1, pi
0
D and pi
1
D, results in
1
2
[
pD(a0) e
−y + pD(a1) e
−y
2 + pD(a2) e
−2y
]
≤
3
8
[2pD(a0) e
−2y + 2pD(a1) e−y + 2pD(a2) e−4y] .
(4.6)
Finally, the incorporation of the particular pD(a) produces
1
2
[
1
2
e−y + 1
6
e−
y
2 + 1
3
e−2y
]
≤ 3
8
[
e−2y + 1
3
e−y + 2
3
e−4y
]
,
which gets simplified to checking the inequality
2e−
y
2 + 3e−y − 5e−2y − 6e−4y ≤ 0.
It may be estimated that decision d0 should be made when a value y . 0.372 is
observed. However, a slight change of the parameters might deliver a completely
different result. For example, with pi0D =
1
3
(and pi1D =
2
3
), and all other probabilities
and costs as above, d1 is optimal regardless of the observed y. In addition, note that
an adversary-unaware defender would expect pD(a0) = 1 (and pD(a1) = pD(a2) = 0),
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alternatively leading in (4.6) to support d0 when a value y . 0.405 is perceived and,
thus, biasing the choice in favour of θ0.
Consider now the case in which the defender does not accurately know pD(a). To
comply with the ARA approach, assume that the following assessments from Section
4.2.2 are made:
• The defender considers that Π0A ∼ U(0.25, 0.75) is drawn uniformly (and Π1A =
1− Π0A).
• The defender’s knowledge of PA(x | θ), where θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}, is modelled as a
Gamma distribution Ga(α, β) with mean θ = α/β and variance σ2 = α/β2 ∼
U(0.5, 2) uniformly distributed. This variance randomness induces that of
PA(x | θ).
• The PA(y |x, a) distributions will be Dirac, coinciding with the defender’s
pD(y |x, a).
• Distribution PA(d | y) is built based on the likelihood h(y | d, a) of y under
different choices of d and a, mixing them through a random allocation of
probabilities to each action. Suppose that the defender assumes that the
attacker thinks she is modelling the data with an exponential distribution,
assessing the probabilities (0, 1, 2) assigned by him to each strategy through
a Dirichlet distribution Dir(1, 1, 1). Then, PA(d0 | y) has the subsequent form:
g(0, 1, 2, y) =
∑2
j=0 j h(y | d0, aj)∑2
j=0 j h(y | d0, aj) +
∑2
j=0 j h(y | d1, aj)
=
2 (0 e
−2y + 1 e−y + 2 e−4y)
2 (0 e−2y + 1 e−y + 2 e−4y) + 0 e−y + 1 e
−y
2 + 2 e−2y
.
The distribution of (0, 1, 2) causes the randomness of PA(d0 | y). Finally,
PA(d1 | y) = 1− PA(d0 | y).
• The random loss function LA(d, θ, a) is as in Table 4.3, where C0A ≡ 0 is
degenerate and C1A ∼ U(0.5, 1) is uniformly distributed.
Taking into account the characterisation of LA(d, θ, a) and PA(y |x, a) in (4.5), the
attacker’s random expected losses for his three actions will be:
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ΨA(a0) = Π
0
A
∫
PA(d0 | y = x)PA(x | θ0) dx
+C1A Π
1
A
∫
PA(d1 | y = x)PA(x | θ1) dx,
ΨA(a1) = Π
0
A
∫
PA(d0 | y = 2x)PA(x | θ0) dx
+C1A Π
1
A
∫
PA(d1 | y = 2x)PA(x | θ1) dx,
ΨA(a2) = Π
0
A
∫
PA(d0 | y = x2 )PA(x | θ0) dx
+C1A Π
1
A
∫
PA(d1 | y = x2 )PA(x | θ1) dx.
The random models for LA(d, θ, a), PA(θ), PA(x | θ) and PA(d | y) induce the ran-
domness in these expected losses. The attack probabilities are estimated as follows:
Algorithm 5 AHT: Simulation of attack probabilities
Data: Hypotheses θ0 and θ1; number of iterations K.
1: Set pj = 0, j = 0, 1, 2.
2: For k = 1 to K do
3: Generate pi0,kA ∼ U(0.25, 0.75) and compute pi1,kA = 1− pi0,kA .
4: Generate σ2i,k ∼ U(0.5, 2) and compute αki = θ2i /σ2i,k; βki = θi/σ2i,k, i = 0, 1.
5: Generate (k0, 
k
1, 
k
2) ∼ Dir(1, 1, 1) and C1,kA ∼ U(0.5, 1).
6: ΨkA(a0) = pi
0,k
A
∫
(1− g(k0, k1, k2, x)) f(x |αk0, βk0 ) dx
+ C1,kA pi
1,k
A
∫
g(k0, 
k
1, 
k
2, x) f(x |αk1, βk1 ) dx.
7: ΨkA(a1) = pi
0,k
A
∫
(1− g(k0, k1, k2, 2x)) f(x |αk0, βk0 ) dx
+ C1,kA pi
1,k
A
∫
g(k0, 
k
1, 
k
2, 2x) f(x |αk1, βk1 ) dx.
8: ΨkA(a2) = pi
0,k
A
∫
(1− g(k0, k1, k2, x/2)) f(x |αk0, βk0 ) dx
+ C1,kA pi
1,k
A
∫
g(k0, 
k
1, 
k
2, x/2) f(x |αk1, βk1 ) dx.
9: Find j∗ = arg min
j
ΨkA(aj).
10: Set pj∗ = pj∗ + 1.
11: End For
12: Set pˆD(aj) = pj/K, j = 0, 1, 2.
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An application in R (Appendix B.3) of Algorithm 5 with K = 105 iterations leads
to estimates pˆD(a0) ≈ 0.04, pˆD(a1) ≈ 0.85 and pˆD(a2) ≈ 0.11. Plugging such values
in (4.6), the optimal decision is d0 when a value y . 0.737 is observed, which differs
from the Bayesian solution obtained earlier.
4.2.4 A game-theoretic perspective
In order to provide a broader understanding of the benefits of the ARA approach
to the AHT problem, a standard game-theoretic perspective to it is presented here.
The numerical example in the previous section is employed for this purpose.
Within the game-theoretic framework, both agents’ loss functions are redefined in
terms of their combined decisions. If the defender’s decision is d and the attacker’s
is a, the defender’s (equivalent) expected payoff is
ψD(d, y, a) =
1∑
j=0
pijD
∫
lD(d, θj) pD(y |x, a) pD(x | θj) dx,
and that of the attacker is
ψA(d, a) =
1∑
j=0
pijA lA(d, θj, a).
Under common knowledge assumptions, if a Nash equilibrium (d∗(y), a∗) exists, then
it must satisfy
ψD(d
∗(y), y, a∗) ≤ ψD(d, y, a∗), ∀d ∈ {d0, d1};
ψA(d
∗(y), a∗) ≤ ψD(d∗(y), a), ∀a ∈ {a0, a1, a2}.
When replicating the numerical example in Section 4.2.3, the elements involved
in the defender’s problem coincide, while those required for the attacker’s prob-
lem shall be based on the means of the defender’s assessments of the specified
probability distributions. Thus, pi0A = E [U(0.25, 0.75)] = 12 = pi1A, c0A = 0 and
c1A = E [U(0.5, 1)] = 34 . The defender’s expected payoff is determined then as
ψD(d0, y, a0) =
1
2
e−y, ψD(d0, y, a1) = 12e
−y
2 , ψD(d0, y, a2) =
1
2
e−2y,
ψD(d1, y, a0) =
3
4
e−2y, ψD(d1, y, a1) = 34e
−y, ψD(d1, y, a2) = 34e
−4y.
That of the attacker is
ψA(d0, a) =
1
2
, ψD(d1, a) =
3
8
, ∀a ∈ {a0, a1, a2}.
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Only a Bayes-Nash equilibrium may be found. The attacker would rely on any of
his three possible attacks (a0, a1 and a2) with probability
1
3
; the defender, also with
probability 1
3
, would follow one of the three corresponding matching decision rules:
choose d0 if y . 0.405 (R0), choose d0 if y . 0.811 (R1) and choose d0 if y . 0.203
(R2).
The defender could deviate from the mixed-strategies Nash equilibrium and just
adopt one of the decision rules in terms of her risk attitude towards adopting d0,
where R2 is the most conservative, R1 the least and R0 in-between. In any case,
the obtained game-theoretic decision rules do not aggregate all of her uncertainty,
but rather condense it around the different attacker’s choices. On the contrary, the
ARA solution (4.6) provides the defender with a precise decision rule that takes
into account both her aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. Moreover, ideas in Chap-
ter 3 could be applied to deal with concept uncertainty and even combine, among
others, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium solution with the level-2 thinking ARA solution
developed in this chapter.
4.3 A batch acceptance model
As a significant example of how the structure of the elementary AHT problem may
be extended to more sophisticated situations, a model for batch acceptance is consid-
ered. The problem dealt with is deciding whether to accept a batch of items received
over a period of time among which some of them could be faulty, thus entailing po-
tential security and/or performance problems. This type of issues arise in areas such
as screening containers at international ports, filtering batches of electronic messages
or admitting packages of perishable products or electronic components. The main
difference with the AHT model in Section 4.2 is that, in this case, the decision-
maker has only partial information on the observations and the consequences of
her decision do not depend explicitly on the relevant hypothesis but on the observed
data. A non-adversarial version of the problem is first described, which is afterwards
modified to include adversaries.
4.3.1 Problem setting
The problem initially faced is outlined in Figure 4.2. Its structure is similar to
the SDT problem depicted in Figure 3.1, except for two key differences. One is
minor, since two influencing states are considered, called θ and γ, as well as two
pieces of information: the batch size m (observed when making the decision) and its
composition (unobserved when making the decision) with x acceptable items and
m − x faulty items. The second one is major, since the relevant hypothesis (the
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batch acceptability) does not directly rely on parameters θ and γ, but is rather
determined by data m and x (in particular, by the presence of faulty items).
X
Θ Γ
M
lDD
Figure 4.2: Outline of the non-adversarial batch acceptance problem
The problem is specified as follows:
• A defender (decision-maker) receives a batch with two types of items (X): 0,
associated with acceptable items; and 1, corresponding to faulty ones. She
needs to decide (D) whether to accept (d0) or reject (d1) the batch.
• The defender observes the size of the batch (M), which is related with certain
parameter (Γ). To fix ideas, assume that, over a period of duration 1, the
number of items m follows a Poisson distribution with an average of γ items
so that m | γ ∼ Po(γ). In addition, suppose that the prior over γ is a Gamma
distribution Ga(a, b). After t periods in which, in total, r items have arrived,
the posterior is γ | t, r ∼ Ga(a + r, b + t). Note that γ will have no impact in
the non-adversarial version, as the defender observes the actual value of m.
However, it will provide useful information about m in the adversarial case in
Section 4.3.2.
• The probability that an item is acceptable is determined by another param-
eter (Θ). If Z is used to designate this (z = 0, an acceptable item; z = 1,
otherwise), pD(z = 0 | θ) = θ. The number of acceptable items x among the
total amount m will have a binomial distribution x |m, θ ∼ Bin(m, θ). To
complete model specification, consider that prior beliefs about θ are modelled
through a Beta distribution Be(α, β). If after receiving r items, s have been
acceptable (and r − s, faulty), the posterior is θ | r, s ∼ Be(α + s, β + r − s).
As for the loss function lD, numerous forms may be contemplated. Two are men-
tioned here, although only the first one shall be used in the adversarial problem in
Section 4.3.2.
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Form A: Winner takes it all
A batch with m items is received in a given period. In this scenario, just allowing
one faulty item is as bad as allowing several of them, because of the entailed security
and/or performance issues. The loss composition is displayed in Table 4.4, where
c describes the (expected) opportunity costs associated with rejecting a batch with
all acceptable items.
Batch of m Items
All Acceptable Some Faulty
θm 1− θm Exp. Loss
D’s
Decision
Accept, d0 0 1 1− θm
Reject, d1 c 0 c θ
m
Table 4.4: Defender’s loss function (A)
The expected losses of decisions d0 (accept) and d1 (reject) are
ψD(d0) = Eθ [1− θm] = 1− Eθ [θm] , ψD(d1) = Eθ [c θm] = cEθ [θm] .
Then, the defender’s optimal decision is to accept the batch (d0) if and only if
1− Eθ [θm] ≤ cEθ [θm] ⇐⇒ Eθ [θm] ≥ 1
1 + c
.
Since Eθ [θ
m] decreases as m increases, there will be a threshold value mA such that
if m > mA, the decision would be to reject the batch (d1). In particular, with the
posterior Be(α + s, β + r − s) model for θ, it follows that
Eθ [θ
m] =
m−1∏
k=0
α + s+ k
α + β + r + k
, (4.7)
and mA may be recursively obtained.
Form B: Each fault counts
In this case, the loss will depend on the number m − x of faulty items included
in the batch, because of the increased security and/or performance problems. The
relevant loss structure is displayed in Table 4.5, where the new parameter c′ reflects
the (expected) loss per faulty item accepted.
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Batch of m Items
All Acceptable x Acceptable
θm
(
m
x
)
θx (1−θ)m−x Exp. Loss
D’s
Decision
Accept, d0 0 (m− x) c′ mc′ (1− θ)
Reject, d1 c 0 c θ
m
Table 4.5: Defender’s loss function (B)
The expected losses of both decisions are
ψD(d0) = Eθ [mc
′ (1− θ)] = mc′ (1− Eθ [θ]), ψD(d1) = Eθ [c θm] = cEθ [θm] .
Therefore, the defender’s optimal action is to accept the batch (d0) if and only if
mc′ (1− Eθ [θ]) ≤ cEθ [θm] ⇐⇒ Eθ [θ
m]
m
≥ c
′
c
(1− Eθ [θ]).
As with the previous loss function’s form, since Eθ [θ
m] decreases as m increases,
there will be a threshold value mB such that if m > mB, the decision would be to
reject the batch (d1). Specifically, with the posterior Be(α+ s, β + r− s) model for
θ, the decision is to accept the batch (d0) if and only if
Eθ [θ
m]
m
≥ c
′
c
β + r − s
α + β + r
,
where, once again, (4.7) may be used to find mB recursively.
4.3.2 Adversarial problem
The adversarial version is now engaged, considering the loss in Section 4.3.1 (Form
A). As represented in the BAID in Figure 4.3, an attacker (adversary) is faced
who might alter the received batch so as to confound the defender to reach some
objectives.
70 Adversarial hypothesis testing
X Y
Θ Γ
MN
lD lAD A
Figure 4.3: ARA modelling of the batch acceptance problem
The original batch x is influenced by parameters γ, which regulates the number m
of items received, and θ, which conditions their quality. The attacker knows the size
m of the batch before choosing his attack, possibly modifying the size of the final
batch y to n, which is observed by the defender before making her decision. The
problems of the defender and attacker are, respectively, displayed in Figures 4.4a
and 4.4b.
X Y
Θ Γ
MN
lDD A
(a) Defender’s problem
X Y
Θ Γ
MN
lAD A
(b) Attacker’s problem
Figure 4.4: Both agents’ IDs for the batch acceptance problem
Three possible attack Tactics T1, T2 and T3 are gradually studied, identifying the
attacker’s decision variables, how the item arrival process changes, the attacker’s
loss function and the solution. The final number of items in a batch will be n, with
x acceptable items and m−x original faulty ones, designated outer faults (O-faults).
The remaining n−m items correspond to faulty items introduced by the attacker,
called A-faults. The attacker’s loss is smaller (greater benefit) if the defender accepts
an A-fault rather than an O-fault.
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T1: A-fault injection
Within this tactic, the attacker injects y1 of his faulty items. The data received
by the defender includes x acceptable items, m − x O-faults and y1 A-faults. The
attacker needs to decide y1, which is random to the defender. As announced in
Section 4.3.1, γ will be relevant here, since it provides information about m.
Suppose first that the defender knows the distribution pD(y1 |m), describing her
beliefs about how many faulty items will be injected by the attacker if the original
batch size were m. The loss function for the defender is as in Table 4.6, where the
probability of having a final batch size of n = m+ y1 items, given γ, is
p1(n | γ) =
n∑
i=0
pD(y1 = n− i |m = i) pD(m = i | γ),
reflecting the possible initial sizes of the batch and the included faulty items. The
probability that all those items are acceptable (x = m and y1 = 0) is
q1(n | γ) = pD(y1 = 0 |m = n) pD(m = n | γ)
p1(n | γ) θ
n,
since the only combination for an acceptable final batch is having n initial acceptable
items (x = m = n) and no faulty items injected (y1 = 0).
Final Batch of n Items
All Acceptable Some Faulty
q1(n |γ) 1− q1(n |γ) Exp. Loss
D’s
Decision
Accept, d0 0 1 1− q1(n | γ)
Reject, d1 c 0 c q1(n | γ)
Table 4.6: Defender’s loss function (T1)
The expected losses of decisions d0 (accept) and d1 (reject) are
ψD(d0) = 1− Eθ,γ [q1(n | γ)] , ψD(d1) = cEθ,γ [q1(n | γ)] .
Then, the rule is to accept the batch (d0) if and only if
Eθ,γ [q1(n | γ)] ≥ 1
1 + c
,
whose evaluation would typically require simulation.
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An ARA procedure is now provided to estimate the crucial quantities pD(y1 |m) and,
thus, q1(n | γ). Consider the attacker’s loss function depicted in Table 4.7, which
depends on the batch composition and the decision made by the defender, as well as
on his own choice. It holds that x ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} and y1 ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. The involved
parameters are the expected gain h due to each O-fault, the expected gain g due to
each A-fault and the unitary cost f of injecting A-faults.
Final Batch Composition
Acceptable O-Fault A-Fault
x m− x y1
D’s
Decision
Accept, d0 0 −h f − g
Reject, d1 0 0 f
Table 4.7: Attacker’s loss per item (T1)
Given that the attacker chooses y1, his losses associated with both defender’s deci-
sions are
lA(d0, y1) = −h (m− x) + (f − g) y1, lA(d1, y1) = f y1.
Knowing the original batch size m, the attacker selects y1 to minimise his expected
loss, which is
ΨA(y1 |m) = pA(d0 |n = m+ y1)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
lA(d0, y1) pA(x |m, θ)
)
pA(θ) dθ
+ (1− pA(d0 |n = m+ y1)) lA(d1, y1)
= y1 (f − g pA(d0 |n = m+ y1))
−h pA(d0 |n = m+ y1)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
(m− x) pA(x |m, θ)
)
pA(θ) dθ,
where pA(d0 |n = m+ y1) reflects his beliefs about the defender’s decision being to
accept the batch (d0), given that she perceives the batch size to be n = m+ y1.
Since the defender lacks information about the attacker’s loss function and proba-
bilities, as usual, she may model her uncertainty about them through random losses
and probabilities
(
F,G,H, PA(d0 |n), PA(x |m, θ), PA(θ)
)
and look for the random
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optimal attack Y ∗1 (m) that minimises in y1
y1 (F −GPA(d0 |n = m+ y1))
−H PA(d0 |n = m+ y1)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
(m− x)PA(x |m, θ)
)
PA(θ) dθ.
Then, she would estimate
pˆD(y1 |m) ≈ #{Y ∗1,k(m) = y1}/K,
where {Y ∗1,k(m)}Kk=1 would be a sample of size K from Y ∗1 (m), obtained by drawing
from the involved components and computing the corresponding optimal amount of
injected faulty items.
Regarding the attacker’s random losses and probabilities, typical assumptions would
be:
• The gains and costs could be uniformly distributed: F ∼ U(f1, f2), G ∼
U(g1, g2) and H ∼ U(h1, h2).
• PA(d0 |n) could be modelled through a uniform distribution, although this
might require further recursions, if deeper strategic thinking is considered, as
discussed in Section 3.3.3.
• Due to its specificity, PA(x |m, θ) could actually be regarded as a Binomial
distribution Bin(m, θ), i.e. not a random distribution.
• PA(θ) could be a Dirichlet process with a Beta distribution base Be(α+ s, β+
r − s) and concentration parameter ρ.
T2: Item modification
This tactic corresponds to the attacker modifying y2 of the original items into faults
of his. The data perceived by the defender includes x−y02 acceptable items, m−x−y12
O-faults and y2 A-faults, where y
0
2 and y
1
2 verify y
0
2 + y
1
2 = y2 and 0 ≤ y02 ≤ x,
0 ≤ y12 ≤ m − x. The attacker is supposed to not distinguish the type of items he
changes and needs to determine y2, which is random to the defender.
Pretend first that the defender is acquainted with the distribution pD(y2 |m), de-
scribing her beliefs about how many items will be modified by the attacker if the
original batch size were m. The defender’s loss structure is as in Table 4.6, replacing
q1(n | γ) by q2(n), defined as follows. To start with, the probability of having a final
batch with n = m items, given γ, is
p2(n | γ) = pD(m = n | γ),
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indicating the only possible initial size of the batch and the included faulty items.
Then, the probability that all those items are acceptable (x = m and y2 = 0) is
q2(n) = pD(y2 = 0 |m = n) θn,
manifesting that the only combination for an acceptable final batch is having n
initial acceptable items (x = m = n) and no faulty items included (y2 = 0). In this
case, knowing γ is irrelevant for gaining information about the batch configuration,
since the initial and final batch sizes coincide.
The expected losses of both decisions are
ψD(d0) = 1− Eθ [q2(n)] , ψD(d1) = cEθ [q2(n)] ;
which may be simplified to
ψD(d0) = 1− pD(y2 = 0 |m = n)Eθ [θn] , ψD(d1) = c pD(y2 = 0 |m = n)Eθ [θn] .
Therefore, the defender’s optimal choice is to accept the batch (d0) if and only if
pD(y2 = 0 |m = n)Eθ [θn] ≥ 1
1 + c
.
A way to estimate pD(y2 |m) and, thus, the crucial quantity pD(y2 = 0 |m = n)
under an ARA approach is now indicated. The attacker’s loss function is described in
Table 4.8, dictated by the batch composition and the decision made by the defender
(and the attacker’s decision). It holds that x ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} and y2 = y02 + y12 ∈
{0, 1, . . . ,m}. The new parameter f ′ is the cost of changing one item to make it
faulty.
Final Batch Composition
Acceptable O-Fault A-Fault
x− y02 m− x− y12 y2
D’s
Decision
Accept, d0 0 −h f ′ − g
Reject, d1 0 0 f
′
Table 4.8: Attacker’s loss per item (T2)
The attacker’s (expected) losses associated with both defender’s decisions, when he
chooses y2, are
lA(d0, y2) = −h (m− x− E
[
y12
]
) + (f ′ − g) y2, lA(d1, y2) = f ′ y2.
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Assuming that he picks the items randomly, so that E [y12] = y2
m−x
m
, then
lA(d0, y2) = −h (m− x) (1− y2m ) + (f ′ − g) y2.
The attacker needs to select y2 so as to minimise his expected loss when the original
batch size is m, which is
ΨA(y2 |m) = pA(d0 |n = m)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
lA(d0, y2) pA(x |m, θ)
)
pA(θ) dθ
+ (1− pA(d0 |n = m)) lA(d1, y2)
= y2 (f
′ − g pA(d0 |n = m))
−h (1− y2
m
) pA(d0 |n = m)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
(m− x) pA(x |m, θ)
)
pA(θ) dθ,
(4.8)
with pA(d0 |m) defined as in Tactic T1.
The defender does not know the attacker’s loss function nor probabilities, so she
may assume uncertainty about them and look for the random optimal attack Y ∗2 (m)
minimising in y2
y2 (F
′ −GPA(d0 |n = m))
−H (1− y2
m
)PA(d0 |n = m)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
(m− x)PA(x |m, θ)
)
PA(θ) dθ,
where F ′ would be the distribution over cost f ′. She would then approximate
pˆD(y2 = 0 |m) ≈ #{Y ∗2,k(m) = 0}/K,
where {Y ∗2,k(m)}Kk=1 is a sample of size K from Y ∗2 (m) drawn in a similar manner to
Tactic T1. Note that due to the linearity of the attacker’s loss function (4.8), the
random optimal attack will be 0 or m, depending on whether it is worth modifying
items or not. Non-linear loss functions for the attacker would allow other attacks to
take place.
Assumptions about the attacker’s random losses and probabilities would be similar
to those for Tactic T1. In particular, F ′ ∼ U(f ′1, f ′2).
T3: Combination of Tactics T1 and T2
The attacker combines both previous tactics, so he adds y1 faulty items and converts
y2 of the original items into faults of his. The batch received by the defender consists
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of x− y02 acceptable items, m− x− y12 O-faults and y1 + y2 A-faults, where y02 and
y12 are subject to the restrictions in Tactic T2. The attacker needs to decide y1 and
y2, which are random to the defender.
Initially, consider that the defender knows the joint distribution pD(y1, y2 |m). The
loss structure for her is as in Table 4.6, with q1(n | γ) substituted by q3(n | γ), char-
acterised next. First, the probability of having a final batch of n = m + y1 items,
given γ, is
p3(n | γ) = p1(n | γ),
showing the possible initial batch sizes and the included faulty items (as in Tactic
T1). Then, the probability that all those items are acceptable (x = m and y1 =
y2 = 0) is
q3(n | γ) = pD(y1 = 0, y2 = 0 |m = n) pD(m = n | γ)
p3(n | γ) θ
n, (4.9)
since the only combination for an acceptable final batch is having n initial acceptable
items (x = m = n) and no faulty items included (y1 = y2 = 0). As for Tactic T1, γ
provides information about m.
The expected losses of decisions d0 (accept) and d1 (reject) are
ψD(d0) = 1− Eθ,γ [q3(n | γ)] , ψD(d1) = cEθ,γ [q3(n | γ)] .
So the rule is to accept the batch (d0) if and only if
Eθ,γ [q3(n | γ)] ≥ 1
1 + c
, (4.10)
which would require simulation to be ascertained.
An ARA scheme is now developed to estimate the quantities pD(y1, y2 |m) and,
thus, q3(n | γ). To do so, deem the attacker’s loss function to be that in Table
4.9, subordinate to the batch composition and the decision made by the defender,
as well as his own action. It holds that x ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}, y1 ∈ {0, 1, . . .} and
y2 = y
0
2 + y
1
2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}.
Final Batch Composition
Acceptable O-Fault A-Fault
Injected Modified
x− y02 m−x−y12 y1 y2
D’s
Decision
Accept, d0 0 −h f − g f ′ − g
Reject, d1 0 0 f f
′
Table 4.9: Attacker’s loss per item (T3)
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As established in Tactic T2, the attacker picks the items to be modified randomly,
so that E [y12] = y2
m−x
m
. Thus, the attacker’s (expected) losses associated with both
defender’s decisions, when he chooses (y1, y2), are
lA(d0, y2) = −h (m−x) (1− y2m )+(f−g) y1 +(f ′−g) y2, lA(d1, y2) = f y1 +f ′ y2.
The attacker selects (y1, y2) to minimise his expected loss when the original size of
the batch is m, which is
ΨA(y1, y2 |m) = pA(d0 |n = m+ y1)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
lA(d0, y1, y2) pA(x |m, θ)
)
pA(θ) dθ
+ (1− pA(d0 |n = m+ y1)) lA(d1, y1, y2)
= y1 (f − g pA(d0 |n = m+ y1)) + y2 (f ′ − g pA(d0 |n = m+ y1))
−h (1− y2
m
) pA(d0 |n = m+ y1)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
(m− x) pA(x |m, θ)
)
pA(θ) dθ,
with pA(d0 |n = m+ y1) defined as in Tactics T1 and T2.
Uncertainty about the attacker’s loss function and probabilities is assumed, since
common knowledge is not available to the defender. She looks for the random
optimal attack (Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 )(m) that minimises in y1 and y2
y1 (F −GPA(d0 |n = m+ y1)) + y2 (F ′ −GPA(d0 |n = m+ y1))
−H (1− y2
m
)PA(d0 |n = m+ y1)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
(m− x)PA(x |m, θ)
)
PA(θ) dθ
and then estimates
pˆD(y1, y2 |m) ≈ #{Y ∗1,k(m) = y1, Y ∗2,k(m) = y2}/K,
where {(Y ∗1,k, Y ∗2,k)(m)}Kk=1 is a sample of size K from (Y ∗1 , Y ∗2 )(m) obtained in a
similar way as for the previous tactics.
Concerning the attacker’s random losses and probabilities, analogous assumptions
to those for Tactics T1 and T2 would be made.
4.3.3 Batch acceptance: A numerical example
As an illustration, a numerical example of the analysis in Section 4.3.2 involving
Tactic T3 is provided. With regard to the defender’s problem, embracing the setting
in Section 4.3.1, the elements involved are:
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• The rate γ of original incoming items. The prior over γ will be a Ga(5, 1)
distribution; i.e. the expected size of the original batch will be 5.
• The probability θ that an item is acceptable. The prior over θ will be a Be(9, 1)
distribution; i.e. the expected probability of an item’s acceptability will be 0.9.
• The (expected) opportunity costs associated with rejecting a batch with all
acceptable items will be c = 0.9.
As for the attacker’s problem, in accordance with assumptions in Section 4.3.2,
suppose the following assessments are made:
• The gains and costs will be uniformly distributed as: F ∼ U(0.25, 0.5), F ′ ∼
U(0.3, 0.6), G ∼ U(0.8, 1) and H ∼ U(0, 0.25). Two implicit assumptions
are: (i) on average, injecting A-faults involves less effort for the attacker than
modifying items to A-faults as he has broader control over the process (F vs
F ′); and (ii) the expected gain due to A-faults is greater than that due to
O-faults as he may better design them to fulfil his objectives (G vs H).
• PA(d0 |n) will be modelled through a uniform distribution dependent on the
final batch size n. To avoid further recursion, consider that the attacker relates
it to the defender’s non-adversarial version of the problem in Section 4.3.1. In
terms of the batch’s original expected acceptability, he could expect the the
defender to accept it with probability Eθ [θ
n]. Additionally, he could weigh
that probability by 0.5, admitting that the defender might presume him to be
manipulating every other batch. In this manner
E [PA(d0 |n)] = Eθ [θ
n]
2
=
1
2
n−1∏
k=0
9 + k
10 + k
=
9
18 + 2n
is estimated, making use of the defender’s prior over θ and expression (4.7).
To allow for some uncertainty, and assuming that PA(d0 |n) > PA(d0 |n + 1)
for every value of n, finally adopt
PA(d0 |n) ∼ U
(
9
19 + 2n
,
9
(
1 + 1
9+n
)
19 + 2n
)
.
• Due to its specificity, PA(x |m, θ) will coincide with the Bin(m, θ) model of
the defender.
• PA(θ) will be a Dirichlet process with a Beta distribution base Be(9, 1) and
concentration parameter ρ = 100.
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Recall that y∗2 ∈ {0,m}. Therefore, the attack probabilities for each original batch
size m may be estimated as follows:
Algorithm 6 Batch acceptance (T3): Simulation of attack probabilities
Data: Original batch size m; number of iterations K; upper bound for the amount
of injected items Y 1.
1: Set p(y1, y2) = 0, y1 = 0, . . . , Y 1, y2 = 0,m.
2: For k = 1 to K do
3: Generate fk ∼ U(0.25, 0.50).
4: Generate f ′k ∼ U(0.30, 0.60).
5: Generate gk ∼ U(0.80, 1.00).
6: Generate hk ∼ U(0.00, 0.25).
7: Generate distribution pkA(θ) ∼ DirP(Be(9, 1), 100).
8: For y1 = 0 to Y 1 do
9: Generate pi0,kA (y1) ∼ U
 9
19 + 2m+ 2y1
,
9
(
1 + 1
9+m+y1
)
19 + 2m+ 2y1
.
10: ψkA(y1, 0) = y1
(
fk − gk pi0,kA (y1)
)
− hk pi0,kA (y1)
∫ ( m∑
x=0
(
m
x
)
θx (1− θ)m−x (m− x)
)
pkA(θ) dθ.
11: ψkA(y1,m) = y1
(
fk − gk pi0,kA (y1)
)
+m
(
f ′k − gk pi0,kA (y1)
)
.
12: End For
13: Find (y∗1, y
∗
2) = arg min
y1,y2
ψkA(y1, y2).
14: Set p(y∗1, y
∗
2) = p(y
∗
1, y
∗
2) + 1.
15: End For
16: Set pˆD(y
∗
1, y
∗
2) = p(y
∗
1, y
∗
2)/K, y1 = 0, . . . , Y 1, y2 = 0,m.
Algorithm 6 has been coded in R (Appendix B.4). Tables 4.10 and 4.11 reflect an
application of the previous scheme with K = 103 iterations (sufficient for illustrative
purposes as the procedure is computationally intensive due to the need to sample
from the Dirichlet process) and an upper bound for the amount of injected items
of Y 1 = 4, leading to the estimates of pˆD(y1, y2 |m) for an original batch size of
m = 0, 1, . . . , 8.
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Original Batch Size - m
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Attack
-
y1
0 0.374 0.375 0.557 0.726 0.806 0.902 0.966 0.995 1.000
1 0.292 0.183 0.157 0.142 0.133 0.086 0.034 0.005 0.000
2 0.203 0.129 0.103 0.054 0.028 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.104 0.048 0.025 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.027 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 4.10: Defender’s estimation of pˆD(y1, y2 |m) with y2 = 0
Original Batch Size - m
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Attack
-
y1
0 – 0.200 0.142 0.064 0.032 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 – 0.044 0.013 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 – 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 – 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 4.11: Defender’s estimation of pˆD(y1, y2 |m) with y2 = m
Plugging such values in (4.9), the defender may compute the expected probability
that all items are acceptable conditional on the observed size of the final batch.
In Table 4.12, those values are provided, as well as the defender’s optimal decision
based on expression (4.10), with threshold 1/(1 + c) = 0.526. According to Tables
4.10 and 4.11, the final batch size possibilities that may be encountered are just
n = 0, 1, . . . , 8.
The following remarks may be deduced from Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12:
• When an empty batch is received (n = 0), the model behaves correctly and
accepts the batch since the defender knows that there are no faulty items.
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Final Batch Size - n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Eθ,γ [q3(n |γ)] 1.000 0.523 0.546 0.555 0.516 0.498 0.493 0.511 0.524
Accept, d0 Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No
Table 4.12: Defender’s optimal decision given a final batch of n items
• For smaller original batch sizes, the attacker is encouraged to both inject
and/or modify items as it is more likely that all original items are acceptable.
This might cause the defender not to accept batches with a small final size
(n = 1 in the current example).
• For bigger original batch sizes, the attacker is discouraged to intervene and thus
avoid costs as it is more likely that some original items are already faulty. This
might lead the defender to accept batches with a medium final size (n = 2, 3
in the ongoing example).
• When a sufficiently large batch is received (starting with n = 4 in the provided
example), the defender will not accept the batch as she will expect the original
one to formerly include faulty items.
4.4 Recapitulation
The AHT problem has been examined in detail from an ARA perspective. In this
manner, concept uncertainty and common knowledge limitations frequently found in
game-theoretic solutions to adversarial classification and adversarial machine learn-
ing have been avoided. Support has been provided to a decision-maker who essen-
tially needs to ascertain which of several hypotheses holds, based on observations
from a source that may be perturbed by another agent with some purpose. The
main focus has been on testing two simple hypothesis, but the framework extends
to other types of hypothesis tests.
Specific models for explicit AHT problems have been developed and numerical ex-
amples have been provided and implemented in R, with the code included in Ap-
pendices B.3 and B.4. These differ in the degree of information perceived by each of
the agents and, in particular, an elaborate batch acceptance model has been devised
to be applied to e.g. spam detection or container screening at international ports.
Further real-world applications to adversarial classification may be found in Naveiro
et al. [2018].
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
ARA is an emergent paradigm in the context of strategic reasoning in conflict situ-
ations and, as such, much work remains to be completed so as to spread its use and
make it widely known. This chapter recaps the PhD thesis developments in Chapters
2, 3 and 4 and proposes new problems to extend that work, respectively, in Sections
5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. Besides, Section 5.4 suggests applying an ARA perspective to
(stochastic) differential games to transcend discrete decision-making processes and
approach continuous ones.
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5.1 Bi-agent influence diagrams
Objective O1 proposed developing representation methods in ARA, which has been
approached by producing an ARA algorithmic scheme to evaluate proper BAIDs
and applying it to solve a simplified CIP problem. Results in Chapter 2 have been
condensed into a paper on an ARA algorithmic evaluation of BAIDs which is to be
published in EJOR [Gonza´lez-Ortega, R´ıos Insua and Cano, 2018] and has already
been presented in several international conferences. Additionally, the code developed
to compute BAIDs, available in Appendix B.1, is intended to be disclosed in an R
public package.
Of the different elements which the decision-maker uses to model her uncertainty
about the opponent’s probabilities and utilities, those concerning chance BAID
nodes are relatively standard decision-analytic assessments. They rely on the sup-
ported agent’s beliefs about her adversary’s judgements over the results of their
interaction, which she can always base on her own probability distributions with
some uncertainty around it. Usual candidates would be a Dirichlet distribution in
the discrete case or a Dirichlet process in the continuous one, as they constitute
probability distributions whose domains are themselves sets of probability distribu-
tions. Banks et al. [2015] provide further examples from those in this PhD thesis
of the use of Dirichlet distributions and processes in the modelling of probability
distributions with uncertainty. As far as utility nodes are concerned, adversarial
utility elicitation has been extensively reviewed in Gonza´lez-Ortega, Radovic and
R´ıos Insua [2018]. Further information may be found in R´ıos Insua et al. [exp. 2019].
However, the decision-maker’s own decisions as perceived by the opponent entail
strategic thinking and could lead to recursions when higher level-k thinking strate-
gies are considered, as discussed in R´ıos and R´ıos Insua [2012] for a simpler class
of problems. Algorithms in this PhD thesis could be extended to consider higher
level-k strategies, though, in any case, the development of additional procedures
to the Beta and Dirichlet distributions used in the example poses a challenge that
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should be undertaken as a future line of research.
An effort should be made to promote efficient computational schemes for BAIDs.
One possibility would be to try a single stage process based on the augmented prob-
ability simulation approach to ID valuation [Bielza et al., 1999]. Another possibility
would be to use loop parallelisation algorithms [Boulet et al., 1998]. It might be
interesting to produce a computational environment supporting this methodology,
possibly linked with or embedded within GeNIe [1998].
BAIDs, similarly to IDs, symmetrise problems inducing inefficiencies in some cases
as in Bielza and Shenoy [1999]. This issue becomes manifest in sequential decision di-
agrams [Call and Miller, 1990], sequential valuation networks [Demirer and Shenoy,
2006], multi-agent versions of decision circuits [Bhattacharjya and Shachter, 2012] or
chain event graphs [Thwaites and Smith, 2017]. All these alternative representation
methods could be explored under an ARA perspective.
Multiple attacker and/or multiple defender cases are also of interest. An ARA
approach of MAIDs would support one of the agents (the defender) against the rest
(the attackers), see Hausken and Bier [2011] for a game-theoretic framework. In this
case, it would be necessary to differentiate the possibilities in which attackers are
completely independent, partially or totally coordinated or such that their attacks
influence somehow each other. It could also be the case that there are various
defenders, possibly cooperating.
Finally, the ARA algorithmic approach to BAIDs has been illustrated with a CIP
example considering a simplified version of a single installation structure. However,
if the model were to be applied to a real case, the attacker’s choice contemplated in
the model on whether to infiltrate the system would substantially condition his final
decision on whether to attack and, thus, a discussion on the value of information and
secrecy would be relevant, see Zhuang and Bier [2010], R´ıos and R´ıos Insua [2012]
and Zhang et al. [2015]. Moreover, a multi-period problem which would allow for
information updating, as in Zhuang et al. [2010], could be considered. In addition,
the figure of merit would need to be reassessed as it is over-simplified to the number
of days of service shortage. Other criteria that could be recognised are the repair
costs, the number of captured terrorists or the number of fatalities if it were a
violent attack. Furthermore, the attacker’s interests may reside in different features
than those of the defender, e.g. Keeney [2007] and Keeney and von Winterfeldt
[2010] provide what may be viewed as catalogues in the domain of terrorism. The
simplification was made for the sake of a better understanding of the numerical
example and a reduction of the problem’s size and computation time.
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5.2 Concept uncertainty
The enhancement of the modelling of strategic reasoning was the aim of Objective
O2 and, to that end, concept uncertainty has been explored within an ARA per-
spective using ASDT to procure an example in adversarial point estimation. An
online reference of ARA [R´ıos Insua et al., 2017] and a paper [R´ıos Insua et al.,
2018] have already been published covering the contents of Chapter 3. However,
just two different solution concepts have been considered in this PhD thesis. Ad-
ditional classes of adversaries that could be examined would include non-strategic
or prospect-maximising players, among others. The model requires assessing the
weights of various solution concepts, which would be done based on expert judge-
ment. Should the situation be repeated over time, a strategy for learning about the
relevance solution concepts based on a Bayesian updating scheme could be intro-
duced, as suggested in R´ıos and R´ıos Insua [2012].
Game theory and ARA are different frameworks to provide support to decision-
makers in competitive situations. As such, they differ in their core assumptions
about the available information, shared knowledge and consequent solution concept
and, indeed, lead to different solutions as shown in Chapters 3 and 4 or in e.g. R´ıos
Insua, Ruggeri et al. [2016]. The prescribed decisions for the decision-maker provided
by both methodologies might coincide or not, but the underlying rationale for any
enacting player would be different, as well as the information each of them handles
about the other(s). Future work could systematically show the connection and
relation between both types of solutions, possibly in line with the approach in Go´mez
Esteban et al. [exp. 2019].
5.3 Adversarial hypothesis testing
Research on the AHT problem was specially conceived to comply with transversal
Objective O3 on the implementation of ARA models. Towards that end, a paper
[Gonza´lez-Ortega et al., exp. 2019] has been produced and, though it still awaits
publication, it has already been recognised with the Student Merit Award of the
Security & Defense Specialty Group (SDSG) in the SRA 2016 Annual Meeting.
An illustrative application in relation with batch acceptance has been studied. How-
ever, it was assumed that the decision-maker only observed the batch size, which
might not be the case (e.g. when screening containers at international ports) so
that supplementary partial information could be considered. For example, it could
be the case that, besides the batch size, she observes some item features and this
information is incorporated to the hypothesis testing problem. Moreover, when the
decision-maker has no information about the batch size other than her previous ex-
perience, a multi-stage version of the model could be proposed, maybe considering
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hidden states as in Zhang and Zenios [2008]. New strategies for the adversary such
as the injection of (apparently) acceptable items to confound the decision-maker
could be considered. Other loss functions could be explored as well.
Additional applications may be found in the context of, for example, adversarial sig-
nal processing, such as in Electronic Warfare (EW) where pulse/signal environment
is generally very complex with many different radars transmitting simultaneously.
The time interval between two pulses emitted by a threat radar is defined as the
Pulse Repetition Interval (PRI). PRI tracking is an important problem in naval EW
applications because knowledge of the PRI is used to defend ships against radar-
guided missiles. The signals received may be jammed by hostile radars and this
results in missing pulses due to reduced sensitivity of the receiver, see Hock and
Soyer [2006] for an introduction.
5.4 (Stochastic) differential games
This PhD thesis, and more generally the research in ARA, has focused on decision-
making processes in which the various agents’ choices are discrete in time. However,
there are many situations such that the strategies determine courses of action over
time. Thus, the ARA methodology should be extended so as to be applicable to
continuous non-cooperative decision-making processes.
Among them, conflicts related to dynamical systems, known as Differential Games
(DGs), present a relevant subset of problems that could be first approached. DGs
are mathematical models describing the strategic interactions between two or more
agents who affect the evolution of a system over time. Its applications are sig-
nificant, for example, in economic competition, security conflicts, disease control,
predator-prey relations or environmental regulation. Their methods may be seen
as a combination of game theory and optimal control theory and have their ori-
gin in the work of Isaacs [1965]. Friedman [1972] introduced stochastic elements in
the evolution of the system leading to the so-called Stochastic Differential Games
(SDGs). A recent review may be seen in the updated 2015 edition of Nisio [1981].
Optimal strategies for SDGs based on ARA could be elaborated, performing infer-
ence and prediction on stochastic processes while acknowledging the presence of an
underlying adversary.
Essentially, DGs consider that the evolution of a system’s state in time is dictated
by a set of differential equations that depend on the state itself and the decisions
made by two or more agents, who receive payoffs conditioned on the evolution of
the system, the final state and the implemented actions. As a fundamental solution
concept, Nash equilibria are computed as, for example, in Basar and Li [1989]. This
requires that each agent knows the status of the others, which is hardly sustainable
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in many applications and motivates the use of ARA. To calculate and prove the
existence of the equilibrium, optimal control concepts such as Pontryagin’s maxi-
mum principle [Pontryagin, 1961] are employed and enhanced. In SDGs, a known
stochastic element (in the sense that the corresponding stochastic process parame-
ters are assumed to be known) is added, which again is difficult to accept in many
applications. An ARA perspective for SDGs would avoid the current problem of
common knowledge assumptions and, as a Bayesian approach, could introduce un-
certainty in the underlying stochastic processes, e.g. as in R´ıos Insua et al. [2012]
and Go´mez-Corral et al. [2015].
Preliminary work, already presented in the SEIO 2018 Spanish Conference on Statis-
tics and Operational Research and the EURO 2018 European Conference on Opera-
tional Research, has been conducted for DGs replicating the game-theoretic botnet
defence model in Bensoussan et al. [2010]. The undertaken ARA approach trans-
forms the relevant deterministic DG into two stochastic control problems, one for
each of the involved agents, in which the stochasticity derives from the opponent’s
uncertain strategy. Though optimal ARA solutions still need to be developed, re-
sults already show that deviating from the proposed Nash equilibria and reflecting
the decision-maker’s uncertainty about the adversary’s chosen strategy may reduce
her expected losses. Therefore, an effort should be made towards consolidating an
ARA framework for DGs and SDGs.
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Appendix A
CIP algorithmic solution
In an attempt to better illustrate how the general computational strategy for BAIDs
in Chapter 2 works, scheme G to solve the CIP example is graphically displayed here.
For each G step, the relevant problem D (defender) or A (attacker) is identified and
a decomposition into the corresponding substeps is conducted.
Step G1 (D)
Select decision node D2 in SCC {D2} to be solved (problem D).
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.1: Step G1 (D)
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Step D1
Remove chance node S2 in D.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.2: Step D1
Step D2
Eliminate decision node D2 in D and store optimal action d∗2(d1, a2, s1).
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.3: Step D2
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Step G2 (A)
Tag decision node A2 in SCC {A2} to be solved (problem A).
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.4: Step G2 (A)
Step A1
Remove chance node S2 in A.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.5: Step A1
94 CIP algorithmic solution
Step A2
Eliminate chance (for the attacker) node D2 in A.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.6: Step A2
Step A3
Take out chance node S1 in A.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.7: Step A3
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Step A4
Withdraw decision node A2 in A and record (random) optimal action A∗2(d1, a1).
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.8: Step A4
Step G3 (A)
Choose decision node A1 in SCC {D1, A1} to be solved (problem A).
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.9: Step G3 (A)
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Step A5
Delete chance (for the attacker) node D1 in A.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.10: Step A5
Step A6
Reduce decision node A1 in A and save (random) optimal action A∗1.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.11: Step A6
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Step G4 (D)
Pick decision node D1 in SCC {D1, A1} to be solved (problem D).
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.12: Step G4 (D)
Step D3
Take out chance node S1 in D.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.13: Step D3
98 CIP algorithmic solution
Step D4
Withdraw chance (for the defender) A2 in D using A∗2(d1, a1).
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.14: Step D4
Step D5
Delete chance (for the defender) A1 in D employing A∗1.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.15: Step D5
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Step D6
Reduce decision node D1 in D and find optimal action d∗1.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.16: Step D6
End
The defender should choose d∗1 at D1 and, later, d
∗
2(d1, a2, s1) at D2.
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uD
(a) Defender’s problem
S1D2 A2
D1 A1
S2
uA
(b) Attacker’s problem
D1 A1
D2 A2
(c) Relevance graph
Figure A.17: End
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Appendix B
Code
The original R and MATLAB codes used for the resolution of the numerical examples
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 is incorporated here.
B.1 Bi-agent influence diagrams (R)
1 ## SETTINGS ####################################################
3 # Required libraries:
5 library(gtools)
7 # Monte Carlo iterations:
9 K <- 10^5
11 ## INPUT #######################################################
13 # BAID:
15 B <- list()
17 # Number of nodes:
19 B$n <- 8
21 # Value nodes (1st row = D / 2nd row = A):
23 B$V <- matrix(c("7","8"),
24 nrow = 2, ncol = 1, byrow = TRUE)
26 # Decision nodes (1st row = D / 2nd row = A):
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28 B$D <- matrix(c("1","4","2","5"),
29 nrow = 2, ncol = 2, byrow = TRUE)
31 # Chance nodes:
33 B$C <- c("3","6")
35 # Arcs:
37 B$A <- matrix(0,B$n,B$n)
38 rownames(B$A) <- c(1:8); colnames(B$A) <- rownames(B$A)
40 B$A["1","3"] <- 1; B$A["1","4"] <- 1; B$A["1","5"] <- 1
41 B$A["1","7"] <- 1; B$A["2","3"] <- 1; B$A["2","5"] <- 1
42 B$A["2","8"] <- 1; B$A["3","4"] <- 1; B$A["3","6"] <- 1
43 B$A["3","7"] <- 1; B$A["3","8"] <- 1; B$A["4","6"] <- 1
44 B$A["4","7"] <- 1; B$A["5","3"] <- 1; B$A["5","4"] <- 1
45 B$A["5","6"] <- 1; B$A["5","8"] <- 1; B$A["6","7"] <- 1
46 B$A["6","8"] <- 1
48 # Nodes:
49 # type - Continuous (c) / Discrete (d) / Utility (u)
50 # set - Value set (interval bounds if c)
51 # 1 - D’s assessment
52 # 2 - A’s assessment
54 B$f <- list()
55 for(i in rownames(B$A)){
56 B$f[[i]] <- list()}
57 rm(i)
59 B$f[["1"]]$type <- "d"
60 B$f[["1"]]$set <- c(0,1)
61 B$f[["1"]][["1"]] <- function(y=
62 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"1"] == 1)))){
63 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"1"] == 1)))
64 f <- function(x){
65 if(x %in% B$f[["1"]]$set){
66 return (1)}
67 else{
68 return (0)}}
69 return(f)}
70 B$f[["1"]][["2"]] <- function(y=
71 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"1"] == 1)))){
72 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"1"] == 1)))
73 prob <- array(0, dim = length(B$f[["1"]]$set))
74 dimnames(prob)[[1]] <- B$f[["1"]]$set
75 aux <- rbeta(1, shape1 = 13, shape2 = 7)
76 prob["0"] <- 1-aux; prob["1"] <- aux
77 f <- function(x){
78 if(x %in% B$f[["1"]]$set){
79 return(unname(prob[as.character(x)]))}
80 else{
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81 return (0)}}
82 return(f)}
84 B$f[["2"]]$type <- "d"
85 B$f[["2"]]$set <- c(0,1)
86 B$f[["2"]][["1"]] <- function(y=
87 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"2"] == 1)))){
88 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"2"] == 1)))
89 f <- function(x){
90 if(x %in% B$f[["2"]]$set){
91 cat(’\n Unknown , resort to ARA \n\n’)}
92 else{
93 return (0)}}
94 return(f)}
95 B$f[["2"]][["2"]] <- function(y=
96 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"2"] == 1)))){
97 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"2"] == 1)))
98 f <- function(x){
99 if(x %in% B$f[["2"]]$set){
100 return (1)}
101 else{
102 return (0)}}
103 return(f)}
105 B$f[["3"]]$type <- "d"
106 B$f[["3"]]$set <- c(0 ,0.5,1)
107 B$f[["3"]][["1"]] <- function(y=
108 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"3"] == 1)))){
109 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"3"] == 1)))
110 prob <- array(0, dim = c(length(B$f[["3"]]$set),
111 length(B$f[["1"]]$set),
112 length(B$f[["2"]]$set)))
113 dimnames(prob)[[1]] <- B$f[["3"]]$set
114 dimnames(prob)[[2]] <- B$f[["1"]]$set
115 dimnames(prob)[[3]] <- B$f[["2"]]$set
116 prob[ "0","0","0"] <- 0.30; prob[ "0","1","0"] <- 0.40
117 prob["0.5","0","0"] <- 0.45; prob["0.5","1","0"] <- 0.40
118 prob[ "1","0","0"] <- 0.25; prob[ "1","1","0"] <- 0.20
119 prob[ "0","0","1"] <- 0.15; prob[ "0","1","1"] <- 0.25
120 prob["0.5","0","1"] <- 0.55; prob["0.5","1","1"] <- 0.50
121 prob[ "1","0","1"] <- 0.30; prob[ "1","1","1"] <- 0.25
122 if(y["5"] == 0){
123 f <- function(x){
124 if(x == 0){
125 return (1)}
126 else{
127 return (0) }}}
128 else{
129 f <- function(x){
130 if(x %in% B$f[["3"]]$set){
131 return(unname(prob[as.character(x),
132 as.character(y["1"]),
133 as.character(y["2"])]))}
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134 else{
135 return (0) }}}
136 return(f)}
137 B$f[["3"]][["2"]] <- function(y=
138 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"3"] == 1)))){
139 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"3"] == 1)))
140 conc <- array(0, dim = c(length(B$f[["3"]]$set),
141 length(B$f[["1"]]$set),
142 length(B$f[["2"]]$set)))
143 dimnames(conc)[[1]] <- B$f[["3"]]$set
144 dimnames(conc)[[2]] <- B$f[["1"]]$set
145 dimnames(conc)[[3]] <- B$f[["2"]]$set
146 conc[ "0","0","0"] <- 69.70; conc[ "0","1","0"] <- 59.60
147 conc["0.5","0","0"] <- 104.55; conc["0.5","1","0"] <- 59.60
148 conc[ "1","0","0"] <- 58.08; conc[ "1","1","0"] <- 29.80
149 conc[ "0","0","1"] <- 84.85; conc[ "0","1","1"] <- 74.75
150 conc["0.5","0","1"] <- 311.12; conc["0.5","1","1"] <- 149.50
151 conc[ "1","0","1"] <- 169.70; conc[ "1","1","1"] <- 74.75
152 if(y["5"] == 0){
153 f <- function(x){
154 if(x == 0){
155 return (1)}
156 else{
157 return (0) }}}
158 else{
159 aux <- rdirichlet (1, conc[,as.character(y["1"]),
160 as.character(y["2"])])
161 dimnames(aux)[[2]] <- dimnames(conc)[[1]]
162 f <- function(x){
163 if(x %in% B$f[["5"]]$set){
164 return(unname(aux[1,as.character(x)]))}
165 else{
166 return (0) }}}
167 return(f)}
169 B$f[["4"]]$type <- "d"
170 B$f[["4"]]$set <- c(0,1)
171 B$f[["4"]][["1"]] <- function(y=
172 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"4"] == 1)))){
173 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"4"] == 1)))
174 f <- function(x){
175 if(x %in% B$f[["4"]]$set){
176 return (1)}
177 else{
178 return (0)}}
179 return(f)}
180 B$f[["4"]][["2"]] <- function(y=
181 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"4"] == 1)))){
182 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"4"] == 1)))
183 conc <- array(0, dim = c(length(B$f[["4"]]$set),
184 length(B$f[["3"]]$set)))
185 dimnames(conc)[[1]] <- B$f[["4"]]$set
186 dimnames(conc)[[2]] <- B$f[["3"]]$set
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187 conc["0", "0"] <- 1.00; conc["1", "0"] <- 0.00
188 conc["0","0.5"] <- 39.40; conc["1","0.5"] <- 26.27
189 conc["0", "1"] <- 69.70; conc["1", "1"] <- 162.63
190 if(y["5"] == 0){
191 f <- function(x){
192 if(x == 0){
193 return (1)}
194 else{
195 return (0) }}}
196 else{
197 aux <- rdirichlet (1, conc[,as.character(y["3"])])
198 dimnames(aux)[[2]] <- dimnames(conc)[[1]]
199 f <- function(x){
200 if(x %in% B$f[["4"]]$set){
201 return(unname(aux[1,as.character(x)]))}
202 else{
203 return (0) }}}
204 return(f)}
206 B$f[["5"]]$type <- "d"
207 B$f[["5"]]$set <- c(0,1)
208 B$f[["5"]][["1"]] <- function(y=
209 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"5"] == 1)))){
210 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"5"] == 1)))
211 f <- function(x){
212 if(x %in% B$f[["5"]]$set){
213 cat(’\n Unknown , resort to ARA \n\n’)}
214 else{
215 return (0)}}
216 return(f)}
217 B$f[["5"]][["2"]] <- function(y=
218 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"5"] == 1)))){
219 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"5"] == 1)))
220 f <- function(x){
221 if(x %in% B$f[["5"]]$set){
222 return (1)}
223 else{
224 return (0)}}
225 return(f)}
227 B$f[["6"]]$type <- "d"
228 B$f[["6"]]$set <- c(0 ,0.25 ,0.5 ,0.75 ,1)
229 B$f[["6"]][["1"]] <- function(y=
230 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"6"] == 1)))){
231 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"6"] == 1)))
232 prob <- array(0, dim = c(length(B$f[["6"]]$set),
233 length(B$f[["3"]]$set)))
234 dimnames(prob)[[1]] <- B$f[["6"]]$set
235 dimnames(prob)[[2]] <- B$f[["3"]]$set
236 prob[ "0", "0"] <- 1.00
237 prob[ "0","0.5"] <- 0.20; prob["0.25","0.5"] <- 0.50
238 prob["0.5","0.5"] <- 0.30
239 prob[ "0", "1"] <- 0.10; prob["0.25", "1"] <- 0.15
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240 prob["0.5", "1"] <- 0.30; prob["0.75", "1"] <- 0.25
241 prob[ "1", "1"] <- 0.20
242 if(y["4"] == 0 | y["5"] == 0){
243 f <- function(x){
244 if(x == 0){
245 return (1)}
246 else{
247 return (0) }}}
248 else{
249 f <- function(x){
250 if(x %in% B$f[["6"]]$set){
251 return(unname(prob[as.character(x),
252 as.character(y["3"])]))}
253 else{
254 return (0) }}}
255 return(f)}
256 B$f[["6"]][["2"]] <- function(y=
257 rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"6"] == 1)))){
258 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"6"] == 1)))
259 conc <- array(0, dim = c(length(B$f[["6"]]$set),
260 length(B$f[["3"]]$set)))
261 dimnames(conc)[[1]] <- B$f[["6"]]$set
262 dimnames(conc)[[2]] <- B$f[["3"]]$set
263 conc[ "0", "0"] <- 1.00
264 conc[ "0","0.5"] <- 79.80; conc["0.25","0.5"] <- 199.50
265 conc["0.5","0.5"] <- 119.70
266 conc[ "0", "1"] <- 89.90; conc["0.25", "1"] <- 134.85
267 conc["0.5", "1"] <- 269.70; conc["0.75", "1"] <- 224.75
268 conc[ "1", "1"] <- 179.80
269 if(y["4"] == 0 | y["5"] == 0){
270 f <- function(x){
271 if(x == 0){
272 return (1)}
273 else{
274 return (0) }}}
275 else{
276 aux <- rdirichlet (1, conc[,as.character(y["3"])])
277 dimnames(aux)[[2]] <- dimnames(conc)[[1]]
278 f <- function(x){
279 if(x %in% B$f[["6"]]$set){
280 return(unname(aux[1,as.character(x)]))}
281 else{
282 return (0) }}}
283 return(f)}
285 B$f[["7"]]$type <- "u"
286 B$f[["7"]][["1"]] <- function (){
287 m <- rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"7"] == 1)))
288 names(m) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"7"] == 1)))
289 m["1"] <- -5; m["3"] <- -40; m["4"] <- -10; m["6"] <- 40
290 rho <- 0.06
291 c <- - unname(m["1"] + m["3"]*max(B$f[["3"]]$set) + m["4"])
292 f <- function(x){
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293 names(x) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"7"] == 1)))
294 val <- unname( m["1"]*x["1"] + m["3"]*x["3"]
295 + m["4"]*x["4"] + m["6"]*x["6"])
296 return (1 - exp(-rho*(val + c)))}
297 return(f)}
298 B$f[["7"]][["2"]] <- function (){
299 cat(’\n Not applicable \n\n’)}
301 B$f[["8"]]$type <- "u"
302 B$f[["8"]][["1"]] <- function (){
303 cat(’\n Not applicable \n\n’)}
304 B$f[["8"]][["2"]] <- function (){
305 m <- rep(0,length(which(B$A[,"8"] == 1)))
306 names(m) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"8"] == 1)))
307 un <- runif(3, min = -0.5, max = 0.5)
308 m["2"] <- -1 + un[1]; m["3"] <- 35 + un[2]
309 m["5"] <- -5 + un[3]; m["6"] <- -35 - un[2]
310 rho <- runif(1, min = 0.05, max = 0.07)
311 c <- - max(0,unname(m["3"]*max(B$f[["3"]]$set) + m["5"]))
312 f <- function(x){
313 names(x) <- sortN(names(which(B$A[,"8"] == 1)))
314 val <- unname( m["2"]*x["2"] + m["3"]*x["3"]
315 + m["5"]*x["5"] + m["6"]*x["6"])
316 return(exp(rho*(val + c)))}
317 return(f)}
319 ## FUNCTIONS ###################################################
321 # Sort array nodes:
322 # Input -- x (array) - Nodes
323 # Output -- ord (array) - Ordered nodes
325 sortN <- function(x){
326 return(as.character(sort(as.numeric(x))))}
328 # Agents ’ ID generator from BAID:
329 # Input -- baid (object) - BAID
330 # ag (int) - Agent
331 # Output -- id (object) - Agent ’s ID
333 genID <- function(baid ,ag){
334 id <- list()
335 id$n <- baid$n-1
336 id$V <- baid$V[ag ,]
337 id$D <- sortN(baid$D[ag ,]); id$D <- id$D[id$D != 0]
338 id$C <- sortN(c(baid$C,baid$D[-ag ,])); id$C <- id$C[id$C != 0]
339 id$A <- baid$A[!rownames(baid$A) %in% baid$V[-ag ,],
340 !colnames(baid$A) %in% baid$V[-ag ,]]
341 id$f <- baid$f[!rownames(baid$A) %in% baid$V[-ag ,]]
342 for(i in names(id$f)){
343 id$f[[i]][["0"]] <- id$f[[i]][[as.character(ag)]]
344 id$f[[i]][["1"]] <- NULL
345 id$f[[i]][["2"]] <- NULL}
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346 while(min(rowSums(id$A[!rownames(id$A) %in% id$V,])) == 0){
347 i <- names(which.min(rowSums(id$A[!rownames(id$A)
348 %in% id$V,])))
349 id$n <- id$n - 1
350 id$D <- id$D[id$D != i]
351 id$C <- id$C[id$C != i]
352 id$A <- id$A[!rownames(id$A) %in% i,!colnames(id$A) %in% i]
353 id$f[[i]] <- NULL
354 if(id$n == 1) break}
355 return(id)}
357 # Order graph nodes:
358 # Input -- arcs (matrix) - Adjacency matrix
359 # Output -- order (array) - Order of nodes (NULL if cycles)
361 orderN <- function(arcs){
362 w <- rownames(arcs)[rowSums(arcs) == 0]
363 if(length(w) != 0){
364 aux <- length(rownames(arcs)) - length(w)
365 if(aux > 1){
366 return(c(orderN(arcs[!rownames(arcs) %in% w,
367 !colnames(arcs) %in% w]),w))}
368 else{
369 return(c(rownames(arcs)[!rownames(arcs) %in% w],w))}}
370 else if(length(which(!rownames(arcs) %in% w)) > 0){
371 cat(’\n Graph is cyclic \n\n’)
372 return(NULL)}
373 else{
374 return(w)}}
376 # Auxiliar function for computing SCCs:
377 # Input -- v (char) - Visiting node
378 # SCCs (object) - Auxiliar object to compute SCCs
379 # arcs (matrix) - Adjacency matrix
380 # Output -- SCCs (object) - Auxiliar object to compute SCCs
382 auxSCC <- function(v,SCCs ,arcs){
383 SCCs$ind [1] <- SCCs$ind [1] + 1
384 SCCs$indN [1:2,v] <- SCCs$ind [1]
385 SCCs$S <- c(v,SCCs$S)
386 SCCs$stack[v] <- TRUE
387 for(w in colnames(arcs)[arcs[v,] != 0]){
388 if(SCCs$indN[1,w] == 0){
389 SCCs <- auxSCC(w,SCCs ,arcs)
390 SCCs$indN[2,v] <- min(SCCs$indN[2,c(v,w)])}
391 else if(SCCs$stack[w]){
392 SCCs$indN[2,v] <- min(SCCs$indN[2,v],SCCs$indN[1,w])}}
393 if(SCCs$indN[1,v] == SCCs$indN[2,v]){
394 SCCs$ind [2] <- SCCs$ind [2] + 1
395 repeat{
396 w <- SCCs$S[1]
397 SCCs$S <- SCCs$S[SCCs$S != w]
398 SCCs$stack[w] <- FALSE
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399 SCCs$indN[3,w] <- SCCs$ind [2]
400 if(w == v) break}}
401 return(SCCs)}
403 # Order graph SCCs:
404 # Input -- arcs (matrix) - Adjacency matrix
405 # Output -- order (array) - SCC for each node (num. ordered)
407 orderS <- function(arcs){
408 N <- rownames(arcs)
409 order <- rep(0,length(N)); names(order) <- N
410 SCCs <- list()
411 SCCs$ind <- rep(0,2)
412 SCCs$indN <- matrix(0,3,length(N)); colnames(SCCs$indN) <- N
413 SCCs$S <- NULL
414 SCCs$stack <- rep(FALSE ,length(N)); names(SCCs$stack) <- N
415 for(i in N){
416 if(SCCs$indN[1,i] == 0){
417 SCCs <- auxSCC(i,SCCs ,arcs)}}
418 order <- SCCs$indN[3,]
419 NS <- max(order)
420 arcsS <- matrix(0,NS,NS)
421 rownames(arcsS) <- c(1:max(order))
422 colnames(arcsS) <- c(1:max(order))
423 for(i in N){
424 for(j in colnames(arcs)[arcs[i,] != 0]){
425 if(order[i] != order[j]){
426 arcsS[order[i],order[j]] <- 1}}}
427 orderS <- orderN(arcsS)
428 ind <- 1
429 aux <- order
430 for(i in orderS){
431 order[aux == i] <- ind
432 ind <- ind + 1}
433 return(order)}
435 # Proper ID check:
436 # Input -- id (object) - ID
437 # Output -- proper (boolean) - TRUE if ID proper
439 propID <- function(id){
440 proper <- TRUE
441 # Orientation
442 if(length(id$V) != 1){
443 proper <- FALSE
444 cat(’\n ID is not oriented \n\n’)
445 return(proper)}
446 # Value node ’s successors
447 if(sum(id$A[id$V,]) != 0){
448 proper <- FALSE
449 cat(’\n Value node with sucessors \n\n’)
450 return(proper)}
451 # Cycles
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452 w <- orderN(id$A)
453 if(length(w) != id$n){
454 proper <- FALSE
455 return(proper)}
456 # No-forgetting arcs
457 wD <- w[w %in% id$D]
458 for(i in wD){
459 wD <- wD[wD != i]
460 if(length(wD) != sum(id$A[i,wD])){
461 proper <- FALSE
462 cat(’\n ID lacks some no -forgetting arcs \n\n’)
463 return(proper)}}
464 return(proper)}
466 # Modified Bayes -Ball:
467 # Input -- id (object) - ID
468 # dec (array) - Decisions
469 # Output -- relev (matrix) - Relevance graph for ID
471 bayesBall <- function(id,dec){
472 relev <- matrix(0,length(dec),length(id$D))
473 rownames(relev) <- dec; colnames(relev) <- id$D
474 wD <- orderN(id$A)
475 decD <- rev(wD[wD %in% id$D])
476 obs = NULL
477 for(i in decD){
478 J <- c(id$V,obs)
479 K <- c(i,rownames(id$A)[id$A[,i] == 1])
480 vis <- NULL; top <- NULL; bot <- NULL
481 child <- J; parent <- NULL
482 while(length(child) + length(parent) > 0){
483 if(length(child) > 0){
484 j <- child [1]
485 child <- child[child != j]
486 vis <- c(vis[vis != j],j)
487 if(!j %in% K){
488 if(!j %in% top){
489 top <- c(top ,j)
490 for(k in rownames(id$A)){
491 if(id$A[k,j] == 1){
492 child <- c(child[child != k],k)}}}
493 if(!j %in% bot){
494 bot <- c(bot ,j)
495 for(k in colnames(id$A)){
496 if(id$A[j,k] == 1){
497 parent <- c(parent[parent != k],k)}}}}}
498 else{
499 j <- parent [1]
500 parent <- parent[parent != j]
501 vis <- c(vis[vis != j],j)
502 if((j %in% K) & (!j %in% top)){
503 top <- c(top ,j)
504 for(k in rownames(id$A)){
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505 if(id$A[k,j] == 1){
506 child <- c(child[child != k],k)}}}
507 if((!j %in% K) & (!j %in% bot)){
508 bot <- c(bot ,j)
509 for(k in colnames(id$A)){
510 if(id$A[k,j] == 1){
511 parent <- c(parent[parent != k],k)}}}}}
512 obs <- vis[vis %in% K]
513 for(j in dec){
514 if(j %in% top){
515 relev[j,i] <- 1}}}
516 return(relev)}
518 # Relevance graph generator from BAID:
519 # Input -- baid (object) - BAID
520 # Output -- relev (matrix) - Relevance graph (NULL not proper)
522 genRelev <- function(baid){
523 idD <- genID(baid ,1)
524 idA <- genID(baid ,2)
525 if(!propID(idD) | !propID(idA)) return(NULL)
526 dec <- c(idD$D,idA$D)
527 relevD <- bayesBall(idD ,dec)
528 relevA <- bayesBall(idA ,dec)
529 relev <- cbind(relevD ,relevA)
530 return(relev)}
532 # Chance node removal:
533 # Input -- id (object) - ID
534 # v (char) - Chance node to be removed
535 # Output -- idR (object) - Reduced ID and reduction
537 chance <- function(id ,v){
538 idR <- list(); idR$id <- list(); idR$red <- list()
539 idR$id$n <- id$n - 1
540 idR$id$D <- id$D
541 idR$id$C <- id$C[!id$C %in% v]
542 idR$id$V <- id$V
543 idR$id$A <- id$A[!rownames(id$A) %in% v,
544 !colnames(id$A) %in% v]
545 idR$id$A[names(which(id$A[,v] == 1)),id$V] <- 1
546 idR$id$f <- id$f[!names(id$f) %in% v]
547 idR$red$type <- "c"
548 idR$red$node <- v
549 idR$id$f[[idR$id$V]][["0"]] <- function (){
550 varO <- sortN(names(which(id$A[,id$V] == 1)))
551 varP <- sortN(names(which(id$A[,v] == 1)))
552 fV <- id$f[[id$V]][["0"]]()
553 f <- function(x){
554 names(x) <- sortN(names(which(idR$id$A[,idR$id$V] == 1)))
555 if(length(varP) > 0){
556 fv <- id$f[[v]][["0"]](x[varP])}
557 else{
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558 fv <- id$f[[v]][["0"]]()}
559 faux <- function(z){
560 aux <- c(x[names(x) %in% varO],z)
561 names(aux)[length(aux)] <- v
562 aux <- aux[sortN(names(aux))]
563 return(fV(aux)*fv(z))}
564 val <- 0
565 if(id$f[[v]]$type == "d"){
566 for(z in id$f[[v]]$set){
567 val <- val + faux(z)}}
568 else{
569 for(z in seq(id$f[[v]]$set[1],id$f[[v]]$set[2],
570 id$f[[v]]$set [3])){
571 val <- val + faux(z)}}
572 return(val)}
573 return(f)}
574 return(idR)}
576 # Decision node removal:
577 # Input -- id (object) - ID
578 # v (char) - Decision node to be removed
579 # Output -- idR (object) - Reduced ID and reduction
581 decision <- function(id,v){
582 idR <- list(); idR$id <- list(); idR$red <- list()
583 idR$id$n <- id$n - 1
584 idR$id$D <- id$D[!id$D %in% v]
585 idR$id$C <- id$C
586 idR$id$V <- id$V
587 idR$id$A <- id$A[!rownames(id$A) %in% v,
588 !colnames(id$A) %in% v]
589 idR$id$f <- id$f[!names(id$f) %in% v]
590 idR$red$type <- "d"
591 idR$red$node <- v
592 if(idR$id$n > 1){
593 aux <- function(id){
594 if(length(c(idR$id$C,idR$id$D)) > 1){
595 return(min(rowSums(
596 idR$id$A[!rownames(idR$id$A) %in% idR$id$V,])))}
597 else{
598 return(sum(
599 idR$id$A[!rownames(idR$id$A) %in% idR$id$V,]))}}
600 while(aux(idR$id) == 0){
601 if(length(c(idR$id$C,idR$id$D)) > 1){
602 i <- names(which.min(rowSums(
603 idR$id$A[!rownames(idR$id$A) %in% idR$id$V,])))}
604 else{
605 i <- c(idR$id$C,idR$id$D)}
606 idR$id$n <- idR$id$n - 1
607 idR$id$D <- idR$id$D[idR$id$D != i]
608 idR$id$C <- idR$id$C[idR$id$C != i]
609 idR$id$A <- idR$id$A[!rownames(idR$id$A) %in% i,
610 !colnames(idR$id$A) %in% i]
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611 idR$id$f[[i]] <- NULL
612 if(idR$id$n == 1) break}
613 idR$id$f[[idR$id$V]][["0"]] <- function (){
614 varO <- sortN(names(which(id$A[,id$V] == 1)))
615 fV <- id$f[[id$V]][["0"]]()
616 f <- function(x){
617 names(x) <- sortN(names(which(
618 idR$id$A[,idR$id$V] == 1)))
619 faux <- function(z){
620 aux <- c(x[names(x) %in% varO],z)
621 names(aux)[length(aux)] <- v
622 aux <- aux[sortN(names(aux))]
623 return(fV(aux))}
624 valD <- NULL
625 numD <- 1
626 if(id$f[[v]]$type == "d"){
627 for(z in id$f[[v]]$set){
628 valD <- c(valD ,faux(z))
629 names(valD)[numD] <- z
630 numD <- numD + 1}}
631 else{
632 for(z in seq(id$f[[v]]$set[1],id$f[[v]]$set[2],
633 id$f[[v]]$set [3])){
634 valD <- c(valD ,faux(z))
635 names(valD)[numD] <- z
636 numD <- numD + 1}}
637 val <- max(valD)
638 return(val)}
639 return(f)}
640 idR$red$f <- function (){
641 varO <- sortN(names(which(id$A[,id$V] == 1)))
642 fV <- id$f[[id$V]][["0"]]()
643 f <- function(x){
644 names(x) <- sortN(names(which(
645 idR$id$A[,idR$id$V] == 1)))
646 val <- list()
647 faux <- function(z){
648 aux <- c(x[names(x) %in% varO],z)
649 names(aux)[length(aux)] <- v
650 aux <- aux[sortN(names(aux))]
651 return(fV(aux))}
652 valD <- NULL
653 numD <- 1
654 if(id$f[[v]]$type == "d"){
655 for(z in id$f[[v]]$set){
656 valD <- c(valD ,faux(z))
657 names(valD)[numD] <- z
658 numD <- numD + 1}}
659 else{
660 for(z in seq(id$f[[v]]$set[1],id$f[[v]]$set[2],
661 id$f[[v]]$set [3])){
662 valD <- c(valD ,faux(z))
663 names(valD)[numD] <- z
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664 numD <- numD + 1}}
665 val$eV <- max(valD)
666 val$dec <- as.numeric(names(which.max(valD)))
667 return(val)}
668 return(f)}}
669 else{
670 idR$id$f[[idR$id$V]][["0"]] <- function (){
671 fV <- id$f[[id$V]][["0"]]()
672 f <- function (){
673 valD <- NULL
674 numD <- 1
675 if(id$f[[v]]$type == "d"){
676 for(z in id$f[[v]]$set){
677 valD <- c(valD ,fV(z))
678 names(valD)[numD] <- z
679 numD <- numD + 1}}
680 else{
681 for(z in seq(id$f[[v]]$set[1],id$f[[v]]$set[2],
682 id$f[[v]]$set [3])){
683 valD <- c(valD ,fV(z))
684 names(valD)[numD] <- z
685 numD <- numD + 1}}
686 val <- max(valD)
687 return(val)}
688 return(f)}
689 idR$red$f <- function (){
690 fV <- id$f[[id$V]][["0"]]()
691 f <- function (){
692 val <- list()
693 valD <- NULL
694 numD <- 1
695 if(id$f[[v]]$type == "d"){
696 for(z in id$f[[v]]$set){
697 valD <- c(valD ,fV(z))
698 names(valD)[numD] <- z
699 numD <- numD + 1}}
700 else{
701 for(z in seq(id$f[[v]]$set[1],id$f[[v]]$set[2],
702 id$f[[v]]$set [3])){
703 valD <- c(valD ,fV(z))
704 names(valD)[numD] <- z
705 numD <- numD + 1}}
706 val$eV <- max(valD)
707 val$dec <- as.numeric(names(which.max(valD)))
708 return(val)}
709 return(f)}}
710 return(idR)}
712 # Arc inversion:
713 # Input -- id (object) - ID
714 # v (char) - Chance node to be inversed
715 # Output -- inv (object) - Inversed ID
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717 inverse <- function(id ,v){
718 inv <- id
719 suc = orderN(id$A)[orderN(id$A)
720 %in% names(which(id$A[v,id$C] == 1))]
721 for(i in suc){
722 inv$A[v,i] <- 0
723 inv$A[names(which(inv$A[,v] == 1)),i] <- 1
724 inv$A[names(which(inv$A[,i] == 1)),v] <- 1
725 inv$A[i,v] <- 1
726 inv$f[[i]][["0"]] <- function(y=
727 rep(0,length(which(inv$A[,i] == 1)))){
728 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(inv$A[,i] == 1)))
729 varO <- sortN(names(which(id$A[,i] == 1)))
730 varP <- sortN(names(which(id$A[,v] == 1)))
731 fv <- id$f[[v]][["0"]](y[varP])
732 f <- function(x){
733 faux <- function(z){
734 aux <- c(y[names(y) %in% varO],z)
735 names(aux)[length(aux)] <- v
736 aux <- aux[sortN(names(aux))]
737 fi <- id$f[[i]][["0"]]( aux)
738 return(id$f[[i]][["0"]](x)*fv(z))}
739 val <- 0
740 if(id$f[[v]]$type == "d"){
741 for(z in id$f[[v]]$set){
742 val <- val + faux(z)}}
743 else{
744 for(z in seq(id$f[[v]]$set[1],id$f[[v]]$set[2],
745 id$f[[v]]$set [3])){
746 val <- val + faux(z)}}
747 return(val)}
748 return(f)}
749 inv$f[[v]][["0"]] <- function(y=
750 rep(0,length(which(inv$A[,v] == 1)))){
751 names(y) <- sortN(names(which(inv$A[,v] == 1)))
752 varO <- sortN(names(which(id$A[,i] == 1)))
753 varN <- sortN(names(which(inv$A[,i] == 1)))
754 varP <- sortN(names(which(id$A[,v] == 1)))
755 f <- function(x){
756 aux <- c(y[names(u) %in% varO],x)
757 names(aux)[length(aux)] <- v
758 aux <- aux[sortN(names(aux))]
759 return(id$f[[i]][["0"]]( aux)(y[i])*
760 id$f[[v]][["0"]](y[varP])(x)/
761 inv$f[[i]][["0"]](y[!names(y) %in% i])(y[i]))}
762 return(f)}
763 id <- inv}
764 return(inv)}
766 # Shachter ’s procedure to evaluate IDs:
767 # Input -- id (object) - ID
768 # Output -- idR (object) - Reduced ID and reduction
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770 shachter <- function(id){
771 idR <- list()
772 if(length(id$C) > 1){
773 redC <- id$C[id$A[id$C,id$V] == 1 &
774 rowSums(id$A[id$C,]) == 1]}
775 else{
776 redC <- id$C[id$A[id$C,id$V] == 1 &
777 sum(id$A[id$C,]) == 1]}
778 if(length(redC) != 0){
779 idR <- chance(id ,redC [1])}
780 else {
781 redD <- NULL
782 for(i in id$D){
783 if(id$A[i,id$V] == 1){
784 if(all(names(which(id$A[,id$V] == 1))
785 %in% c(names(which(id$A[,i] == 1)),i))){
786 redD <- c(redD ,i)}}}
787 if(length(redD) != 0){
788 idR <- decision(id ,redD)}
789 else{
790 invC <- id$C[id$A[id$C,id$V] == 1 &
791 rowSums(id$A[id$C,c(id$D,id$V)]) == 1]
792 id <- inverse(id ,invC [1])
793 idR <- chance(id ,invC [1])}}
794 return(idR)}
796 # Include adversarial decision in ID:
797 # Input -- id (object) - ID
798 # v (char) - Adversarial decision to be updated
799 # rf (function) - Random decision function
800 # K (num) - Monte Carlo iterations
801 # Output -- idU (object) - Updated ID
803 advDec <- function(id ,v,rf ,K){
804 idU <- id
805 if(idU$f[[v]]$type == "c"){
806 idU$f[[v]]$type <- "d"
807 idU$f[[v]]$set <- seq(id$f[[v]]$set[1],id$f[[v]]$set[2],
808 id$f[[v]]$set [3])}
809 if(length(which(id$A[,v] == 1)) == 0){
810 prob <- rep(0,length(id$f[[v]]$set))
811 names(prob) <- id$f[[v]]$set
812 for(k in 1:K){
813 faux <- rf()
814 ind <- as.character(faux()$dec)
815 prob[ind] <- prob[ind] + 1}
816 prob <- prob/K
817 idU$f[[v]][["0"]] <- function (){
818 f <- function(x){
819 return(unname(prob[as.character(x)]))}
820 return(f)}}
821 else{
822 var <- sortN(names(which(id$A[,v] == 1)))
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823 sets <- list()
824 dims <- rep(0,length(var))
825 names(dims) <- var
826 for(i in var){
827 if(id$f[[i]]$type == "d"){
828 sets[[i]] <- id$f[[i]]$set}
829 else{
830 sets[[i]] <- seq(id$f[[i]]$set[1],id$f[[i]]$set[2],
831 id$f[[i]]$set [3])}
832 dims[i] <- length(sets[[i]])}
833 prob <- array(0, dim = c(length(id$f[[v]]$set),dims))
834 dimnames(prob)[[1]] <- id$f[[v]]$set
835 for(i in 2:( length(var)+1)){
836 dimnames(prob)[[i]] <- sets[[var[i -1]]]}
837 for(i in 1:prod(dims)){
838 y <- NULL
839 aux <- i
840 for(j in 1: length(var)){
841 r <- aux%%dims[j]
842 if(r > 0){
843 y <- c(y,sets[[var[j]]][r])
844 aux <- aux%/%dims[j] + 1}
845 else{
846 y <- c(y,sets[[var[j]]][ dims[j]])
847 aux <- aux%/%dims[j]}}
848 for(k in 1:K){
849 faux <- rf()
850 ind1 <- which(id$f[[v]]$set == faux(y)$dec)
851 ind <- ind1 + (i-1)*length(id$f[[v]]$set)
852 prob[ind] <- prob[ind] + 1}}
853 prob <- prob/K
854 idU$f[[v]][["0"]] <- function(y){
855 aux <- 1
856 for(i in length(var):1){
857 ind2 <- which.min(abs(sets[[var[i]]] - y[i]))
858 aux <- unname ((aux - 1)*dims[var[i]] + ind2)}
859 f <- function(x){
860 ind1 <- which(id$f[[v]]$set == x)
861 ind <- ind1 + (aux -1)*length(id$f[[v]]$set)
862 return(prob[ind])}
863 return(f)}}
864 return(idU)}
866 # Acyclic case computation algorithm:
867 # Input -- baid (object) - BAID (acyclic relevance graph)
868 # ordSCC (array) - SCC for each node (num. ordered)
869 # K (num) - Monte Carlo iterations
870 # Output -- value (object) - Expected value and decisions
872 acAlg <- function(baid ,ordSCC ,K){
873 idD <- genID(baid ,1)
874 idA <- genID(baid ,2)
875 value <- list(); value$D <- list(); value$A <- list()
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876 for(i in 1: length(ordSCC)){
877 v <- names(which(ordSCC == i))
878 if(v %in% baid$D[1,]){
879 while(v %in% idD$D){
880 idR <- shachter(idD)
881 idD <- idR$id}
882 value$D[[idR$red$node]] <- idR$red$f()}
883 else{
884 while(v %in% idA$D){
885 idR <- shachter(idA)
886 idA <- idR$id}
887 idD <- advDec(idD ,idR$red$node ,idR$red$f,K)
888 value$A[[idR$red$node]] <- idD$f[[idR$red$node ]][["0"]]}}
889 return(value)}
891 # Cyclic case computation algorithm:
892 # Input -- baid (object) - BAID (cyclic relevance graph)
893 # ordSCC (array) - SCC for each node (num. ordered)
894 # K (num) - Monte Carlo iterations
895 # Output -- value (object) - Expected value and decisions
897 cAlg <- function(baid ,ordSCC ,K){
898 idD <- genID(baid ,1)
899 idA <- genID(baid ,2)
900 ordN <- rev(orderN(baid$A))
901 value <- list(); value$D <- list(); value$A <- list()
902 for(i in 1:max(ordSCC)){
903 nod <- ordN[ordN %in% names(which(ordSCC == i))]
904 for(v in nod[nod %in% idA$D]){
905 while(v %in% idA$D){
906 idR <- shachter(idA)
907 idA <- idR$id}
908 idD <- advDec(idD ,idR$red$node ,idR$red$f,K)
909 value$A[[idR$red$node]] <- idD$f[[idR$red$node ]][["0"]]}
910 for(v in nod[nod %in% idD$D]){
911 while(v %in% idD$D){
912 idR <- shachter(idD)
913 idD <- idR$id}
914 value$D[[idR$red$node]] <- idR$red$f()}}
915 return(value)}
917 ## COMPUTATION #################################################
919 # Start time:
921 sTime <- Sys.time()
923 # Seed for random variables:
925 set.seed (12345)
927 # Determine relevance graph:
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929 R <- genRelev(B)
931 # Solve with appropriate algorithm:
933 if(length(R) == 0){
934 stop("BAID is not proper")
935 }else{
936 ordSCC <- orderS(R)
937 if(length(ordSCC) == max(ordSCC)){
938 cat(’\n Relevance graph is acyclic \n\n’)
939 value <- acAlg(B,ordSCC ,K)}
940 else{
941 cat(’\n Relevance graph is cyclic \n\n’)
942 value <- cAlg(B,ordSCC ,K)}}
944 # Computational time:
946 cTime <- Sys.time() - sTime
948 ## OUTPUT ######################################################
950 # Defender ’s optimal decisions and expected values:
952 cat(’\n Optimal decisions:’,
953 ’\n\n Decision D1 -> ’,
954 value$D[["1"]]()$dec , ’/ Exp. Val =’,
955 format(value$D[["1"]]()$eV ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
956 ’\n\n Decision D2 (D1 = 0, S1 = 0, A2 = 0) -> ’,
957 value$D[["4"]](c(0,0,0))$dec , ’/ Exp. Val =’,
958 format(value$D[["4"]](c(0,0,0))$eV ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
959 ’\n Decision D2 (D1 = 0, S1 = 0, A2 = 1) -> ’,
960 value$D[["4"]](c(0,0,1))$dec , ’/ Exp. Val =’,
961 format(value$D[["4"]](c(0,0,1))$eV ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
962 ’\n Decision D2 (D1 = 0, S1 = 0.5, A2 = 1) -> ’,
963 value$D[["4"]](c(0 ,0.5,1))$dec , ’/ Exp. Val =’,
964 format(value$D[["4"]](c(0,0.5 ,1))$eV ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
965 ’\n Decision D2 (D1 = 0, S1 = 1, A2 = 1) -> ’,
966 value$D[["4"]](c(0,1,1))$dec , ’/ Exp. Val =’,
967 format(value$D[["4"]](c(0,1,1))$eV ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
968 ’\n Decision D2 (D1 = 1, S1 = 0, A2 = 0) -> ’,
969 value$D[["4"]](c(1,0,0))$dec , ’/ Exp. Val =’,
970 format(value$D[["4"]](c(1,0,0))$eV ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
971 ’\n Decision D2 (D1 = 1, S1 = 0, A2 = 1) -> ’,
972 value$D[["4"]](c(1,0,1))$dec , ’/ Exp. Val =’,
973 format(value$D[["4"]](c(1,0,1))$eV ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
974 ’\n Decision D2 (D1 = 1, S1 = 0.5, A2 = 1) -> ’,
975 value$D[["4"]](c(1 ,0.5,1))$dec , ’/ Exp. Val =’,
976 format(value$D[["4"]](c(1,0.5 ,1))$eV ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
977 ’\n Decision D2 (D1 = 1, S1 = 1, A2 = 1) -> ’,
978 value$D[["4"]](c(1,1,1))$dec , ’/ Exp. Val =’,
979 format(value$D[["4"]](c(1,1,1))$eV ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
980 ’\n\n’)
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982 # Attack probabilities:
984 cat(’\n Attack probabilities (0 / 1):’,
985 ’\n\n Action A1 -> ’,
986 format(value$A[["2"]]() (0),digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
987 format(value$A[["2"]]() (1),digits=3,nsmall =3),
988 ’\n\n Action A2 (D1 = 0, A1 = 0) -> ’,
989 format(value$A[["5"]](c(0,0))(0),digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
990 format(value$A[["5"]](c(0,0))(1),digits=3,nsmall =3),
991 ’\n Action A2 (D1 = 0, A1 = 1) -> ’,
992 format(value$A[["5"]](c(0,1))(0),digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
993 format(value$A[["5"]](c(0,1))(1),digits=3,nsmall =3),
994 ’\n Action A2 (D1 = 1, A1 = 0) -> ’,
995 format(value$A[["5"]](c(1,0))(0),digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
996 format(value$A[["5"]](c(1,0))(1),digits=3,nsmall =3),
997 ’\n Action A2 (D1 = 1, A1 = 1) -> ’,
998 format(value$A[["5"]](c(1,1))(0),digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
999 format(value$A[["5"]](c(1,1))(1),digits=3,nsmall =3),
1000 ’\n\n’)
1002 # Computational time:
1004 cat(’\n Time difference of’, format(cTime ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
1005 ’\n\n’)
B.2 Concept uncertainty (MATLAB)
1 %% SETTINGS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
3 % Monte Carlo iterations:
5 K = 10^4;
7 % Average data -stream rate ’s integration bounds:
9 boundT = [-10^3 10^3];
11 % Observations ’ integration bounds:
13 boundX = [-10^3 10^3];
15 %% INPUT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
17 % Attacker ’s choices:
19 a = [-25 0];
21 % Defender ’s assessment of attacker ’s parameters [lower upper ]:
22 % mu - Average data -stream bitrate
23 % sigma - Standard deviation data -stream rate
24 % rho - Standard deviation observations
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25 % d - Defender ’s decision range
26 % alpha - Effort cost
27 % beta - Misestimation benefit
29 mu = [175 225];
30 sigma = [20 30];
31 rho = [5 15];
32 d = [-10 10];
33 alpha = [3 5];
34 beta = [-0.3 -0.1];
36 param = [mu; sigma; rho; d; alpha; beta];
38 %% COMPUTATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
40 % Start time:
42 tic
44 % Seed for random variables:
46 rng (12345)
48 % Attack probabilities simulation (Bayesian adversary):
50 prob = simBay(a,param ,K,boundT ,boundX);
52 % Computational time:
54 cTime = toc;
56 %% OUTPUT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
58 % Attack probabilities (Bayesian adversary):
60 fprintf(’\n’)
61 disp(’Attack probabilities (Bayesian adversary):’)
62 fprintf(’\n’)
63 disp([’Action ’, num2str(prob (1,1),’%.0f’), ...
64 ’ -> ’, num2str(prob (1,3)/100,’%.3f’)])
65 disp([’Action ’, num2str(prob (2,1),’%.0f’), ...
66 ’ -> ’, num2str(prob (2,3)/100,’%.3f’)])
68 % Computational time:
70 fprintf(’\n’)
71 disp([’Time difference of ’, num2str(cTime ,’%.3f’), ’ secs’])
72 fprintf(’\n’)
74 %% FUNCTIONS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
76 % Attack probabilities simulation (Bayesian adversary):
77 % Input -- a (array) - Attacker ’s choices
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78 % param (matrix) - Attacker ’s parameters
79 % K (num) - Monte Carlo iterations
80 % boundT (array) - Theta integration bounds
81 % boundX (array) - X integration bounds
82 % Output -- prob (matrix) - Attack probabilities
84 function prob = simBay(a,param ,K,boundT ,boundX)
85 prob = zeros(1,K);
86 for i = 1:K
87 mu = unifrnd(param (1,1),param (1,2));
88 sigma = unifrnd(param (2,1),param (2,2));
89 rho = unifrnd(param (3,1),param (3,2));
90 dl = param (4,1); du = param (4,2);
91 alpha = unifrnd(param (5,1),param (5,2));
92 beta = unifrnd(param (6,1),param (6,2));
93 prob(i) = a(1);
94 val1 = val(a(1));
95 for j = 2: length(a)
96 val2 = val(a(j));
97 if(val2 < val1)
98 prob(i) = a(j);
99 val1 = val2;
100 end
101 end
102 end
103 prob = tabulate(prob);
104 function w = val(y)
105 f = @auxInt;
106 w = integral2(f,boundX (1),boundX (2),boundT (1),boundT (2));
107 function z = auxInt(x,t)
108 z1 = 1/( rho*sqrt (2*pi))*exp(-(x-(t+y)).^2/(2* rho ^2));
109 z2 = 1/( sigma*sqrt (2*pi))*exp(-(t-mu).^2/(2* sigma ^2));
110 z3 = alpha*(du -dl)*abs(y) ...
111 + beta /3*((x+du-t).^3-(x+dl-t).^3);
112 z = z1.*z2.*z3;
113 end
114 end
115 end
B.3 Adversarial hypothesis testing (R)
1 ## SETTINGS ####################################################
3 # Required libraries:
5 library(gtools)
6 library(rootSolve)
8 # Monte Carlo iterations:
10 K <- 10^5
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12 # Observation ’s integration upper bound:
14 boundX <- 500
16 ## INPUT #######################################################
18 # Hypotheses:
20 theta <- c(2,1)
22 # Non -adversarial attack probabilities:
24 probNoadv <- c(1/2,1/6,1/3)
25 names(probNoadv) <- c("a0","a1","a2")
27 ## FUNCTIONS ###################################################
29 # Attack probabilities simulation (AHT problem):
30 # Input -- theta (array) - Hypotheses
31 # K (num) - Monte Carlo iterations
32 # boundX (num) - X integration upper bound
33 # Output -- prob (array) - Attack probabilities
35 simAHT <- function(theta ,K,boundX){
36 prob <- rep(0,3)
37 names(prob) <- c("a0","a1","a2")
38 piA <- rep(0,2)
39 sigma <- rep(0,2)
40 alpha <- rep(0,2)
41 beta <- rep(0,2)
42 f1 <- function(x){
43 dgamma(x, shape = alpha[1], rate = beta [1])}
44 f2 <- function(x){
45 dgamma(x, shape = alpha[2], rate = beta [2])}
46 eps <- rep(0,3)
47 g <- function(y){
48 1/(1 + 2*
49 (eps[1]*exp(-2*y) + eps[2]*exp(-y) + eps[3]*exp(-4*y))/
50 (eps[1]*exp(-y) + eps[2]*exp(-y/2) + eps[3]*exp(-2*y)))}
51 cA <- 0
52 cost1 <- function(x){
53 piA[1]*(1-g(x))*f1(x) + cA*piA[2]*g(x)*f2(x)}
54 cost2 <- function(x){
55 piA[1]*(1-g(2*x))*f1(x) + cA*piA[2]*g(2*x)*f2(x)}
56 cost3 <- function(x){
57 piA[1]*(1-g(x/2))*f1(x) + cA*piA[2]*g(x/2)*f2(x)}
58 psiA <- rep(0,3)
59 jOpt <- 0
60 for(k in 1:K){
61 piA[2] <- runif(1, min = 1/4, max = 3/4)
62 piA[1] <- 1 - piA[2]
63 sigma <- runif(2, min = 1/2, max = 2)
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64 alpha <- theta ^2/sigma
65 beta <- theta/sigma
66 eps <- rdirichlet (1, alpha = c(1,1,1))
67 cA <- runif(1, min = 1/2, max = 1)
68 psiA [1] <- try(integrate(cost1 , lower = 0,
69 upper = boundX)$value , silent = TRUE)
70 psiA [2] <- try(integrate(cost2 , lower = 0,
71 upper = boundX)$value , silent = TRUE)
72 psiA [3] <- try(integrate(cost3 , lower = 0,
73 upper = boundX)$value , silent = TRUE)
74 jOpt <- suppressWarnings(which.min(psiA))
75 prob[jOpt] <- prob[jOpt] + 1}
76 return(prob/K)}
78 # Defender ’s condition for d0 (AHT problem):
79 # Input -- y (num) - Observed data
80 # theta (array) - Hypotheses
81 # prob (array) - Attack probabilities
82 # Output -- cond (num) - Evaluated condition (d0 if <=0)
84 condAHT <- function(y,theta ,prob){
85 cond = ( 1/2*( prob [1]*exp(-theta [2]*y)
86 + prob [2]*exp(-theta [2]*y/2)
87 + prob [3]*exp(-theta [2]*2*y))
88 - 3/4*( prob [1]*exp(-theta [1]*y)
89 + prob [2]*exp(-theta [1]*y/2)
90 + prob [3]*exp(-theta [1]*2*y)))
91 return(cond)}
93 ## COMPUTATION #################################################
95 # Start time:
97 sTime <- Sys.time()
99 # Seed for random variables:
101 set.seed (12345)
103 # Non -adversarial defender ’s optimal condition:
105 obsNoadv <- uniroot.all(
106 function(y){condAHT(y,theta ,probNoadv)},c(0,boundX))
108 # Adversarial defender ’s optimal condition:
110 probAdv <- simAHT(theta ,K,boundX)
111 obsAdv <- uniroot.all(
112 function(y){condAHT(y,theta ,probAdv)},c(0,boundX))
114 # Computational time:
116 cTime <- Sys.time() - sTime
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118 ## OUTPUT ######################################################
120 # Non -adversarial defender ’s optimal condition:
122 cat(’\n Non -adversarial defender optimal condition:’,
123 ’\n\n Choose d0 if observation less or equal than’,
124 format(obsNoadv ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
125 ’\n\n’)
127 # Non -adversarial attack probabilities:
129 cat(’\n Non -adversarial attack probabilities:’,
130 ’\n\n Action a0 -> ’,
131 format(probNoadv["a0"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
132 ’\n Action a1 -> ’,
133 format(probNoadv["a1"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
134 ’\n Action a2 -> ’,
135 format(probNoadv["a2"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
136 ’\n\n’)
138 # Adversarial defender ’s optimal condition:
140 cat(’\n Adversarial defender optimal condition:’,
141 ’\n\n Choose d0 if observation less or equal than’,
142 format(obsAdv ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
143 ’\n\n’)
145 # Adversarial attack probabilities:
147 cat(’\n Adversarial attack probabilities:’,
148 ’\n\n Action a0 -> ’,
149 format(probAdv["a0"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
150 ’\n Action a1 -> ’,
151 format(probAdv["a1"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
152 ’\n Action a2 -> ’,
153 format(probAdv["a2"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
154 ’\n\n’)
156 # Computational time:
158 cat(’\n Time difference of’, format(cTime ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
159 ’\n\n’)
B.4 Batch acceptance model (R)
1 ## SETTINGS ####################################################
3 # Required libraries:
5 library(gtools)
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7 # Maximum number of injected items:
9 Y1 <- 4
11 # Maximum observed batch size:
13 N <- 8
15 # Monte Carlo iterations:
17 K <- 10^3
19 # Dirichlet process iterations:
21 DP <- 500
23 # Average reception rate ’s integration upper bound:
25 boundG <- 500
27 ## INPUT #######################################################
29 # Batch acceptante parameters:
31 batch <- list()
33 # Defender ’s parameters:
34 # gamma - Reception rate parameters (Gamma distribution)
35 # theta - Acceptability parameters (Beta distribution)
36 # c - Expected opportunity costs
38 batch$theta <- c(9,1)
39 batch$gamma <- c(5,1)
40 batch$c <- 0.90
42 # Defender ’s assessment of attacker ’s parameters:
43 # f1 - Expected A-fault injection cost
44 # f2 - Expected A-fault modification cost
45 # g - Expected A-fault gain
46 # h - Expected O-fault gain
47 # rho - Acceptability conc. parameter (Dirichlet process)
49 batch$f1 <- c(0.25 ,0.50)
50 batch$f2 <- c(0.30 ,0.60)
51 batch$g <- c(0.80 ,1.00)
52 batch$h <- c(0.00 ,0.25)
53 batch$rho <- 100
55 ## FUNCTIONS ###################################################
57 # Attacker ’s distribution over defences given batch size:
58 # Input -- n (num) - Batch size
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59 # batch (list) - Defender ’s assumptions
60 # Output -- pD0 (num) - Simulated acceptance probability
62 simD0 <- function(n,batch){
63 bound <- rep(1,2)
64 if(n > 0){
65 avg <- 1
66 for(k in 0:(n-1)){
67 avg <- avg*(batch$theta [1]+k)/(sum(batch$theta)+k)}
68 aux <- batch$theta [2]/(2*(batch$theta [1]+n)+batch$theta [2])
69 bound [1] <- avg*(1-aux)/2
70 bound [2] <- avg*(1+aux)/2}
71 pD0 <- runif(1, min = bound[1], max = bound [2])
72 return(pD0)}
74 # Theta ’s Dirichlet process:
75 # Input -- batch (list) - Defender ’s assumptions
76 # DP (num) - Dirichlet process iterations
77 # Output -- thetaP (array) - Theta (names) & prob (value)
79 thetaDP <- function(batch ,DP){
80 theta <- rbeta(1, shape1 = batch$theta [1],
81 shape2 = batch$theta [2])
82 thetaP <- table(theta)
83 pr <- NULL
84 aux <- 0
85 for(i in 2:DP){
86 pr <- thetaP/(batch$rho +1)
87 if(length(thetaP) > 1){
88 for(j in 2: length(thetaP)){
89 pr[j] <- pr[j] + pr[j -1]}}
90 aux <- runif(1, min = 0, max = 1)
91 if(aux > pr[length(pr)]){
92 theta <- c(theta ,
93 rbeta(1, shape1 = batch$theta [1],
94 shape2 = batch$theta [2]))}
95 else{
96 theta <- c(theta ,as.numeric(names(which.min(
97 pr[pr >= aux]))))}
98 thetaP <- table(theta)}
99 return(thetaP/DP)}
101 # Attack probabilities simulation (batch acceptance):
102 # Input -- m (num) - Batch size
103 # batch (list) - Defender ’s assumptions
104 # Y1 (num) - Maximum number of injected items
105 # K (num) - Monte Carlo iterations
106 # DP (num) - Dirichlet process iterations
107 # Output -- prob (matrix) - Attack probabilities
108 # (1st col = y2=0 / 2nd col = y2=m)
110 simBatch <- function(m,batch ,Y1,K,DP){
111 prob <- matrix(0,Y1+1,2)
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112 rownames(prob) <- c(0:Y1); colnames(prob) <- c(0,m)
113 f1 <- 0
114 f2 <- 0
115 g <- 0
116 h <- 0
117 thetaP <- NULL
118 pD0 <- rep(0,Y1+1)
119 psiA <- matrix(0,Y1+1,m+1)
120 yOpt <- 0
121 for(k in 1:K){
122 h <- runif(1, min = batch$h[1], max = batch$h[2])
123 g <- runif(1, min = batch$g[1], max = batch$g[2])
124 f1 <- runif(1, min = batch$f1[1], max = batch$f1[2])
125 f2 <- runif(1, min = batch$f2[1], max = batch$f2[2])
126 if(m > 0){
127 thetaP <- thetaDP(batch ,DP)
128 intTheta <- 0
129 for(t in names(thetaP)){
130 sumX = 0
131 for(x in 0:m){
132 sumX <- sumX + (m-x)*dbinom(x, size = m,
133 prob = as.numeric(t))}
134 intTheta <- intTheta + sumX*unname(thetaP[t])}
135 for(y1 in 0:Y1){
136 pD0[y1+1] <- simD0(m+y1 ,batch)
137 for(y2 in 0:1){
138 psiA[y1+1,y2+1] <- ( y1*(f1 -g*pD0[y1+1])
139 + y2*(f2 -g*pD0[y1+1])*m
140 - h*(1-y2)*pD0[y1+1]*intTheta)}}}
141 else{
142 for(y1 in 0:Y1){
143 pD0[y1+1] <- simD0(m+y1 ,batch)
144 psiA[y1+1,1] <- y1*(f1 -g*pD0[y1+1])}}
145 yOpt <- which.min(psiA)
146 prob[yOpt] <- prob[yOpt] + 1}
147 return(prob/K)}
149 # Defender ’s batch acceptance:
150 # Input -- batch (list) -- Defender ’s assumptions
151 # Y1 (num) - Maximum number of injected items
152 # N (num) - Maximum observed batch size
153 # K (num) - Monte Carlo iterations
154 # DP (num) - Dirichlet process iterations
155 # boundG (num) - Gamma integration upper bound
156 # Output -- accept (object) - Acceptance per size and info.
158 acceptBatch <- function(batch ,Y1,N,K,DP,boundG){
159 accept <- list()
160 accept$cond <- array(0,N+1,list (0:N))
161 accept$val <- array(0,N+1,list (0:N))
162 accept$prob <- list()
163 cond <- array(0,N+1,list (0:N))
164 prob <- matrix(0,N+1,N+1)
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165 prob0 <- rep(0,N+1)
166 aux <- NULL
167 for(i in 0:N){
168 aux <- simBatch(i,batch ,Y1 ,K,DP)
169 accept$prob[[as.character(i)]] <- aux
170 for(j in i:min(i+Y1 ,N)){
171 prob[i+1,j+1] <- sum(aux[j-i+1,])}
172 prob0[i+1] <- aux["0","0"]}
173 ETheta <- rep(1,N+1)
174 if(N > 0){
175 for(i in 0:(N-1)){
176 ETheta[i+2] <- ETheta[i+1]*(batch$theta [1]+i)/
177 (sum(batch$theta)+i)}}
178 EGamma <- rep(0,N+1)
179 for(i in 0:N){
180 pGamma <- function(g){
181 sum = 0
182 for(j in 0:i){
183 sum = sum + dpois(j, lambda = g)*prob[j+1,i+1]}
184 pG <- dgamma(g, shape = batch$gamma[1],
185 rate = batch$gamma [2])
186 return(dpois(i, lambda = g)*pG/sum)}
187 EGamma[i+1] <- try(integrate(pGamma , lower = 0,
188 upper = M)$value ,silent = TRUE)}
189 EGamma <- as.numeric(EGamma)
190 for(i in 0:N){
191 if(prob0[i+1] > 0){
192 cond[i+1] <- ( 1/(1+ batch$c)
193 - EGamma[i+1]*ETheta[i+1]*prob0[i+1])}
194 else{
195 cond[i+1] <- 1/(1+ batch$c)}}
196 accept$val <- 1/(1+ batch$c) - cond
197 accept$cond <- cond <= 0
198 return(accept)}
200 ## COMPUTATION #################################################
202 # Start time:
204 sTime <- Sys.time()
206 # Seed for random variables:
208 set.seed (12345)
210 # Defender ’s batch acceptance:
212 accept <- acceptBatch(batch ,Y1 ,N,K,DP ,boundG)
214 # End and computing time:
216 cTime <- Sys.time() - sTime
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218 ## OUTPUT ######################################################
220 # Defender ’s optimal acceptance per size:
222 cat(’\n Defender optimal acceptance:’,
223 ’\n\n Size 0 -> ’, accept$cond["0"],
224 ’\n Size 1 -> ’, accept$cond["1"],
225 ’\n Size 2 -> ’, accept$cond["2"],
226 ’\n Size 3 -> ’, accept$cond["3"],
227 ’\n Size 4 -> ’, accept$cond["4"],
228 ’\n Size 5 -> ’, accept$cond["5"],
229 ’\n Size 6 -> ’, accept$cond["6"],
230 ’\n Size 7 -> ’, accept$cond["7"],
231 ’\n Size 8 -> ’, accept$cond["8"],
232 ’\n\n’)
234 # Defender ’s optimal acceptance values:
236 cat(’\n Defender optimal acceptance values (q3):’,
237 ’\n\n Size 0 -> ’,
238 format(accept$val["0"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
239 ’\n Size 1 -> ’, format(accept$val["1"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
240 ’\n Size 2 -> ’, format(accept$val["2"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
241 ’\n Size 3 -> ’, format(accept$val["3"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
242 ’\n Size 4 -> ’, format(accept$val["4"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
243 ’\n Size 5 -> ’, format(accept$val["5"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
244 ’\n Size 6 -> ’, format(accept$val["6"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
245 ’\n Size 7 -> ’, format(accept$val["7"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
246 ’\n Size 8 -> ’, format(accept$val["8"],digits=3,nsmall =3),
247 ’\n\n’)
249 # Attack probabilities:
251 cat(’\n Attack probabilities:’,
252 ’\n\n Size 0 \n [y2 = 0] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
253 format(accept$prob[["0"]][1,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
254 format(accept$prob[["0"]][2,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
255 format(accept$prob[["0"]][3,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
256 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
257 format(accept$prob[["0"]][4,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
258 format(accept$prob[["0"]][5,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
259 ’\n\n Size 1 \n [y2 = 0] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
260 format(accept$prob[["1"]][1,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
261 format(accept$prob[["1"]][2,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
262 format(accept$prob[["1"]][3,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
263 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
264 format(accept$prob[["1"]][4,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
265 format(accept$prob[["1"]][5,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
266 ’\n [y2 = 1] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
267 format(accept$prob[["1"]][1,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
268 format(accept$prob[["1"]][2,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
269 format(accept$prob[["1"]][3,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
270 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
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271 format(accept$prob[["1"]][4,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
272 format(accept$prob[["1"]][5,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
273 ’\n\n Size 2 \n [y2 = 0] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
274 format(accept$prob[["2"]][1,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
275 format(accept$prob[["2"]][2,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
276 format(accept$prob[["2"]][3,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
277 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
278 format(accept$prob[["2"]][4,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
279 format(accept$prob[["2"]][5,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
280 ’\n [y2 = 2] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
281 format(accept$prob[["2"]][1,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
282 format(accept$prob[["2"]][2,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
283 format(accept$prob[["2"]][3,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
284 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
285 format(accept$prob[["2"]][4,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
286 format(accept$prob[["2"]][5,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
287 ’\n\n Size 3 \n [y2 = 0] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
288 format(accept$prob[["3"]][1,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
289 format(accept$prob[["3"]][2,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
290 format(accept$prob[["3"]][3,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
291 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
292 format(accept$prob[["3"]][4,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
293 format(accept$prob[["3"]][5,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
294 ’\n [y2 = 3] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
295 format(accept$prob[["3"]][1,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
296 format(accept$prob[["3"]][2,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
297 format(accept$prob[["3"]][3,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
298 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
299 format(accept$prob[["3"]][4,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
300 format(accept$prob[["3"]][5,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
301 ’\n\n Size 4 \n [y2 = 0] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
302 format(accept$prob[["4"]][1,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
303 format(accept$prob[["4"]][2,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
304 format(accept$prob[["4"]][3,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
305 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
306 format(accept$prob[["4"]][4,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
307 format(accept$prob[["4"]][5,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
308 ’\n [y2 = 4] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
309 format(accept$prob[["4"]][1,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
310 format(accept$prob[["4"]][2,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
311 format(accept$prob[["4"]][3,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
312 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
313 format(accept$prob[["4"]][4,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
314 format(accept$prob[["4"]][5,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
315 ’\n\n Size 5 \n [y2 = 0] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
316 format(accept$prob[["5"]][1,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
317 format(accept$prob[["5"]][2,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
318 format(accept$prob[["5"]][3,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
319 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
320 format(accept$prob[["5"]][4,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
321 format(accept$prob[["5"]][5,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
322 ’\n [y2 = 5] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
323 format(accept$prob[["5"]][1,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
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324 format(accept$prob[["5"]][2,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
325 format(accept$prob[["5"]][3,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
326 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
327 format(accept$prob[["5"]][4,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
328 format(accept$prob[["5"]][5,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
329 ’\n\n Size 6 \n [y2 = 0] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
330 format(accept$prob[["6"]][1,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
331 format(accept$prob[["6"]][2,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
332 format(accept$prob[["6"]][3,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
333 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
334 format(accept$prob[["6"]][4,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
335 format(accept$prob[["6"]][5,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
336 ’\n [y2 = 6] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
337 format(accept$prob[["6"]][1,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
338 format(accept$prob[["6"]][2,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
339 format(accept$prob[["6"]][3,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
340 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
341 format(accept$prob[["6"]][4,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
342 format(accept$prob[["6"]][5,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
343 ’\n\n Size 7 \n [y2 = 0] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
344 format(accept$prob[["7"]][1,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
345 format(accept$prob[["7"]][2,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
346 format(accept$prob[["7"]][3,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
347 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
348 format(accept$prob[["7"]][4,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
349 format(accept$prob[["7"]][5,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
350 ’\n [y2 = 7] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
351 format(accept$prob[["7"]][1,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
352 format(accept$prob[["7"]][2,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
353 format(accept$prob[["7"]][3,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
354 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
355 format(accept$prob[["7"]][4,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
356 format(accept$prob[["7"]][5,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
357 ’\n\n Size 8 \n [y2 = 0] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
358 format(accept$prob[["8"]][1,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
359 format(accept$prob[["8"]][2,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
360 format(accept$prob[["8"]][3,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
361 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
362 format(accept$prob[["8"]][4,1], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
363 format(accept$prob[["8"]][5,1], digits=3,nsmall =3),
364 ’\n [y2 = 8] y1 = 0 / y1 = 1 / y1 = 2 -> ’,
365 format(accept$prob[["8"]][1,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
366 format(accept$prob[["8"]][2,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
367 format(accept$prob[["8"]][3,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
368 ’\n y1 = 3 / y1 = 4 -> ’,
369 format(accept$prob[["8"]][4,2], digits=3,nsmall =3), ’/’,
370 format(accept$prob[["8"]][5,2], digits=3,nsmall =3),
371 ’\n\n’)
373 # Computational time:
375 cat(’\n Time difference of’, format(cTime ,digits=3,nsmall =3),
376 ’\n\n’)
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Abbreviations
AHT Adversarial Hypothesis Testing
ARA Adversarial Risk Analysis
ASDT Adversarial Statistical Decision Theory
BAID Bi-Agent Influence Diagram
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection
DG Differential Game
EW Electronic Warfare
ID Influence Diagram
MAID Multi-Agent Influence Diagram
PRI Pulse Repetition Interval
SCC Strongly Connected Component
SDG Stochastic Differential Game
SDT Statistical Decision Theory
Seq. A-D Sequential Attack-Defend
Seq. D-A Sequential Defend-Attack
Seq. D-A with PI Sequential Defend-Attack with Private Information
Seq. D-A-D Sequential Defend-Attack-Defend
Sim. D-A Simultaneous Defend-Attack
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(BA)IDs
Conditional arrow
Informational arrow
Defender’s decision node
Defender’s chance node
Defender’s chance node relative to an attacker’s choice
Defender’s utility node
Attacker’s decision node
Attacker’s chance node
Attacker’s chance node relative to a defender’s choice
Attacker’s utility node
Shared chance node
SCC
Selected decision node
Selected chance node
Selected chance node relative to an attacker’s choice
Selected chance node relative to a defender’s choice
Selected SCC
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